doi 10.26343/0585556X11001 STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNO-POLITYCZNE. SERIA NOWA
NR 1(10)/2019 ■ ISSN 0585-556X

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Raymond Taras
2019 Fulbright Distinguished Chair, Australian National University, Canberra, and Professor of Political Science, Tulane University, New Orleans[1]
ORCID: 0000-0001-7702-1262

RE-IMAGING NATIONHOOD: CONSOLIDATING NATIVIST AND IMMIGRANT SOCIAL BONDING

NATIONHOOD RE-THOUGHT

States are today demarcated less by the nation or nations living in them and more by the awareness of nationhood. Nationhood accepts that societies have become complex in an age of global migration. Diversity management has become a pivotal issue in the shift to nationhood. Managing difference singles out the way that a state derives legitimacy from how it incorporates its inhabitants. Rather than absolute loyalty by recent immigrants to the majority culture, which had previously entailed state policies aimed at assimilationism or monoculturalism, nationhood offers a viable alternative policy option in which a civic understanding on the part of a receiving society – its wish to construct an organic whole – replaces rigid, primordial, ethnic attitudes to the nation.

For Paul Collier, development economist at Oxford who writes on migration policy, „if a shared sense of national identity enhances the ability of people to cooperate at that level, it is doing something truly important" (Collier 2013: 2 and 18). This enhancement, which generates trust, social integration, and a sense of community belonging in a host society, is what I term nationhood.

To date, nations and nationhood have been used interchangeably and rarely as complimentary to or distinguishable from each other. Distinctions have focused on concepts of the state, state identity, nationalism, national identity, national character, patriotism and chauvinism. However it is rare that nation and nationhood are distinguishable; instead they become conflated. Given the

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[1] E-mail: taras@tulane.edu.
Acknowledgements are owed to two anonymous referees for their constructive critiques.

unprecedented diversity of immigrant societies today, nationhood deserves to have its own explicit meaning.

Nationhood suggests a communitarian perspective in which ethnically based nations, which include the products of several generations of mixed marriages and kinship affiliations, are bonded with more recent migrants in order to establish partnership. Belonging in a society becomes a more significant stage than citizenship since, frequently, belonging may be more difficult to achieve. In a sense, then, naturalization precedes the conveying of citizenship because the demanding part has been achieved. Post-ethnic nationhood produces deeper resonance and accord than mere banal nationalism. As Michael Billig wrote, banal nationalism typically serves as the pretext for mistreating foreigners whether in the host society or, through colonial exploitation, the migrant's home country (Billig 1995). It is far removed from a sense of nationhood.

Put differently, nationhood signifies the process of expanding the nation when otherwise different people now come to share some combination of language, religion, norms, values, faith, culture, identity and ideals. It is **not** constructed ethnically; unity out of diversity has become a cliché employed in many parts of the world but nationhood re-invents how this process works. It manages diversity so as to produce a felt, experienced, organic whole. What differentiates nationhood from related concepts is, then, enlarging the nation, interlocking it with new migrant arrivals, so that it comprises different but well-integrated ethnic parts[2] (Taras 2018).

REPUBLICANISM, TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

How similar to nationhood is the time-honored model of French republican citizenship? Its assumption is that, like nationhood, immigrants are well integrated into a secular francophone state. As individuals, they are treated equally, no better, no worse, than the French. Assimilation of immigrants is a cornerstone of the republican tradition in exchange for an abstract universalism of rights.

To be sure, this tradition allows for no injurious or positive discrimination – it does not countenance affirmative action. Without such assistance, immigrants are on their own even while needing to incorporate themselves in the re-

[2] A tripartite synthesis of nativists, migrants **and** Aboriginal indigenous First Peoples make up nationhood in my book. The latter component, often comprising the most discriminated-against population of any society that is denied basic land rights, requires separate treatment not feasible in this article.

publican ideal of a single people. Thus *assimilation républicaine* holds that the values of liberty, equality and fraternity require full insertion in French society.

Cultural assimilation follows from the principle that the French nation is based not on ethnic or racial exclusiveness but on citizenship, that is, membership in the national community. In theory, republicanism is composed of five fundamental components: equality before the law; individual emancipation understood as a rejection of communitarianism; a universal understanding of citizenship; secularism, that is, *laïcité*; and cultural assimilation.

But France has not implemented all elements of this model. In practice it has become a culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse society while formally committed to colour blindness. For Étienne Balibar, then, France's refusal to recognize any kind of foreignness – even of linguistic groups living in the Hexagon such as Alsace, Breton, Catalan and Occitan – demonstrates „a profound fear of a multicultural society and cultural *métissage*" (Balibar 1997: 327 and 328). The exclusionary rather than inclusionary character of republicanism becomes transparent, as opposed to the nationhood idea.

Nationhood is not as new or as radical an idea as it appears. It is a more liminal proposition than republicanism and is prepared to tweak policy so as to give up on notions of universalism while encouraging communitarianism and bonding across minority groups[3] (Levey 2019: 200–226). Nationhood insists on a sufficient degree of social integration so that nativists and migrants deepen their sense of belonging to one shared nation. It also questions whether race and ethnicity can be swept under the carpet; on the contrary, minorities *qua* minorities merit assistance by the state.

Trust and social capital are mainstays of communitarian networks. Collier underscores the importance of cooperation between locals and migrants, similar to the idea of nationhood: „By cooperating, people are able to provide public goods that would otherwise not be well supplied by a purely market process" (Collier 2013: 62). He used Robert Putnam's classic study of social capital that distinguished bonding social capital – the value assigned to social networks between **homogeneous** groups of people – and bridging capital which cuts across socially **heterogeneous** groups, for example, those based on race, class, or religion (Putnam 2000).

In an article arousing controversy, Putnam had linked the significance of trust to its impact on migrants. Not only did he find that mutual levels of trust were lowered when immigrant numbers increased, trust also declined **within** nativist populations – in other words, homogeneous groups of people – when immigrants had become numerous (Putnam 2009: 137–174). If this

[3] This resembles the Bristol school of multiculturalism.

was accurate, then we can infer that the correlation between trust and migrant numbers would destabilize emergent nationhood.

Collier adds a corollary to Putnam's thesis: „the higher the level of trust is on the part of the indigenous [nativist] population, not just regarding migrants but each other, the easier it is for migrants to integrate" (Collier 2013: 105). That is, immigrants succeed in forming attachments and having a stronger sense of belonging to a host society when locals trust them more. Cross-cultural bridging social capital can therefore forge links between the two aspirational partners.

It is not simply questions of trust that create obstacles for the nationhood project. Collier adds that, instead of viewing migration numbers as excessive, nativists single out how „unabsorbed diasporas are getting too large". He contends that dependent relatives joining their kin in host societies „will increasingly crowd out other would-be migrants as diaspora-fueled migration accelerates" (Collier 2013: 259 and 260).

Nationhood is unlikely to take hold when close-knit migrant communities attract greater migrant numbers, keep to themselves, focus on bonding rather than bridging capital, and prefer to practice cultures distinctive from nativists. „Precisely because their diasporas take longer to be absorbed [i.e. socially integrated] than the culturally proximate, these large diasporas facilitate further migration". Presumably they are now too large to get a fair share of the welfare pie in one country and have to move on to another one. Collier concludes that „It may prove unsustainable to combine rapid migration with multicultural policies that keep absorption rates low and welfare systems that are generous" (Collier 2013: 262 and 265).

The end result is that multiculturalism – a building block for fashioning nationhood – falls by the wayside. The vicious circle of arriving migrants procuring fewer benefits while driving down wages – the so-called race to the bottom – is exacerbated. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman lamented the fact that such people were on the road to leading wasted lives (Bauman 2003).

POLICY FEARS

So far I have considered nationhood in terms of immigrant-receiving societies located in the Western world that serve as magnets. These are not the societies that send, facilitate transit, or place a ban on migrants. Nevertheless in these societies significant attitudinal changes have occurred over the past decade, even earlier in some countries. Tallying election results is enough to demonstrate that there is blowback to admitting current numbers of immigrants. Purely

xenophobic and racist movements have sometimes taken over from anti-establishment political parties, although the two can have much in common.

The unprecedented scale and accelerating rates of migration have become causes for concern for parties not just of the right but also the left. Centrist parties have also „mainstreamed" immigration-skeptic views and have become rent-seeking entities. A ban on white supremacist groups using social media can help isolate them. But other forms of racism and xeno-racism – new categories of the uprooted, displaced and dispossessed who have the same skin colour as nativists – make categorizing racists difficult, especially with freedom-of-speech rights.

Government policies regulating migrant numbers are critical factors. But loopholes exist which undermine these policies, for example, immigration and recruitment „consultants" in host societies; work-and-study permits allowing abuse; and family unification programs that allow distant relatives to join them (so-called chain migration). Migration blowback can have many different sources.

A counterintuitive finding on migration policy is therefore timely. Dutch expert Ruud Koopmans claims that societies endorsing multicultural policies **retard** immigrant integration. All things being equal and holding labor market integration policies constant, multiculturalism causes migrants to learn the national language more slowly because the increasing size of diasporas slow language acquisition. He further found that generous welfare systems in particular societies can cause social integration to decrease since they would entice migrants to linger longer at the bottom of the social ladder (Koopmans 2010: 1–26).

Koopmans' quantitative analysis raises a number of questions. Does multiculturalism lead to lowering national-language proficiency among newly arrived immigrants? While this may be the case in Britain where a *laissez-faire* approach has led to marginalization in ethnic enclaves and even ghettoization, the French republican approach insists, at a minimum, that migrants learn French. Multicultural models have also differed from one country to another[4] (Taras 2013). Moreover, the effects reported by Koopmans can be explained by differences in the structure of migration, for example, humanitarian flows based on acceptance of large numbers of asylum seekers (Germany) compared to economic migration (Austria). To be sure, Koopmans controls for other factors and his sample size provides validity, so sophisticated research projects such as his offer valuable contributions to migration research.

[4] It compares eleven Europe-wide cases of multiculturalism including three notional ones – Poland, Russia and Turkey.

Sociologist Myron Weiner sketched a policy-based approach to migration many years ago. He introduced an informal „iron law of migration" which stated: „If there is a single «law» in migration, it is that a migration flow, once begun, induces its own flows". Chain migration follows (Weiner 1995: 21). Nationhood is jeopardized when host societies become aware that „the longer migration continues, the more difficult politically it is to stop it". Thus, nongovernmental organizations lobby to expand migrant rights and benefits, thereby promoting ever more immigration. With increased numbers, Weiner argued, „sustained high-level immigration retards and can even obstruct assimilation". We have two arguments, therefore, that caution how migration is not a problem in itself, only its persistent and elevated levels.

Based on Weiner's proposition, my hypothesis is that building nationhood becomes far fetched if migrant flows continue unabated. For whatever reason – economic, political, identitarian, or the reluctance of host society and newcomer population to adjust to each other – no degree of trust, social cohesion, or cooperation with each other can emerge if a government carries on without becoming a representative form of government (Taras 2019).

EUROCENTRIC BIASES

The cognates nation and nationhood suffer from a Eurocentric bias. They have been operationalised in European-based research projects but have also been transposed to make sense of non-Western states. British-based academics have a special penchant for employing the term nationhood (Grant 1991; Bell 1995; Hastings 1997; Schöpflin 1997; Canovan 1998; Lynch 1999; Davidson 2000; Kidd 2006; Kenney 2014).

What are some of the significant theories advanced when challenging received Western dogma on the nation? A possibility is that nationhood will be emancipated from serving as mere cognate of the nation. The conventional approach is to insist that secular multilingual societies in the West are treated as the products of centuries of political evolution guided by state institutions. Civic nationalism – a „big tent nationalism" inclusive of all denizens living within state borders – is thought to be the result of such processes unique to Western societies. But Azar Gat, an Israeli political scientist who may have first-hand experience of life in civilizations 3,000 years old, draws a contrast between civic and ethnic nationalisms:

> Ostensibly, civic nationalism is defined as belonging to a political community, state, and territory, whereas ethnic nationalism is based on a perception of blood relation and common descent. The civic nation has been identified with

> a benign Western European liberal model epitomized by Britain and France, whereas xenophobic ethnic nationalism supposedly characterized Central and Eastern Europe […]. This picture is largely misleading (Gat 2013: 260).

In Europe the nation dates back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the beginnings of the use of the vernacular, secularization and an end to religious domination, and the rise of a scientific revolution took place, though at different speeds and on separate registers for many countries. England is sometimes identified as God's first-born while as late as the nineteenth century Germany, Italy, Russia, and several other European colossi were still said to be in the throes of birth pangs (Greenfeld 1993). Are we measuring nations by the same criteria? Even if we are, do they have significance today?

Recent scholarship has returned to an old truth: very few nations are not connected to traditions and histories permeating their ethnicity and culture. Gat in particular is a leading proponent of *la longue durée* of nations. He contends that nationalism antedated modernity, nations are hardly recent formations, and they are not superficial or contrived, as some modernist experts on nationalism believe. He takes issue with instrumentalist approaches which claim that „leaders use the nation for their own purposes". Or with the social constructivist argument that „we imagine that there are such things as nations" (Gat 2017).

Ethnic and national sentiments are inscribed in human nature and are as ancient as human civilizations, Gat contends. Thus, „ethnic and national identities, though they are always in flux, are also among the most durable, and most potent, of human cultural forms. They often span centuries and even millennia". National sentiments of common identity, affinity, and solidarity long precede the modern era: „Ethnicity made the state and the state made ethnicity, in a reciprocal and dialectical process" (Gat 2013: 3).

Crucial for Gat is that nationhood emerges out of people's sense of culture and kinship. Kinship, not descent, is constitutive of ethnicity: „The key to the fusion of a shared ethnic identity, even in the absence of a belief in common descent, is extensive intermarriage among the founding groups and the adoption of a common culture. Over time these processes both turn the populations in question into self-perceived kin or a «community of blood»" (Gat 2013: 20).

The propensity to bond with genetic fellow travellers performs a deterministic function: „people tend to prefer closer kin, who share more genes with them, to more remote kin or strangers'" (Gat 2013: 27). Gat comes close to approximating my understanding of nationhood when he proposes the following dynamic: „civic nationalism **in particular** generates assimilation into the

ethnonational community […] not only to old ethnicities and nations, but also to new ones" (Gat 2013: 7).

These interlocking mechanisms are perceptible in immigration societies molded by processes of integration, hybridization, and amalgamation. Of critical importance is the exogenous marriage that blurs genetic lines and eventually becomes indistinguishable from indigenous marriage, „The more ethnic and national collectives integrate through marriages over generations and centuries the more they feel them to be a kin community" (Gat 2013: 38).

Shared common features are no guarantee that a sense of common nationhood will arise. Yet „In the vast majority of nations there are strong ties of common culture; and over time these ties also produce a perception of the nation as an extended family, if a sense of kinship did not exist from the outset" (Gat 2013: 311 and 349). It follows that an immigrant, once naturalized, joins the host nation even if she may preserve different markers of cultural distinctiveness. The kin-culture fusion will assure this.

Gat states explicitly, then, that „the perception of a common nationhood strongly correlates with shared kin-culture identity" (Gat 2013: 385). When societies are not segregated by ethnicity, language, or religion and are prepared to incorporate „strangers", it is on the path to nationhood. Citing Bauman, uninvited guests have always been strangers who strike anxiety and fear precisely because they are unknown (Bauman 2016). My iteration of nationhood is that, as a first step, such imaginings of strangers and the fears they project must be cast aside because shared kin-culture merits a more sympathetic understanding.

Renewed interest in the nationhood idea can be dated back to a book published in 1992. To be sure, the focus of Rogers Brubaker's study was on Europe, specifically, *Mitteleuropa.* His *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* groomed a cohort of academics fixated on distinguishing between ethnic and civic nationalism. They overlooked the nationhood idea to capture the relationship that receiving societies and recent migration influxes were forging. Brubaker himself largely consigned nationhood to the cognate – nation – as earlier generations had done.

Brubaker's approach examined the cultural and historical roots of what he termed nationhood in France and Germany. He concluded that the nation in France was associated with the institutional and territorial contours of the state; French writers therefore defined the nation as a form of political unity synonymous with *la République*. In Germany, by contrast, nationhood and citizenship were treated chiefly as ethno-cultural, grounded on common descent, bloodlines, and ancestry. In both cases nationhood was used to depict the two states' respective pathways to statehood (Brubaker 1992). He juxtaposed civic and ethnic approaches to membership in a nation: „If the French

understanding of nationhood has been state-centered and assimilationist, the German understanding has been Volk-centered and differentialist" (Brubaker 1992: 1). In sum, centuries-old traditions of nationhood in the two countries were fashioned by distinctive geographical, cultural, and political conditions.

Brubaker did not re-tool nationhood, then. The closest he came to inferring that migration represented a value-added element to the character of a host society was in his concept of „nationalizing nationalism". It claimed that formerly marginalized ethnic groups who had insisted on being treated as a core nationality could now take part in legitimate ownership of the state in which they lived.

Nearly two decades after publishing *Nationhood Reframed,* Brubaker revisited the notion of nationhood to underscore a different characteristic – its ability to mobilize people:

> Nationhood is not an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact; it is a political claim. It is a claim on people's loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity. If we understand nationhood not as fact but as claim, then we can see that „nation" is not a purely analytical category. It is not used to describe a world that exists independently of the language used to describe it. It is used, rather, to change the world, to change the way people see themselves, to mobilize loyalties, kindle energies, and articulate demands (Brubaker 2004: 116).

As a mobilizing political claim, nationhood might lead to „more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster **the integration of immigrants**" (Brubaker 2004: 115). It is this last characteristic of nationhood that I single out as the **defining** quality of nationhood.

Much earlier, sociologist Reinhard Bendix had regarded the extension of citizenship to members of ever-broadening communities, including migrants, as unavoidable. In 1977 he claimed that it was the definitive trademark of successful nation building and modernization. Primarily focused on Western Europe, his case studies of India and Japan applied Eurocentric ideas to societies that were making up their minds about choosing centralized or decentralized forms of authority. Inescapably, „The case of India has served to remind us that the expansion of European ideas and institutions has placed the task of nation-building on the agenda of most countries, whether or not they are ready to tackle the job" (Bendix 1977: 357).

Bendix came close to viewing nation building as a building block for nationhood. Nationhood reflects how people from different heritages are brought together and projected as an integrated whole. Let me compare this understanding with non-Eurocentric, non-Western perspectives.

NON-WESTERN APPROACHES

Scholars outside the Western tradition have been critical of the dominant European paradigm focusing on the nation. A few suggest that nationhood, whether by this name or some other, may be a better explanatory framework for understanding management of diversity and the type of society it can lead to.

In *The Location of Culture,* Homi Bhabba criticized the forms of nationalism that were associated with the European experience. Instead he singled out an in-between life that he famously called the third space, *l'espace entre-deux.* In it there are syncretism, cultural hybridity, multiculturalism, liminality, and space situated on the margins of individual societies. In many respects these attributes correspond to fragments of nationhood. A phenomenon that he termed *migrance* spotlighted the position of postcolonial populations that had become metaphors for displacement. Bhabba reversed the colonial injunction to be like the West – *soyez comme nous* – and derided its absurdity (Bhabba 1994).

Focusing on an ethical dimension, Seyla Benhabib insisted on how liberal democracies had to pass a „moral conscience test" in their approach to outsiders. Three principles had to be followed: 1) members of cultural, religious, linguistic, and other minorities cannot possess lesser degrees of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights than the majority; 2) individuals should not be assigned to a cultural group by virtue of birth but had the right to negotiate change; and 3) an individual's freedom to exit the ascribed group had to entail no restrictions.

These ideal-types increasingly came into conflict with the realities engendered by the immigration-sceptic backlash in Western societies. For Benhabib, minority rights outweighed majority rights causing rifts in building partnership. As she put it, „Universal human rights transcend the rights of citizens and extend them to all persons considered as moral beings" (Benhabib 2002: 148, 149, 152). The result has been the backlash against minority rights advocates undertaken by re-energized majority rights proponents (discussed below).

Gayatri Spivak believes that postcolonial theorists are well positioned to question Europe's civilizational exceptionalism. She underscored the incomplete and amorphous formation of nationalism in the global South, such as India, and arrived at a critical nationhood-related question: „When and how does the love of mother tongue, the love of my little corner of ground become the nation thing? I say nation thing rather than nationalism because something like nations, collectivities bound by birth, that allowed in strangers gingerly, have been in existence long before nationalism came around" (Spivak 2010: 79).

Singling out the exclusionary character of European philosophical thought, Spivak denounced „how Kant foreclosed the Aboriginal; how Hegel put the other of Europe in a pattern of normative deviations and how the colonial subject sanitized Hegel; how Marx negotiated difference" (Spivak 1999: x). It was Eurocentrism, then, that presented an impediment to understanding much of what passed as philosophy. The implication is that if philosophy is lopsided because of European deviations, how can newcomers arriving from other parts of the world form a legitimate partnership with host societies given how programmed these societies are?

Writing about the same time, Dipesh Chakrabarty weighed in on the „first in Europe, then elsewhere" Eurocentric allegation. In his introduction to *Provincializing Europe,* he contended that „No major Western thinker has publicly shared Francis Fukuyama's «vulgarized Hegelian historicism» that saw in the fall of the Berlin wall a common end for the history of all human beings" (Chakrabarty 2000: 3; see too – Fukuyama 1992). Multiple Western citations of his thesis contrasted with few references among non-Western academics.

Chakrabarty went further: „The European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice" (Chakrabarty 2000: 4). In addition, „Historicism, and even the modern, European idea of history, one might say, came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as somebody's way of saying «not yet» to somebody else". What did this mean? „Not yet civilized enough to rule themselves", he explained[5] (Chakrabarty 2000: 8; see too – Heidegger 2008). Preconceived ideas of immigrants partnering with receiving societies that consistently demeaned them ensured that social integration and cohesion models were fanciful.

In turn, Partha Chatterjee accepted that the pathways to nationalism in the West and in the East have diverged. In the West, the nation could take advantage of linguistic, educational, and professional skills brought in by migrants to promote progress. In the East, however, ancestral cultures were maladapted for this purpose, particularly when „those standards have come from an alien culture". For him, a national culture should accept the idea of progress championed by the West but also should retain its own distinctive character (Chatterjee 1986: 2). Migrants socialized in this way would be better prepared for successful integration into Western societies.

A further classic problem involving conceptual stretching was that Asian and African nationalisms were oftentimes distinctive in rejecting the socially constructed idea of imagined communities, even of social constructivism in its

[5] „Not yet" is taken from Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

entirety. Chatterjee believed the concept was dubious for those living in non-Western societies; „imagined communities" had little traction and migrants from these sending countries would find such illusory ideas implausible (Chatterjee 1993: 11 and 14). Appropriately, the author titled his book *The Nation and its Fragments,* published about the time social constructivism was taking off in the West.

Andre Gunder Frank's *ReOrient* was a further effort to decenter Europe. The goal of this German-born academic was to provide a „holistic universal, global, world history – «as it really was»", which would turn „Eurocentric historiography and social theory upside down by using a „«globological» perspective" (Frank 1998: 340). He too rejected the Eurocentrism inherent in the works of European philosophers. Like Spivak, he adopted a „different paradigmatic perspective" which would again place Asia, not Europe, „at the helm of history" (Frank 1998: 334). Already in 1998 the author was convinced that the center of the world economy was returning to the Middle Kingdom – China.

Eurocentrism has applied processes of Othering to assign people to ethnic hierarchies. Whiteness prevailed over Negritude. The consequences have been a persistence of European fears that target rootless migrants whether from faraway countries with peculiar cultures or the Roma, Jews, Turks in their midst. Such groups are often exoticised and even Orientalised.

NATION BRANDING IN PLACE OF NATIONHOOD

In the era of the divine rights of kings, dynasties and unfettered sovereignty, the role of the state and its church – „whose realm, his religion", that is, the religion of the ruler dictates the religion of those ruled over – had been unchallengeable. The scramble for political autonomy begun a few centuries before the Westphalia pact of 1648 had been concluded heralded the enshrining of national sovereignty. At the Council of Constance in 1416, bidding and bargaining among ecclesiastical communities and the populations they commanded had become paramount. As Gat observed, the lines were drawn:

> It is difficult to imagine more impressive evidence for the national question in medieval Europe. Here were delegations from all over the Continent struggling for recognition of their independent national status, voting in national blocs of interest and debating the meaning of the national concept. In this debate they invoked blood relations, language, common customs, and shared history, on the one hand, as well as territory, systems of government and law and voluntary participation, on the other (Gat 2013: 219).

In 1555 the Augsburg formula to end massacres of Catholics and Protestants in Europe was enshrined: *cuius regio, eius religio* or, in Bauman's translation, „who rules decides which God his subjects worship" (Bauman 2017: 156 and 157). Over the next five centuries, a snakes-and-ladders process to the making of the nation, its Gods, and the peoples who worshipped them emerged. Some countries passed out of existence, others were remade under different designations, and new makeshift ones were created. Wars great and small changed state boundaries. The most commonly identified functions of the classic state were to provide for peace, prosperity, territorial integrity, and state and national identity.

Large-scale immigration into a country shakes these traditional functions of the state if the latter insists on its continual right to control its borders. Bauman was convinced that for long periods of history the nation-state acquitted itself well in protecting its independence and autonomy. Writing at the time of the European crisis of migration in 2015, however, in his view it was „demonstrating daily its singular unfitness to act effectively under the present condition of planet-wide interdependence of humans" (Bauman 2017: 159).

Three decades ago, Theda Skocpol made the case for recapturing state autonomy so as to formulate policy (Skocpol 1985: 3–38). Particularly relevant to migration policy was the question which institutions would guarantee social order, promote economic development, create a balance between majoritarian and minority values, and keep borders salient.

A new challenge has surfaced to undermine the state. According to public relations and communications professor Melissa Aronczyk, the meaning of nation has been put into the hands of branders with distorted ideas: „Nation branding maintains and perpetuates the nation as a container of distinct identities and loyalties, and as a project for sovereignty and self-determination". But there is a catch. She regards a nation's culture and territory as marketable, monetizable values. Commodification of the nation begins when economic experts are given the license to determine what values, attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs are superior to others" (Aronczyk 2013: 5 and 9).

A transnational promotional class (TPC) emerges that projects images of legitimacy and authority of the nation; spins positive foreign public opinion about a country; and helps „maintain and reinforce historical inequalities and reify paternalist and neocolonial assumptions" (Aronczyk 2013: 13).

It is no surprise that anti-establishment movements make their appearance in the face of contrived nation branding. For our purposes, it makes migration an even more polarized subject giving „populists" headway. Brubaker notes:

> The opening of national economies to immigrant labor is part of a broader set of economic transformations that have created opportunities for populists to speak in the name of „ordinary people" against „those on top" and against outside forces seen as threatening „our" jobs, „our" prosperity, and „our" economic security. The litany is familiar: sharp increases in inequalities, the regionally concentrated collapse of manufacturing jobs, the accelerating cross-border flows of goods, services, and investments as well as labor, and the shifting of risks and responsibilities to individuals through neoliberal modes of governance (Brubaker 2017).

The rise of „populist" rhetoric is countered by ever more misleading nation branding. Aronczyk explains: „a nation's brand is meant to offer a version of nationalism rooted in the unifying spirit of benign commercial «interests» rather than in the potential divisions of political «passions»". Even though some countries lack success in the competition to capture global markets, nevertheless

> the future of the nation consists of finding a „lucrative role" to play within a globally integrated economic system. Under the rubric of global nationalism, national identity is acknowledged more in terms of its fitness for capital attraction than for its cohesive or collegial properties; that is, cohesiveness and belonging are seen to follow from the nation's fitness for capital attraction, as state polices are mutually configured to favor economic growth as the engines of citizens' well-being (Aronczyk 2013: 17 and 22).

Yet cohesion and belonging are precisely the key attributes of what I call nationhood.

Nation branding practitioners seek to reclaim a unique, distinctive inimitable **national self**. The commodity of **diversity** stands out: these days culture converted into marketable resources trades on diversity. In her six major case studies, all countries market diversity which thrives on migratory influxes. Aronczyk categorically rejects such pretenses: „this making and marketing of diversity is a fundamentally flawed project, one that celebrates difference only insofar as it corresponds to patterns of consumption". Indeed, it comprises „A fantasy of diversity in which the only kind of diversity that matters is one that is defanged for purposes of global trade". It is skin deep: „It encounters social difference without social consequences" (Aronczyk 2013: 31). Contrary to its „spin", diversity is fake in that it does not beget nationhood.

Branding a nation is a contrivance, therefore, that if anything removes nationhood from an incipient partnership struck up between nativists and recently integrated migrants. Fetishizing phony diversity while marketing it comprehensively can lead to social pathologies like segregation, illiberalism, intolerance, ghettoization, radicalization and xenophobia. The superficial character of na-

tion branding may be the antithesis of nationhood by relocating a person's loyalty, allegiance and belonging from the nation to the dictates of economic globalization.

Aronczyk, finally, condemns the perverted shape of what passes for nationhood:

> Theorists of nationalism have conveyed that „idioms of nationhood" emerge from a number of corners and in a variety of registers: from the „felt" nationalisms of communities, classes, and social movements to the „official" registers of state organization, conscription, and education […]. The idiom of nationhood at stake in the phenomenon of nation branding, the „other" who is made to matter for the nation, is the amorphous figure of the „global" (Aronczyk 2013: 168).

This „abracadabra" deception results in markets being regarded as more natural than the nation or the state. It is particularly far removed from the communitarian aspect of nationhood.

CONCLUSION: NATIONHOOD AND MAJORITY RIGHTS

In *The Cultural Defense of Nations,* Liav Orgad, like Gat an Israeli-educated migration specialist, took issue with receiving societies giving in to rights-based claims of minorities while not asserting their own. „For the past half-century, the preservation, protection, and, indeed, active promotion of the cultures of minority groups have been widely championed, as part of an effort to defend the rights of the weak against the crushing dominance of the majority". He agrees that liberal thought and human rights law recognize the rights of minority groups to maintain their cultural identity. But, for Orgad, thus far majority groups have not received similar rights because it is assumed that their culture is not at risk (Orgad 2015: 7 and 21).

For this specialist on constitutional theory, liberal democracies should welcome immigrants without having to adjust their cultural heritage, surrender their liberal traditions or, importantly, slide into right-wing nationalism. Orgad's thesis is the need to establish cultural defense policies. These include aspects of migrant integration that require citizenship tests, loyalty oaths, social integration contracts and language proficiency. He elaborates:

> Liberal democracies are citizen makers. They have a long tradition of attempts to „Protestantize" Catholic immigrants and „Westernize" non-Western immigrants. In contemporary liberal democracies, the ultimate goal of the naturalization process is to „liberate" the illiberal and channel immigrants into the dominant customs, beliefs, and values of the dominant majority (Orgad 2015: 1).

A pivotal disagreement in immigration societies is „whether it is legitimate for a people and nation to seek to preserve their core culture, most notably when they feel it is threatened by large masses of immigrants whose integration into their adopted country is slow and problematic and whose values are often illiberal" (Gat 2017). Orgad may overstate the significance of majorities who need to build up their cultural defenses. But his intent bears on the nationhood approach: fostering partnership between hypothetically vulnerable nativists and purportedly unprotected arriving immigrants.

Nationhood is a grand compromise whose goal includes managing migration flows. Not only does this model recognize diverse communities, it may empower them. But multiple hazards today are in the way. Ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional pecking orders exist in most contemporary societies. They can be longstanding, rigid and unyielding. Many rejuvenated political movements, furthermore, wish to return to ethnocratic-based government. The rhetoric of political leaders has hardened as anti-establishment parties secure more votes from establishment ones.

Nationhood cannot be built if, having made progress in integrating them into host societies, immigrants are not accorded a full sense of belonging. A crucial step towards expanding the nation so as to build nationhood is, therefore, a reasonable, balanced, consensus-based immigration policy aimed at attracting immigrants into a vibrant partnership. Fashioning nationhood in this way creates this sense of belonging **and** partnership. It also encourages political socialization of majority groups to begin early on so as to pre-empt the need to combat racism and xenophobia subsequently.

Nationhood's functions are not, therefore, limited to the classic negative one of protecting borders. Through bonding nativists and migrants into a cohesive unity, it is directly implicated in expansion beyond existing borders.

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Raymond Taras

RE-IMAGING NATIONHOOD: CONSOLIDATING NATIVIST AND IMMIGRANT SOCIAL BONDING

States are today defined less by the nation(s) in them and more by nationhood – a term that subsumes complex and diverse societies characteristic of an age of global migration. Nationhood involves a process in which otherwise different people share some combination of a language, set of values, faith, culture, identity and ideals. When managed successfully, immigration offers an opportunity to give a state the opportunity to expand the nation beyond utilitarian considerations such as labour needs and demographic decline. It begins with immigrant inclusion in the receiving society and the social cohesion that follows. Failed social integration policy results in unachieved, fragmented nationhood leading to different social pathologies. Derived largely from the French Republican tradition, nationhood emphasizes social bonding of a cross-cultural kind. Eurocentric bias focusing primarily on the origins of the nation is examined, non-Western critiques are assayed, and nation branding as a substitute for nationhood is questioned. When nationhood allows locals and immigrants to develop partnership, it is on the basis of an equilibrium established between minority and majority rights regimes.

Keywords: nationhood, Republican citizenship, social bonding, social integration, nation branding, majority rights