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New Authoritarianism

Issue Editor
Jerzy J. Wiatr

Wydawca
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Wydawca
Instytut Socjologii UW, ul. Karowa 18, 00-927 Warszawa
www.is.uw.edu.pl
socpol.redakcja@is.uw.edu.pl

Partner wydawniczy
Wydawnictwo Akademickie SEDNO Sp. z o.o.
ul. Pankiewicza 3, 00-696 Warszawa

Kontakt
Tel. +48 22 46 48 797
info@wydawnictwosedno.pl
www.wydawnictwosedno.pl

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REVIEWS

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Jerzy J. Wiatr
European University of Law and Administration[1]

FROM THE EDITOR

In two ways the present issue of our journal is special. For the first time, it is published in English and there are prominent scholars from abroad among the contributors. In the future, we will continue this practice. We hope that this will facilitate making "Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne" a forum for intellectual debates across national boundaries.

The theme of this issue is "new authoritarianism". It refers to the emergence of hybrid regimes which combine electorally expressed will of the people with the centralization of state power in the hands of the supreme leader and/or in the hands of the ruling oligarchy and with the destruction of the rule of law, the cornerstone of which are independent courts. Such systems have been called by various names, like "controlled democracy" (Peter Anyang Nyong'o), "delegative democracy" (Guillermo O'Donnell), "electoral authoritarianism" (Ilter Turan), "illiberal democracy" (Fareed Zakaria). In this issue we have opted for the term "new authoritarianism" to underline both the continuity with the older forms of authoritarianism and the novelty of the current phenomenon, which – unlike "old" authoritarianism – is not based on a naked power but successfully seeks public support expressed in contested elections.

In the present century several states have been moving in the direction of new authoritarianism. They belong to the large category of countries which had departed from dictatorial regimes in not too distant past. There are, however, authoritarian tendencies in old democracies, as manifested in several recent elections in Europe and America.

This does not mean that new authoritarianism represents the future of mankind. There are still strong anti-authoritarian forces, as demonstrated by the defeats suffered by populist authoritarians in recent French and Austrian

[1] E-mail: jwiatr@ewspa.edu.pl

elections, as well as by the massive protests in Poland against the policies of the ruling Law-and-Justice party. It would, however, be reckless to ignore the danger which new authoritarianism constitutes for the durability of democracy.

The papers published in this issue deal with both theoretical questions and with the political experience of selected countries.

Adam Przeworski (New York University) discusses terminological, historical and comparative aspects of the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism. Late Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017, Professor Emeritus of Leeds University), in the contribution written a few weeks before his death, raises the issue of populist--authoritarian tendencies in old democracies, as illustrated by the results of the American presidential election of 2016. Janusz Reykowski (member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and professor in its Institute of Psychology) discusses the role of the circulation of political elites for the authoritarian trends in contemporary politics. Ilter Turan (Professor Emeritus of Istanbul Bilgi University and the president of the International Political Science Association, 2016–2018) presents the interpretation of the Turkish authoritarianism as a consequence of complicated history of modernization of a traditional society. Peter Anyang Nyong'o (Kenya's Senator, former minister and the prominent political scientist) discusses the turbulent history of authoritarianism and democracy in his native country against the background of comparative reflections on democracy and authoritarianism in Africa. Jerzy Jaskiernia (Professor of law at Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce, former member of the Polish Parliament and former minister of justice) deals with the crisis of Poland's democracy following the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015. Jerzy Wiatr (Professor Emeritus of University of Warsaw, former parliamentarian and former minister of education) presents a comparative analysis of new authoritarianism.

Four of the contributors combine academic careers with high level involvement in politics. Three of them (Peter Anyang Nyong'o, Jerzy Jaskiernia and Jerzy Wiatr) have served in parliaments and in cabinets and one (Janusz Reykowski) played a very important role in Polish negotiated democratization (as co-chair of the political committee of the Polish Round Table Talks in 1989). Hopefully, their contributions show that such combination of roles can help in better understanding of political issues.

Social sciences cannot be value-free, since – as Max Weber has taught us – scholars are members of the society and have their values, which influence the way in which they select and interpret phenomena under study. Contributors to this issue make no attempt to hide their allegiance to the basic values of liberal democracy. Hopefully, this issue proves that such values do not constitute an obstacle to a fully objective scientific analysis.

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ARTICLES

Adam Przeworski
New York University, USA[1]

A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL REGIMES: DEMOCRACY, DICTATORSHIP, AND AUTHORITARIANISM[2]

■ Introduction

Concepts have histories. They appear at specific times, change meanings at times, disappear sometimes. This has been true of the names of entities we classify as distinct political arrangements. Ancient Greeks saw them as "polities" (*politeiai*), political philosophers of the modern era thought in terms of "governments", behavioral political scientists (Easton 1953) conceptualized them as "political systems", while the language dominant today conceives them as "political regimes". Each of these objects, in turn, has been subject to varying distinctions: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (Aristotle, Polybius); monarchy, republic, and despotism (Montesquieu); dictatorship and democracy (Lipset 1959); authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and democracy (Linz 1964, 2000).

These distinctions do not travel well in time. To get a sense of the history of the labels used most frequently today, consider the *n*-gram which portrays the frequency with which the terms "republic", "democracy", "dictatorship", and "authoritarianism" appeared in English language books since 1750.

[1] E-mail: adam.przeworski@nyu.edu

[2] For comments, I am grateful to Jose Antonio Aguilar Rivera, John Dunn, Joanne Fox-Przeworski, Fernando Limongi, Zhaotian Luo, Bernard Manin, Gerry Muncks, Pasquale Pasquino, and Melissa Schwartzberg.



The relative frequencies of these concepts does not look very differently in Spanish or French. In all the three languages, "republic" (sometimes "representative government") was for a long time a more frequent term than "democracy", "dictatorship" became more frequent only when the word radically changed meaning, while "authoritarianism" is a recent term.

Applying our contemporary distinctions to other periods is thus anachronistic. True, one might argue that nothing is wrong with looking at the past through our eyes. The founders of modern representative institutions may have thought that the systems they established were not "democracies" (see below), but we may still think that the "republics" they did found shared enough with the systems we recognize as "democracies" today to consider them as such. Yet with regard to the concept of "dictatorship" complacency about the history of concepts warps our understanding of historical realities: it leads us to find many dictatorships when there were almost none in the present meaning of this word. In turn, "authoritarianism" is a neologism introduced originally in juxtaposition to "totalitarianism", both terms designating varieties of modern dictatorships.

Moreover, labels are not normatively neutral. They are used to distinguish good from bad systems. Because terms which carry normative connotations serve to distinguish us versus them, they are inevitably ethnocentric. They impose a particular distinction as most salient: during the first half of the nineteenth century, the United States insisted that the Western Hemisphere be the land of "republics" as opposed to "monarchies", while now that it must be of "democracies". "Democracy", in particular, became over time an exceptionally effective geopolitical instrument. All kinds of rating agencies give grades to countries for their conformity with the US political norms: "You cheat in elections, so you are not a democracy, even if you claim to be". And it stings, so many rulers insist that their systems are "democratic".

What follows is a conceptual history of political regimes. I have little new to say about "democracy" and "dictatorship", other than to emphasize the categorical transformation of the latter term. In turn, I believe that the label of "authoritarianism" is misleading and redundant. Moreover, it blinds us to the ubiquitous role of reason-giving in politics. All rulers – those selected in clean elections, those who hold this ceremony without putting their power at stake, and those who do not even bother to hold them – give reasons they should be obeyed and in all political regimes people are willing to listen to reasons and to act upon them if they think they are good reasons. Where regimes differ is in the margins of freedom for people to follow other reasons, including their own, in the use of force. Hence, the distinction between democracy and autocracy is sufficient to characterize political regimes.

"Democracy"

Due to the work of Dunn (2005), Hansen (2005), Manin (1997), Rosanvallon (1995) and others, we now know that those who established first modern representative institutions in Great Britain, United States, and France did not think of them as "democracies". The story of this word is bewildering. It appeared during the fifth century BC in a small municipality in Southeastern Europe, acquired a bad reputation, and vanished from usage already in Rome. According to *OED*, its first appearance in English was in 1531. The 1641 constitution of Rhode Island was the first to refer to a "Democratical or Popular Government". In Europe the term entered public discourse only in the 1780's, significantly at the same time as the word "aristocracy" came into common usage as its antonym (Hansen 1989: 72, Palmer 1959: 15, Rosanvallon 1995: 144): "democrats" were those who wanted everyone to enjoy the same rights as aristocrats. "Democracy" as a system of government was still employed almost exclusively with reference to its ancient meaning: the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* referred in 1771 to "Democracy, the same with a popular government, wherein the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the people; *such were Rome and Athens of old...*" (quoted after Hansen 2005: 31, italics supplied). The word carried a negative connotation, so that both in the United States and in France, the newly established systems were distinguished as "republics". "Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to democracy only", complained Madison in *Federalist #14* because democracy was a danger to the security of property, often coded as "anarchy".

Note that one should not confuse the use of "democracy" as a label for a political regime with the use of "democratic" or, in English of the eighteenth century "democratical", element of mixed constitutions (Pasquino 2011). With an eye on Great Britain, several constitutional theorists proposed systems of representative government in which a "democratical" or "popular" element, embodied in the lower house of legislatures[3], would be counterpoised by an "aristocratic" one in the form of a Senate and at times also by a monarchy. These were not "democracies" as we now understand the term, but "mixed constitutions".

While the "Democratic" label was positively reclaimed in the United States in 1828, a positive view of Ancient Greece as a democracy emerged in England, France, and Germany only in the middle of the nineteenth century (Hansen (2005). I could not find a similar history of "democracy" in Latin America[4], but it is clear that the founders of Latin American representative institutions shared the negative view of this system.[5] Yet after several Latin American political thinkers spent some years in the Philadelphia in the 1820s, some adopted a positive connotation for this term. The first to use the term "representative democracy" in a positive sense may have been the Peruvian constitutionalist Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre in 1827 (see Aguilar 2011, chapter 3), but this history remains to be written.

My guess is that if one had conducted a survey in 1913 asking people around the world which countries are "democracies", the only one that would have been so identified would have been the United States, and perhaps because of Tocquevillian association of this word with social equality rather than because of its political characteristics. Identifying good governments as "democracies" became the norm only after the 1918 Versailles Peace Congress when, at the instigation of Woodrow Wilson, "Democracy became a word of common usage in a way that it had never been previously. An examination of the press, not only in the United States, but in other Allied states as well, shows a tendency to use the word democracy in ways that Wilson made respectable and possible" (Graubard 2003: 665).[6] According to Manela (2007: 39ff.), to counter the political impact of Lenin's proclamation of self-determination of nations, Wilson combined it with the "consent of the governed". As the result, he used self-determination

[3] According to Saguir's (2011) account of the Argentine Constitutional Convention of 1816–19, democracy was seen as a danger because it portended anarchy but a democratic element, in the form of the lower house representing the lower classes and checked by the Senate, would be needed to absorb them into the constitutional system.

[4] Neither could Posada-Carbó (2008: 16), and he knows better.

[5] See McEvoy (2008) on Jose Ignacio Moreno in Peru, Posada-Carbó (2008) on Eloy Valenzuela in Colombia. Sarmiento (quoted in Zimmerman 2008: 12) referred to "la democracia consegrada por la Republica de 1810" but only in 1845.

[6] See the ngram for the peak of "democracy" in 1918 (p. 10).

"in a more general, vaguer sense and usually equated this term with popular sovereignty, conjuring an international order based on democratic forms of government". The popularity of this word peaked again after World War II, when it was embraced by the newly formed United Nations. Yet "democracy" became an unquestioned norm perhaps only in the 1980s, when President Reagan launched the program of "democracy promotion" (Munck 2009: 2).

Thus, from a label everyone avoided, "democracy" become a self--denomination that almost all regimes in the world, even the "Democratic People's Republic of North Korea", now claim for themselves. It bears emphasis that the language of "democracy" emanated from the United States, so in most of the world it has been an import, if not simply an export. France until today is a "republique" before a "democratie" (Nicolet 1982: 9).[7]

As Dunn (2005) incisively observed, this history poses two questions: (1) Why any single label would gain the monopoly of being considered irresistibly attractive, (2) Why this particular label? The answer to the first question must be that the ideal – Morgan (1988) would say the "myth" – of "self-government of the people" is an irresistible force in the modern era (Przeworski 2011). Something is deeply appealing in the claim that, even if all cannot rule, the government governs with the authorization of the people, that we are ruled by those we want to rule us. This claim is ubiquitous. Giovanni Gentile, a theoretician of Italian fascism, asserted that "The fascist State... is a popular State, and in this sense democratic State *per eccellenza*" (quoted in Cassese 2011). So claimed Communist leaders of "People's Democracies". So echoed various gentlemen who thought that democracy must be "tutelary" (Sun Yat-sen), "guided" (Sukarno), or "sovereign" (led by the State, Surkov 2007). The foundation for such claims was laid by Carl Schmitt (1993 [1928]: 372) for whom democracy is "the identity of the dominating and the dominated, of the government and the governed, of he who commands and he who obeys". This is a perfidious definition for it opens room for any ruler to assert that he is "identical" with those whom he manipulates, oppresses, imprisons, and even kills. It allows rhetorical maneuvers such as "the Russian political system – in its essence although not in form – does not differ in anything from real, serious Western democracies" (A Russian journalist, Mikhail Leontiev, in an interview with a Polish newspaper, *Dziennik*, January 19, 2008). The unity of the leader and the led is the "essence" of democracy while particular institutions, including elections, are just "forms" because no ruler can admit to ruling without a popular mandate. But why good political arrangements acquired the label attached two thousand years ago to some

[7] On the history of these two terms in France, see Nicolet (1982: 18–31).

villages in the Balkans is bewildering, perhaps just a historical accident due to the emergence of "democracy" in opposition to "aristocracy" in the eighteenth century.

Already J.S. Mill (1859) observed that the slogan of the government "by the people" is incoherent: all citizens cannot rule simultaneously. Following Kelsen (1988 [1920]: 27), this observation became the point of departure of democratic theory: "[I]t is not possible for all individuals who are compelled and ruled by the norms of the state to participate in their creation...". People must be represented and they can be represented only through political parties, which "group men of the same opinion to assure them real influence over the management of public affairs" (Kelsen 1988: 28) or which are groups "whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (Schumpeter 1942: 283) or "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (Downs 1957: 25). Parties, in turn, have followers and leaders, who become representatives through elections. Representatives will for the people. "Parliamentarism", says Kelsen (1988: 38), "is the formation of the directive will of the State by a collegial organ elected by the people.... [t]he will of the State generated by the Parliament is not the will of the people...". Schumpeter (1942: 269) echoes: "Suppose we reverse the roles of these two elements and make the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding". Although in the classical theory "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions... by making the people decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will", in fact the democratic method is one in which the individuals who are to assemble to will for the people are selected through elections (1942: 250). Yet even if the modern conception of democracy yields to the claim that political life is inevitably elitist (Mosca 1939 [1896], Pareto 1991 [1920]), it draws the difference between "elites that *propose* themselves and elites that *impose* themselves" (Bobbio 1989: 157). Hence, we distinguish "democracy" (or "autonomy", Kant 1891 [1793], Kelsen 1988), in which people through some procedures choose those who decide under what laws we live from "autocracy" (or "heteronomy") in which the laws are imposed on the people. And the crucial test of this distinction are competitive elections. In Bobbio's (1987: 93) definition, democracy is these days a system "in which supreme power (supreme in so far as it alone is authorized to use force as a last resort) is exerted in the name of and on behalf of the people by virtue of the procedure of elections...".

The fact is that if by "democracy" we mean regimes in which incumbents expose themselves to being removed from office by elections, such unpleasant

events have been historically rare and quite recent. As of 2009, sixty-eight countries, including the two elephants – Russia and China – never experienced a peaceful alternation in office resulting from elections. In some countries – from Luxembourg, to post-war Japan and Italy, to Botswana – elections have been reasonably clean but the incumbents continued to win them during long periods. Most rulers who did hold elections saw to it that votes would not threaten their tenure in office: over the past two hundred years, incumbents won about 80% of about 3,000 national-level elections in which the office of the chief executive was at stake. Moreover, a handful of countries still never experienced national-level elections.[8]

"Dictatorship"

The concept of "dictatorship" radically changed meaning over the past two hundred years.

Around 1800, its meaning was precise and clear because the common reference was to the design of this institution in Rome, where dictatorship was a power delegated (normally by the consuls upon a declaration of emergency by the senate) to someone else than those authorizing it, limited to a strictly defined period (normally six months), not to be used against the delegating body or its members (Nicolet 2004, Pasquino 2010). The duty of the Roman dictatorship was to return the polity to the constitutional *status quo ante.* These dictatorships were "commissarial" in the language of Schmitt (1921, see McCormick 2004).

This understanding of dictatorship was prevalent until the early 1920s. While General Francisco Miranda was the first person to bear the title of "dictator" in the modern era, this denomination was still based on the Roman concept of dictatorship.[9] The only person during the nineteenth century to establish a "perpetual dictatorship" was Dr. Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia who in 1816 proclaimed himself *El Dictador Perpetuo* of Paraguay and ruled it until 1840 as *El Supremo*.[10] While periods of autocratic rule were frequent, particularly in Latin America, they were invariably justified by a need to respond to emergencies, crises, or exceptional circumstances. As Rippy (1965: 93) observed, "Whether sincere or deliberatively deceptive, the

[8] These numbers are based on Przeworski (2015).

[9] In 1808–1809, Miranda wrote an *Esquise de Gouvernement federal*, a blueprint where he justified an exceptional dictatorship by invoking the experience of Rome (Aguilar 2000: 169).

[10] Rodriguez de Francia is the protagonist of a richly documented historical novel by Augusto Roa Bastos, *Yo el supremo*, but I could not find there any surprise at the notion of a perpetual dictator, an oxymoron in the language of the time.

documents of the period always employed expressions suggesting a crisis: liberator, restorer, regenerator, vindicator, deliverer, savior of the country, and so on. Somebody was constantly having to ‚save' these countries...". Dictators were "saviours" whose intervention was to be restricted to restoring the Roman *salus publica.* The crucial difference from the Roman institution was that, although dictators almost always insisted that they are performing a task authorized by a constitution, claiming the mantle of *gobierno constitucional*, the mission to save the country was unilaterally undertaken by force. Nevertheless, dictatorships were seen as something abnormal and something to self-dissolve when the situation is restored to normal.[11]

Dictators assumed power unilaterally but they were also to abdicate unilaterally. To cite Paz (1963: 3–4), "It is significant that the frequency of military coups has never faded democratic legitimacy from the conscience of our people. For this reason, dictators assuming power almost invariably declared that their government is provisional and that they are ready to restore democratic institutions as soon as circumstances permit".[12]

Europeans, however, faced a problem. In 1799, a general usurped power in France by a coup d'état and a few years later proclaimed himself "emperor". Given that dictatorship was universally understood in the Roman meaning, the only forms of government known at the end of the eighteenth century were monarchies and republics, with the third type distinguished by Montesquieu, "despotism", relegated to the exotic Asia. Hence, the form of government Napoleon established was unclassifiable in the language of the time. He had no legitimate dynastic claim, so he was not a monarch.[13] He abolished the republic by becoming the Emperor. He established a system that was highly institutionalized, ruling by law, so he was not a "despot" in Montesquieu's language. The puzzlement facing the contemporary observers in thinking about this form of government is evidenced by the first labels used to identify it: "Bonapartism" (from Napoleon's last name, suggesting uniqueness), "Caesarism" (from the last Roman dictator who attempted to establish permanent rule), "Imperialism" (from "Emperor"). According to Baehr and Richter (2004: 25), the term "dictatorship" in its modern sense was used in

[11] When Bolivar wanted to resign from his first of three dictatorships, he was asked to keep the office in the following terms: "Remain, your Excellency, as a Dictator, improve your efforts at saving the Fatherland, and once you have done it, then restore full exercise of sovereignty by proposing a Democratic Government". On Bolivar and dictatorship, see Aguilar (2000: Chapter V).

[12] Already Bolivar, in the speech accepting the position of the Dictador Jefe Supremo de la Republica, announced that "ya respiro devolviendos esta autoridad". (Discurso de Angostura, in Bolivar 1969: 93).

[13] On "usurpation" as distinct from hereditary monarchy, see Constant (1997 [1809]).

Europe only during two periods of the nineteenth century: referring to France between 1789 and 1815 and briefly after 1852 to the Second Empire.[14]

The transformation of the concept of "dictatorship" is largely due to European difficulties in understanding regimes such as those of the two Napoleons, communism, fascism, and nazism. The Soviets were the first to use the term as a positive self-designation in the "dictatorship of the proletariat".[15] While some earlier dictatorships ended up lasting long periods and many dictators changed constitutions, so these dictatorships were "sovereign" in terms of Schmitt, none had the pretension of permanently changing the society. The Soviet dictatorship, while still proclaiming to be transitional, was aimed to establish a new economic, social, and political order. As such, it was a new historical phenomenon, not an imitation of the Roman one (McCormick 2004: 199).

The term radically changed its meaning only with the rise of fascism and then nazism, when liberal opponents of these regimes, as well as of communism, adopted "dictatorship" as the label designating what they were fighting against. As a result, we came to include under the concept of dictatorship regimes that were foundational, designed to permanently transform political order. Moreover, the ambiguity is not only conceptual: several military governments in Latin America after 1930 were themselves split or confused as to whether their mission was only to "eradicate the foreign virus of subversion from the body of the nation" and abdicate once this body was sanitized or to establish a new permanent political order.[16]

As this history demonstrates, lumping together the moments when some general usurped power for a few years with institutionalized autocratic regimes designed to last forever ignores the originality of the phenomenon of modern dictatorship. Permanent dictatorships are an invention of the last one hundred years.

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[14] The idea that "permanent dictatorship" is necessary when religion fails to sustain order was developed by a Spanish thinker Juan Donoso Cortés in a speech in 1849. It found echoes in Mexico but an explicit argument that dictatorship should be permanent in Latin America was offered only in 1919 by Vallenilla Lanz (Aguillar 2011, Chapter 7).

[15] "Dictatorship of the proletariat" had intellectual roots in the 1793 French "Committee of public safety".

[16] This ambiguity was first evident in the 1930 coup in Argentina. This coup was led by General Uriburu, who intended to replace individual by functional representation, while General Justo, who became president in 1931, participated in the coup wanting only to depose President Irigoyen and restore democracy. See Ibarguen (1955), Pinedo (1946). The same division reappeared in the Brazilian military government after the coup of 1964, the Ongania regime in Argentina after 1966, the Chilean military regime after 1973, and the Argentine one after 1976.

"Authoritarianism"

Consider the following type of regime: "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones". If you did not know the label which the author, obviously Linz (1964: 225), attached to such systems, what label would you choose? Linz's intent was to extend the notion of "totalitarianism" beyond the narrow meaning given to it by Arendt (1958)[17] and still to distinguish it from Franco's Spain (Dormagen 2008: 20–25). Yet even if Spain under Franco was not "totalitarian", his rule was based on force and, as Arendt (1954: 103) pointed out, "All those who call modern dictatorships, authoritarian'... have implicitly equated violence with authority...". Confounding force with authority as causes of the power to command and be obeyed, treating authoritarianism as just a synonym of soft dictatorship, "dictablanda"[18], renders the concept of "authoritarianism" redundant. "Authoritarianism" cannot just mean that repression is less intense: when preventive repression is sufficiently intimidating, no manifest repression is necessary, but the regime is still based on force.[19] Hence, we need to ask if there is something specific to "authoritarianism" that distinguishes it as a type of dictatorship, other than the intensity of manifest repression.

One answer is provided by Levitsky and Way (2010: 5), according to whom the authoritarian regimes are "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents.... Competition is real but unfair". In this influential conception, "authoritarianism" is a label for regimes based on force

[17] Arendt's conception of "totalitarianism" required mass terror and thus limited the historical extension of this concept to Hitler's Germany and the two periods of Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union.

[18] According to Wikipedia, "The term was first used in Spain in 1930 when Damaso Berenguer replaced Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja as the head of the ruling military junta (or "directorio militar") and attempted to reduce tensions in the country by repealing some of the harsher measures that had been introduced by the latter".

[19] Franco's Spain does not qualify as a "soft" dictatorship. This regime was in fact highly repressive by comparative standards: about 100,000 people were killed in the repression following the civil war and political killings continued until the very last days of the regime. It was not less murderous than the Nazi regime if one excludes the genocide of Jews, even if less so than the Soviet Union under Stalin.

that preserve a façade of democratic institutions. Note that this is a departure from Linz, because Franco's Spain does not qualify as authoritarian under this definition. Neither does China, while Putin's Russia does. Yet how can we tell that competition is sufficiently "unfair" to qualify a regime as "authoritarian" or even "semi-so"? After all, as Putin's apologists maintain, there is nothing non-democratic about a popular leader winning overwhelming support in elections. Hence, if "authoritarianism" is to be a useful concept, it must also be a somehow distinguishable from democracy.

Perhaps because of our ideological biases, we seem to be blind to the political force of giving reasons. Reason-giving is ubiquitous in politics. All rulers – those selected in clean elections, those who hold this ceremony without putting their power at stake, and those who do not even bother to hold them – claim to have reasons to be obeyed and people are willing to obey them if they believe these are good reasons. When people believe that the ruler has good reasons to command them to do (or not do) something, reliance on force is unnecessary. The rulers do not even need to specify the reasons: it is sufficient that people believe that they could do so if asked.

Innumerable studies of "authoritarian regimes" see their rulers as coopting, repressing, propagandizing, or censoring, but not as evoking voluntary compliance. Yet consider Mussolini's retrospective justification of his rule: "strictly speaking, I was not even a dictator, because my power to command coincided perfectly with the will to obey of the Italian people" (a note to a journalist, Ivanoe Fossani, in March 1945; quoted in Cassese 2011). Clearly, one can easily reject his claim as an ex-post excuse for repression. But is it true that Italian people did not want to obey Mussolini? Is the popularity of Presidents Putin or Xi due only to the threat of force? Is this the only reason many Russians and Chinese believe that they are led by great leaders? As Kojeve's (2014 [1942]: 2) observed, "Reducing Authority to Force is... simply either to deny or ignore the existence of the former".[20]

The point of departure in understanding "authoritarianism" must be that "Authority is not power, but it may cause it" (Friedrich 1958: 37). Power, the power to be obeyed, may originate from different sources. One is active authorization to command by those potentially subject to commands, "other-authorization" (Dunn 2015), which in the modern era means elections. Another is physical force. Yet another is "authority". Force is not the same as authority: someone wielding a *stiletto* has the power to cause me to obey but

[20] Sennett's (1980: 17) observation that "the word 'authoritarian' is used to describe a person or system which is repressive" is just one among his innumerable confusions.

someone who gives me good reasons need not brandish a *stiletto* for me to obey (Friedrich 1958: 37).

What, then, is "authority"?[21] Positive analyses of authority canonically depart from a formulation by Theodore Mommsen,[22] according to whom authority is a property of communications that are "more than advice, less than command, an advice which one may not safely ignore" (Friedrich 1958: 30, Arendt 1961: 123, Terre's Introduction to Kojeve 2014: xiv). Authority is "less than command" because authoritative messages do not include a threat of sanctions by whoever issues them. But it is less obvious why it is "more than advice". Any advice entails a view of consequences of one's actions: if you see a sign saying "35 mph" when approaching a curve, you are being advised that driving faster exposes you to a risk of an accident. What is distinctive about authority is that the emitter of the message knows the eventual consequences of your actions better than you do. In Friedrich's (1958: 30) interpretation, authority of the Roman Senate "was intended to prevent violations of what was sacred in the established order of things... . It was a matter of adding wisdom to will, a knowledge of values shared and traditions hallowed, to whatever the people wanted to do". Authority, then, is advice which one cannot safely ignore because it adds to ("augments") the information about the consequences of one's action and because with the better knowledge one is led to choose a different course of action than would have been chosen based only on one's own knowledge. Authority "adds wisdom to will".

On what political leaders must be the authority? Put differently, what are the actions that are subject to authority, again, advice one cannot ignore "safely"? The Roman Senate was the authority on the tradition of Rome and on the conditions for preserving the Roman Republic. The actions this authority was charged to prevent or promote were thus those that would threaten or advance *salus publica*, the wellbeing of all. In this ideological construction, which is what it is, there is one community and one common good. Some one or some body knows what we as a community share in common, our common interest, and it issues advice that makes us promote it. People may not understand correctly what they share in common and may mistakenly take actions that threaten it,

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[21] Discussions of authority among legal philosphers focus on its normative justification, asking when authority is "legitimate" and when rulers have a "right" to be obeyed. I do not delve into these discussions here unless they provide useful distinctions.

[22] Mommsen was a 19th century German historian, best known for a five volume *History of Rome*. The quote, however, is from volume 3 of his *Römisches Staatsrecht* (three volumes, 1871–1888, available in German from www.gutenberg.com). Friedrich and Arendt, who acknowledges Friedrich, quote from the 1878 second German edition, while Terre quotes from the 1985 French translation, *Le droit public romain* (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, vol. 3, page 1034).

so they need to be guided. Hence, authority results from a superior knowledge of what is good for all. The prudential advice given by the authority is "If you pursue your particularistic interest, everyone will be worse off".

Note that this construction assumes that individuals are motivated to pursue the common good and would act against it only out of ignorance. When the collectivity is unanimous about the state of the world it wants to prevail, collective decisions are self-implementing: if someone commands me to do what I want to do anyway, I do not need to be coerced to do it. At most, I need to be enlightened about the consequences of my actions. Yet this assumption is too strong: for authority to exist it is sufficient that people voluntarily submit themselves to coercion applied to enforce a particular conception of common good. Suppose that the structure of interests of a society generates a prisoner's dilemma. The common interest is to cooperate (not steal, vaccinate your child) and if the question whether individuals should be coerced to cooperate were put to a plebiscite, it would win unanimous vote of people who are informed that if they were permitted to defect, each and all would be worse off. Hence, exercise of authority does not preclude coercion.

Hence, the Leader (an elected President, *el Jefe*, *il Duce*, *ein Führer*), the Party, or the State must be the authority on the common interest.[23] In the words of Antonio Salazar, "The return of the State to a wellconstituted order, *rational* as an expression of the nation organized, just in subordinating particular interests to the general, strong because of having as its basis the *authority that cannot be rejected and should not be rejected* [is] the highest achievement of civilization...". (1934 speech, loose translation, italics added; quoted in de Oliveira Marques 1998: 432). The exercise of authority does not preclude coercion as long as it is limited to the subordination of "particular interests to the general". According to an eminent fascist leader, Alfredo Rocco, fascism was inspired by the idea of "liberty conditioned on the protection of general interests" (*libertà condizionata dalla tutela degli interessi generali*, quoted in Cassese 2011).

Delving into mechanisms which make authority effective would require a full-fledged game-theoretic analysis, which is beyond the scope of this essay. Authority may be effective when the claims it conveys are not observable (*Après moi, le déluge*), when it dissuades individuals from a costly search for information, when people know that faking authority is costly to the leaders

[23] Thus, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Chairman of the Polish governing party, *PiS*, called for "the common good to become at least the basic premise of the functioning of the public media. Common good, that is, search for truth and appeal to the values which construct our national community. And here there are no values other than those that arise from our history, which is closely tied to the Church". (www.se.pl/wiadomosci/polityka/jaroslaw-kaczynski-we-wloclawku-omediach-narodowych-maja-mowic-prawde_822470.html)

(Guriev and Treisman 2015), or when it provides a signal on which individuals can coordinate. I suspect there are other potential reasons, but a necessary condition of authority is that people believe that someone knows better what is better for them as a collectivity. Hence, what is called in game-theory language "strategic complementarity" – the motivation to coordinate one's action with those of others – is not sufficient. An orchestra obeys the conductor because all its members want to play in tune even if they think that the conductor leads off key because cacophony is worse than any coordinated interpretation. A Soviet textbook of Marxism-Leninism asked "How does the Party play its leading role...?", with the answer, "It acts through the government and mass public organizations, guiding their efforts toward one single goal.... Party leadership may be compared to the art of the conductor, who strives for harmony in the orchestra..." (Kuusinen 1962: 554–555).[24] But a bad conductor can be a conductor only because someone or something granted him this role, not because members of the orchestra spontaneously recognize his capacity to lead them. While the Party may have played a coordinating role, this does not imply that Soviet citizens believed that it acts in their best interest.

Democracy, Dictatorship, and Authoritarianism

To have authority, the leader must be able to provide reasons. The Pope has authority when he speaks *ex cathedra* on matters of doctrine because he cannot err. The Soviet leaders derived authority from their correct understanding of the laws of history. The contemporary Chinese leaders use the term "scientific development" to justify their authority. What constitutes valid reasons depends, however, on sharing some premises and is, therefore, historically contingent and always questionable. Reasons valid for some "may well appear wholly ‚irrational' to anyone outside the particular belief or value system" (Friedrich 1958: 40). Non-Catholics may not accept the authority of the Pope because they do not share the belief that the Holy Ghost can prevent someone from erring. Non-Nazis do not accept Hitler's views of Jews because they do not share the premise that the history of mankind consists of conflict among races for *Lebensraum*. Fundamentalist Christians do not accept the authority of scientists when it conflicts with the letter of the Bible. Power would be based exclusively on authority only if people could coordinate differently but do not

[24] According to Sabl (2015: ft. 5), "the Nazi term for its totalitarian policy of requiring all civil society and voluntary groups to align themselves with Nazi ideology was *Gleichschaltung*, whose literal meaning is having all railways use the same gauge of track. Nazification was conceptualized, in other words, as a coordination problem".

because they believe the coordination offered to them by the leader is best. But no political leader, not even the Pope, has such self-evident authority. And, to cite Friedrich (1958: 32) again, "when people begin to ask the question 'why should I obey X?', X is on the way to losing his authority". Authority becomes unquestionable only if people are prevented from coordinating on beliefs other than those of the political leader, on their own beliefs about what is best for them as a collectivity and as individuals.

Where does authority originate from? Someone or some body has authority, in the sense of evoking voluntary compliance, if others believe in advance that "whatever is advocated will be worth of respect and of compliance" (Carter 1979: 14), "in advance" meaning even before the emitter of the message itself learns the true state of the world. Views about the origins of such an authority diverge. Arendt, who was not a paragon of historical accuracy,[25] thinks that authority can originate only from an exogenously given position in a generally accepted hierarchy: "The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place" (1954: 93). Hence, authority does not entail "persuasion": no reasoning is entailed, only recognition of a pre-existing hierarchy. For Friedrich (1958: 36), however, authority is the "capacity to issue communications which may be elaborated by reasoning". A communication is authoritative if the receivers of the message believe that the communicator has good reasons to believe that the message is epistemologically true or morally valid, that he or she knows something they do not and that this something will guide them to a better action. The listeners need not know these reasons; it suffices that they believe that the emitter of the message could cite good reasons and that he or she believes that these reasons are valid. Yet reasoning is an intrinsic feature of authoritative communication. Authority is the capacity to persuade.[26]

To clarify what is entailed, consider the example used by almost all students of authority: parenthood. Arendt (1954) bemoans "the decline" of traditional authority of parents, whose ability to command children is given by the fact

[25] While she uses Mommsen's analysis of the Roman Senate, she neglects the fact that the Senate was not hierarchically superior to the plebs. See Carter (1979: 20): "it is clearly nonsensical to describe the relationship between the Senate and the plebs as hierarchical".

[26] Carter (1979: 23–25) criticizes Friedrich for failing to distinguish reasons for the existence of an authority and reasons for particular messages issued by this authority. There may be good reasons to respect the institution of a constitutional tribunal even if the reasons motivating some rulings of the tribunal are not persuasive.

that they are parents, as the ability to rule of monarchs was based on their birthrights. Parents do not have to give reasons to require compliance with their commands and traditional parents did not. Their authority declined when children became less willing to obey them. But for Friedrich (1958: 34), the authority of parents is greater when they reason with their children rather than expect blind obedience. Parents have authority when their reasons evoke compliance of children who are free to disobey. By giving reasons, "discipline is turned into self-discipline". Their effectiveness in generating obedience may have historically declined but perhaps only because reasoning with children is less effective than pure coercion. Yet authority rests on reason, not on submission to authority given by any exogenous force.

By the same argument, elections do not generate epistemic or moral authority of those who are elected (Kojeve 2014: 34, Friedrich 1958: 38). When an elected president tells us that we should use clean energy or if he exhorts us to be compassionate, we obey only if we have reasons to believe that he knows better, not because he was elected. Elections do not create authority; they ratify it. We elect those who we believe have authority. As Manin (1997) argues, we select leaders through elections rather than lot – elections are an "aristocratic" method of selecting rulers – because we believe that some people are better qualified to govern than others. We use whatever observable indicators we want but the quality we are after is authority. As Dworkin (1996: 27) observes, "We certainly do want influence to be unequal in politics for other [than money] reasons: we want those with better views or those who can argue more cogently to have more influence". Hence, we obey elected leaders not only because elections generate legal authority to command and empower the elected rulers to use legally qualified coercion but also because at least some of us believe that they were elected because they have epistemic or moral authority. Moreover, it may be true that having seen that a majority recognizes someone as the authority we update our beliefs on the basis of their information, so that elections do enhance the belief that those elected have authority. "The authority that is based on knowledge", Carter (1979: 11) observes, "is not intrinsically incompatible with democratic and egalitarian attitudes and beliefs". Yet the belief that someone knows better just because he or she is the ruler, having arrived to this position by whatever means, including elections, is an authoritarian attitude.

The difference between regimes is that under democracy authorities compete. The very fact that no one is ever elected unanimously in reasonably clean elections is prima facie evidence that there are people other than those elected who also have authority; moreover, that authority is being questioned. Perhaps the people is not united but divided; perhaps they are united but still disagree

what is better for all: whether elections aggregate interests or judgements, the pluralism of authority is anti-authoritarian. Authority is monopolistic only when it is guarded by repression and censorship. Yet even when rulers monopolize authority by force, obedience is not blind. Communication may be falsified (Kuran 1991, 1995): when information is censored[27] or when dissatisfied individuals who are the center of larger communication networks are repressed (Perez-Oviedo 2012), people have no access to information by which they could update their beliefs, including those about the general support for the regime. Yet falsified communication still entails reasongiving and acting for reasons. Obedience is a result of falsified beliefs but still of beliefs. Authoritarianism is when we have no choice of reasons, not when we have no reasons.

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[27] The Portuguese Constitution of 1933 specified (in Article 3) that "The censorship will have the aim only to impede the perversion of public opinion as a social force and should be exercised to defend it from all the factors that disorient it from truth, justice, morality, good administration and common good...". In turn, the July 1946 decree of the Polish Communist government defined the mission of the censorship as "to avoid misleading public opinion by information that does not correspond to reality" (quoted in Tokarz 2012).

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Adam Przeworski

A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL REGIMES: DEMOCRACY, DICTATORSHIP, AND AUTHORITARIANISM

The labels we attach today to distinguish political regimes have histories. Applying them without understanding these histories is sometimes anachronistic and ethnocentric. I have little new to say about "democracy" and "dictatorship", so that the discussion of these concepts is just a reminder. "Authoritarianism", however, is a dubious neologism. I advance two claims: (1) In all regimes the power to command and be obeyed entails some dose of reason-giving, (2) What distinguishes regimes is the form and the extent to which the authority of rulers is monopolised by physical force. I conclude that the concept of "authoritarianism" adds little to the distinction between democracy and dictatorship.

Key words: political regimes, democracy, dictatorship, authoritarianism

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Zygmunt Bauman

SOME OF THE FOREMOST CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS QUO

1. Strong (Wo)man vs. Crisis of Democracy

There was a genuine cornucopia of reactions to Trump's victory – above all, of its explanations; but amazingly, explanations were almost consensual. Public opinion – inspired, nudged, beefed up and abetted as usual by the media chorus, all but-agreed that (just as the Brexit vote) Trump vote was a massive, indeed popular protest against the political establishment and political elite of the country *as a whole,* with which a large and continually growing part of population grew in recent years frustrated for failing, well – nigh systematically nor routinely, to deliver on its promises. Not being part of that elite, never having occupied any elected office, coming "from outside of the political establishment" and staying stubbornly at loggerheads even with the party of which he was formally a member, Trump's candidature appeared the first credible, indeed unique occasion for such a wholesale condemnation of entire political system – just as in the British referendum, where all major political parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberals) united in their call to remain in the EU and so one could use his/her single vote to recall his/her distaste of the political system *in its entirety* with no need to inadvertendly give preference to another part of the same discredite and resented political elite.

To cut the long story short: Trump won his presidency on the anti-establishment card. Presenting himself as a strong man with his hands untied by peculiar and selfish partisan interest, and for that reason able to set off a new beginning or a return to the glorious past, capable of playing down and sweeping aside the establishment sacrosant principles of political/legal correctness deemed to bear the responsibility of the double sin of impotence to act effectively and indifferently to what the nation which that establishment

pretends to represent and intends to guide wishes to be done. What one heard however much less frequently from the opinion-makers was that Trump won his presidency because *his voters* dreamt all along of the same…

Those who mentioned that factor pointed out to the notable hunger of the population for replacing the endless but ineffective and impotent parliamentary bickering with an indomitable and unassailable will of a "strong man" (or woman) – a dictator or an autoritarian ruler – and his/her determination and capability to impose right away, without prevarication and procrastination, the quick fixes, shortcuts and instant solutions of his or her choice. Throughout the electoral campaign, Trump skillfully and consistently construed his own public image as a person of such qualities of which a large part of the electorate dreamt.

These were surely not the only factors contributing to Trump's triumph but certainly crucial and perhaps paramount and decisive ones. Hilary Clinton's, his main opponent's thirty-years long membership of the establishment and her characteristically half-way, piecemeal, cautiously trimmed and conscientiously self limiting agenda militated, on the contrary, against trusting possessing and willing to deploy similar qualities.

What we are currently witnessing not just in the US but in a considerable and rapidly expanding sector of the EU is a thorough re-hushing of allegedly untouchable, indeed defining principles of "democracy" – though I don't think that the term itself will be abandoned as the name of the political ideal, as a "significant", as Claude Levi-Strauss would have branded it, "democracy" has been absorbing and is still capable of parenting many and different "signifiées". There is, for instance, a distinct possibility of the traditional safeguards (like Montesquieu's division of power into three autonomous – legislative, executive and judiciary – or English "check and balances" system) falling out of public favour and stripped of significance, replaced explicitly or matter-of-factly by the condensation of power in authoritarian or even dicatorial models. Symptoms multiply of a tendency to – so to speak – pulling power down from the nebulous unreachable and impenetrable elitist heights where it has been placed or drifted "closer home": into a quasi-direct communication between the strong (wo)man on the top and the pulverised and eminently fluid and fissiparous aggregate of their supporters/subjects, equipped with "social websites" as apparently wide open and widely accessible gates to the public arena and to the indoctrination/opinion-surveys media.

"Us" and "Them": Then and Now

Division of humans into "us" and "them" – their juxtaposition and antagonism – are inseparable companions of the human mode of being-in-the-world throughout history of the human species. "Us" and "Them" are related as heads *and* tails – two faces of the same coin; while a coin with but one face, were it to be minted as a model for inter human cohabitation, would be an unworkable oxymoron – contradiction in terms.

History of homo sapiens may be written from many perspectives – but also, and most significantly for our theme – as a story of successive extensions of the volume of "us" – of integrated human groups, amenable to integration and postulated/pressed to integrate – from the primitive horde of hunters/gatherers which could not include into the notion of "us" more than 150 members, to the "imagined community" of the modern nation-state, but also and thus far more inevitably, as the story of "them", against whom the groups, whatever their size, has been or ought to and is to integrate. Indeed, the idea of being "one of us" derives its meaning primarily from *not being* "one of them", and only secondarily from being *unlike* "them".

As the great Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth has argued and convincingly shown (Barth 1969): instead of borders being drawn to separate extant differences, it is differences that are sought, found or invented to legitimise and fortify (preferably to the point of non-permeability) the borders already drawn or keenly intended to be drawn. The snag is, that in most and perhaps all such cases a fully and truly airtight leak-proof and impassable non-porous borders are both logically and practically unachievable. Alongside "us" and "them" borders bring in the being, well-nigh inevitably, a cognitive and behavioural "green zone" of conceptual ambiguity and ethical/axiological ambivalence; an era reminiscent of the territories marked on ancient maps as *hic sunt leones* – the sphere of the unknown and for that reason dangerous, but also incommunicable. As Ludwig Wittgenstein put it – "if lions could speak, we wouldn't understand them" (Wittgenstein 1953).

In case of the residents of (or exiles to) the grey frontier zones, the condition of "being unknown and therefore menacing" is the effect of their inherent or imputed resistance to unambiguous classification; eluding of assignment to any of cognitive categories serving as building blocks of "order" and "normality", and first and foremost holding the separating borders impermeable. The cardinal sin or unforgivable crime consists in being the cause of mental and pragmatic incapacitation that follows the behavioural confusion they can't but generate (Wittgenstein, let's recall, defined understanding as knowing how to go on – 1953). In addition, that sin/crime encounters formidable obstacles to

redemption, given the stout refusal of the "us" to engage in a dialogue with "them" aimed at defying and mitigating the initial impossibility to understand them. The assignment to a "grey zone" is a self-propelling as well as intensifying process set in motion and beefed-up by the breakdown, or rather a priori refusal of communication; rising the difficulty of understanding to the rank of a moral injunction and a duty predetermined by God or History is, after all, the prime cause and a paramount stimulus to drawing and fortifying, mostly though not exclusively along the religious or ethnic lines, borders separating "us" from "them" – and the fundamental function they are ascribed to perform. The grey zone of ambiguity and ambivalence being an interface between "us" and "them", it inevitably constitutes the major, perhaps even main and all too often the sole territory on which the implacable hostilities between "us" and "them" are played out and the battles are fought.

The "us" vs. "them" dialectics discussed here thus far is an anthropological *constant* of human condition; the dialectics entails, however, also historical, time-bound *variables* as the game of self-identification and separation (or, more to the point, the game of separation *because* of self-identification and the game of self-identification *through* separation) meets new issues and challenges positing by changing techniques of domination and technologies of social actions that serve them.

One of such new challenges has been the need to design a replica/equivalent/smile, or an updated version of the orthodox, territorial variety of separation inside the online cyberspace of informatics notorious for allowing freedom to bypass border-posts and ignore borders. This challenge has been met; contrary to many a hopeful prognosis, the near-universal and 24/7 online availability of access to instant communication independently of geographical distance did not put paid to limits and off-bounds of information, but on the contrary: facilitated the job of mental separation and non-communication to the degree unattainable in the offline part of the universe we inhabit: nor in *Lebenswelte* shaped by the experience of the world deprived of the online sector. As shown by the research of practices deployed by a great majority of Internet users, the DIY "comfort zones", "echo chambers" or "mirror halls" easily constructed online by the simple expedient of nipping communication in its bud or preventing its building are much more effective tools of creating and sustaining separation than the most refining technologies of "gated communities" or state-installed frontier walls, barbed wires, most ingenious passport-and-visa arrangements and heavily armed border patrols.

The above described challenge of the online version of separation acquires moreover yet graver importance from its coincidence with another challenge – arguably the most seminal and most difficult to be met in the long history

of the human species. That another challenge is an unprecedented link in the long chain of expansions in the volume and reach of socio-political integration (and so, in effect, of the segments of humanity include in the "us" idea). Unprecedented – because all previous levels of integration – from primitive horde to nation-state – were produced and fixed using the same interplay of inclusion and exclusion: integration of "us" coupled, simultaneous and intimately connected to the point of non-discernibility of the separation from a joint enemy: some resented and assumed hostile "them".

The next leap in the history of expanding integration – if it ever happens – will have to do however *without* the clutch of a shared enemy – of new divisions, new separations and new walls needed to accommodate (indeed, to give meaning) to the unity of expanded "us". In our globalized world of universal interdependence we are all already cast, as Ulrich Beck insisted, in a "cosmopolitan *situation*" (Beck 2006) – but we haven't as yet embarked in earnest on the long and wobbly road leading to the acquisition of its necessary complement: the cosmopolitan *awareness* – worldview, mind-set and attitude. And no wonder: those prospective "us" embracing this time – for the first time in human history – the *whole* of humanity, would need to acquire such consciousness with no help of our enemy: a *shared* enemy legitimising and demanding for that reason the solidarity of all of "us". Is this however, with all its concomitants like an end to the grey zone of ambiguity and ambivalence, at all possible? Indeed, conceivable? To become a realistic proposition, this would at any rate require nothing less than an uphill-struggle to renegotiate and replace the thousands years old, deeply ingrained human mode of being-in-the-world.

The incompatibility of means and ends is arguably the gravest, the most intractable and potentially the most menacing among the manifestation of the present-day "instrumental crisis", justifying the view of the current planetary condition as one of "interregnum", defined by Antonio Gramsci as the state of affairs in which the inherited and extant instruments of collective action have stopped already or are imminent to stop working properly, while the new ones, adequate to deal with the already changed or emergent conditions, are still at best on the drawing boards (Gramsci 1971).

Such a mechanism served well all previous stages of the progressive expansion of politically integrated bodies – but does not square well with its last phase, imposed on the impending political agenda by the emergent "cosmopolitan condition"; indeed, it appears singularly unfit for performing "the last leap" in the history of human integration – raising the "we" concept and practices of human cohabitation, cooperation and solidarity to the level of humanity as a whole. Starkly, that last leap stands out from the long row

of its smaller-scale antecedents as not just *quantitatively*, but *qualitatively* distinct, unprecedented and untried in practice. It calls for nothing less than a necessarily traumatic separation between the issue of "belonging" (that is, of the self-identification), from that of territoriality of political sovereignty: a postulate loudly voiced a hundred or so years ago by the likes of Otto Bauer, Karl Reiner or Vladimir Menem in response to the multinational realities of the Austro-Hungarian or Russian Empires, though never and nowhere coming anyplace close to political usages and conventions.

Following that postulate doesn't seem on the cards in foreseeable future. On the contrary: most of the current symptoms (which I attempted to list in my study of "retrotopia" about to be published by the Polity Books) point to the ardent search for "them" – preferably the old-fashioned unmistakable and incurably alien hostile and pugnacious, fit for the job of identity-reinforcement, boundary-drawing and wall-building. The impulsive "natural" – impulsive as well as routine reactions of a rising number of powers-that-be to the progressive erosion of their territorial sovereignty – tends to be an effort to loosen their supra-state commitments and to retreat from previous consent to join resources and coordinate policies – that is moving yet farther away from complementing and matching their objectively cosmopolitan plight with programs and undertakings of a similar level. Such a state of affairs only adds to the volume of the global disarray that underpins the gradual yet relentless disablement of the extant institutions of political power. The prime winners are extraterritorial finances, investment funds and commodity trade of all shades of semi-legality; whereas economic and social equality, principles of inner- and inter-state justice are the losers – together with a large part, possibly, a growing majority, of the world population.

Instead of an earnest, consistent and coordinated, long-term undertaking to uproot the resulting existential fears, governments all around the globe have jumped to the chance of filling the legitimating vacuum left behind by the shrinking social provisions and abandoned post-war efforts to lay foundations under a "family of nations" by a powerful push toward a so-to--speak "securitization" of social problems and in consequence also the tenor of political thought and action. Popular fears, aided and abetted by an unwritten yet intimate, truly buddy-buddy alliance of political elite and mass information and entertainment media and spurred yet further by the rising hegemony of the "strong men" (and women) demagoguery, are for all intents and purposes welcome as the most precious ore fit for continuous smelting of ever new supplies of fresh political capitals which the let-off the leash commercial powers and their political lobbies and executors covet having been famished of their orthodox varieties.

From the top to the bottom of society, incorporating labour markets that set the tune played by their pipers for us, the *hoi polloi,* to chant or croon – an ambience is spewed of mutual (and a priori) distrust, suspiciousness and cut-throat competition. In such climate suffocate, wilt and fade germs of communal spirit and mutual help (if their sprouts haven't been forcibly nipped out before). With the stakes in a concerted, solidary actions losing their values day in, day out, and their potential effects dimming, the interest in joining forces and attend to shared interests in common are robbed of most of their attraction and so the stimuli to engage in a dialogue targeted on reciprocal recognition respect and bona fide understanding die out.

Existential Uncertainty and Migration Panic

There is, let me start, the phenomenon of *emigration/immigration* (from/to). And there is another phenomenon, of *migration* (from, but where to?) – all too often failed to be distinguished from the first and for that reason attempted to be dealt with the same policies. The two phenomena are ruled by different sets of laws and logics, their difference having been determined by the divergence of their roots; all the same, there is similarity between their effects, dictated by the semblance of psychosocial conditions at identities of destinations. Both their differences and similarities are magnified by the ongoing, and in all probability unstoppable, globalization of economy and information. The first makes all genuinely or putatively sovereign territories into "communicating vessels", between which their liquid contents are known to keep flowing until an equal level in all is reached. The second stretches the stimuli diffusion, copycat behaviour and the reference areas and yardsticks of "relative deprivation" to the fully and truly planet-wide dimension.

The phenomenon of immigration, as uniquely visionary Umberto Eco pointed well before the present-day migration of peoples took off[1], "may be controlled politically, restricted, encouraged, planned, or accepted… This is not the case with migration". Immigration can be controlled politically, but like natural phenomena, migration can't be "As long as there is immigration, peoples can hope to keep the immigrants in a ghetto, so that they do not mix with the natives. When migration occurs, there are no more ghettos, and intermarriage is uncontrollable".

[1] Here quoted from *Migration, Tolerance, and Intolerable* in transl. by Alastair McEwen (2001), *Five moral pieces*, Secker &Warburg, p. 93. Originally published as *Cinque scritti morali* by RCS Libri in 1997.

Eco asked then (quite a few years before the "immigration panic" took off) the crucial question: "Is it possible to distinguish immigration from migration when the entire planet is becoming the territory of intersecting movements of people?". And suggested in his reply: "What Europe is still trying to tackle as immigration is instead migration. The Third World is knocking at our doors, and it will come in even if we are not in agreement… Europe will become a multiracial continent – or 'coloured' one… That's how it will be, whether you like it or not". And, let me add – whether *all* of "them" like it or/and *all* of "us" resent.

At what point of time emigration/immigration turns into a migration? At what point the politically manageable trickle of immigrants knocking-at-our--doors turns into the quasi-self-sustained and self-propelling flood of migrants overflowing or by-passing all doors complete with their hastily patched together political reinforcements? At what point the accrued quantitative additions turn into qualitative changes? All answers to such questions are bound to stay essentially contested well beyond the moment which might be retrospectively recognized to have been such a watershed.

What sets the two phenomena apart is the issue of "assimilation"; its endemic presence in the concept "immigration" and its conspicuous absence in the concept of "migration" – a void filled first by the notions of "melting pot" or "hybridisation", and now, increasingly, by that of "multiculturalism": that is, of the cultural differentiation and diversity set to stay here for a foreseeable future, instead of being a stage on the road to cultural homogeneity and so, essentially, no more than a temporary irritant. To avoid the confusion between the extant state of affairs and policy planned/tried to tackle it – a kind of befuddlement for which the concept "multiculturalism" is infamously notorious – it is advisable to replace that term with the concept of "diasporisation": suggestive of two crucial traits of the state of affairs currently emerging in the result of migration – a state subject much more to the grassroots of processes and influences than dependant on a top-down regulation, and grounding the interaction between diasporas more on the division of labour than on gelling of cultures.

At the time when Eco published his study (about 20 years ago) in the city of New York "the whites" counted 58% and were ever nearer to becoming a minority; 42% of the "whites" were Jews, the rest was divided between Wasps, Poles, Italians, Hispanics, Irish etc. (2001: 92). A very similar amount of distinct ethnic, religious or linguistics categories and of the distribution of their percentages can be recorded in great cities of all continents, whose number is also on the rise. And let's recall that for the first time in its history most of humanity lives in cities, where life patterns for the rest of the planet tend to be set and daily modified.

This seminal departure in the modus operandi and the consequences of "peoples on the move" is – to deploy Eco's distinction – the outcome of *migration*, not *immigration:* of a self-propelling process, rather than of politically/militarily-supervised undertaking. Heterogeneity of urban environment can no longer be supposed, perceived and treated as bound to be made null and void ensuing the cultural assimilation of the currently alien elements: the inevitable – voluntary or imposed – surrender/annihilation of their cultural idiosyncrasies. Cultural heterogeneity is fast becoming – and recognized if not approved – as an un-detachable and irremovable, indeed endemic trait of the urban mode of human cohabitation.

Whether we like it or not, we the urban dwellers find ourselves in a situation requiring the development and appropriation of the skills of living with difference daily, and in all probability permanently. After a couple of centuries spent on dreams of cultural assimilation (unilateral) or convergence (bilateral), and on ensuing practices, we begin to face up – even if in many a case reluctantly, and often with un-mitigating resistance – to the prospect of the mixture of interaction and friction between multiplicity of irreducibly diverse identities of neighbouring and/or intermixed cultural diasporas. Realization of such prospect does not come easy and the first response is one of denial – or a resolute, emphatic and pugnacious rejection.

Intolerance, Eco suggests,

> comes before any doctrine. In this sense intolerance has biological roots, it manifests itself among animals as territoriality, it is based on emotional reactions that are often superficial – we cannot bear those who are different from us, because their skin is of different colour; because they speak language we do not understand; because they eat frogs, dogs, monkeys, pigs or garlic; because they tattoo themselves… (2001: 99–100).

To put yet stronger emphasis on the main point for the reason of its stark opposition to common beliefs, Eco reiterates: "doctrines of difference do not produce uncontrolled intolerance: on the contrary, they exploit a pre-existing and diffuse reservoir of intolerance" (2001: 100). Such a statement chimes well with insistent of Fredrik Barth, the formidable Norwegian anthropologist, that boundaries are not drawn because of noted differences, but the other way round: differences are noted or invented because boundaries have been drawn. According to both thinkers, doctrines are composed to "rationally" explain and justify, retrospectively, the already present and in most cases and in most cases firmly settled ill-disposed, disapproving, antagonistic, resentful and bellicose emotions.

Eco goes as far as stating that intolerance arising in the absence of any doctrine is the intolerance's "most dangerous form" (2001: 101). One can, after all, engage in polemics with an articulated doctrine and disprove one by one its explicit assertions and latent presumptions. Elemental drives, however, are immune to, and insulated against arguments. Fundamentalist, integralist, racist and ethnically chauvinist demagogues may and need to be charged with feeding and capitalizing on the pre-existence "elemental intolerance" for political profits, widening thereby its reverberations and exacerbating their morbidity – but not with *causing* the phenomenon of intolerance.

Where to look therefore for the origin and mainspring of the phenomenon? In the last account, I suggest, to the fear of the *unknown* – of which the "strangers" or "aliens" (by definition insufficiently known, yet less understood, and all but unpredictable in their conduct and their responses to one's own gambits) are most prominent emblems: most tangible because nearby and conspicuous. On the world map in which we inscribe our destinations and the roads leading to them, they stay uncharted (again by definition: have they been charted, they would have been moved to some other than the strangers' category). Their status in uncannily reminiscent to that signalled on ancient maps by the warning "hic sunt leones" inscribed on the outskirts of the inhabitable and inhabited *οικουμένη;* with a proviso, though, that these mysterious, sinister and intimidating beasts, lions in the migrants disguise, have left by now their distant lairs and squatted, surreptitiously, next door. If in the times when those road-maps were sketched one could prudently avoid venturing anywhere near their dens and by such a simple stratagem steer clear of trouble, such an option is no longer available. "The beasts" are now at our doors and one can't dodge encountering them whenever stepping out to the street.

To sum up: in the world in which we live, one can attempt to control (even with but a minor success) the issue of immigration – but migration is bound to follow its logic whatever we do. All in all, as things stand now and promise/warn to be standing for a long time to come, mass migration is unlikely to grind to a halt – neither for the lack of prompting nor for the rising ingenuity of attempts to stop it. As Robert Winder wittily remarked in the preface to the second edition of his book (2013) – "We can park our chair on the beach as often as we please, and cry at the oncoming waves, but the tide will not listen, nor the sea retreat". Building of walls in order to stop migrants short of "our own backyards" comes ridiculously close to the story of the ancient philosopher Diogenes rolling to and fro the barrel in which he lived along the streets of his native Sinope. Asked by the reasons for his pointless behaviour, he answered that noting his neighbours being busy barricading their doors and sharpening their swords, he wished to add his own contribution to the defence

of the city against its being conquered by the approaching troops of Alexander of Macedonia.

What has however happened most recently, in the last few years, is enormous leap in the numbers added by refugees and asylum seekers to the total volume of migrants knocking to the doors of Europe; that leap was caused by the rising number of "failing" or rather failed already states, or stateless and so also lawless territories, stages of interminable tribal and sectarian wars, mass murders, catch-as-you-catch-can, and round-the-clock banditry. To a large extent, this is the collateral damage done by the fatally misjudged, ill--starred and utterly calamitous military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq, ending in the replacing of dictatorial regimes with the open-all-hours theatre of unruliness and frenzy of violence – aided and abetted by the global arms trade unleashed from control and beefed up by the profit-greedy arms industry, with a tacit (though all too often proudly displayed in public on international arms fairs) support of GNP rise-greedy governments. The flood of the refugees pushed by the rule of arbitrary violence to abandon their homes and cherished possessions, of people seeking shelter from the killing fields, topped the steady flow of the so called "economic migrants", pulled by the all too human wish to move from the barren soil to where the grass is green: from impoverished lands of no prospects, to dreamlands rich in opportunities.

Back to the Self

The call "back to self" has been born as a battle-cry of the war of liberation from the horrors of tribal imprisonment resurrected by the still-birth of its ostensible cosmopolitan alternative; just as "back to tribes" was, and still remains, the motto of running-for-shelter from the abominations of the loneliness of the orphaned/bereaved individuals of the post-liberation era. Both calls are poisons, curiously serving as antidotes to each other.

In the "Privatisation of Hope"[2] – a succinct, yet all the same trenchant and incisive and first and foremost sincere (one is tempted to say: audaciously sincere) vivisection of human bonds – currently falling apart in the consequence of having been by and large abandoned to the individual humans' own wits, their chronically inadequate resources self-referential nature of their concerns, initiatives and undertakings – published in the "Boston Review" on 26 April 2016, Ronald Aronson asserted:

[2] http://bostonreview.net/us-books-ideas/ronald-aronson-privatization-hope

> Hope is being privatized. Throughout the world but especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, a seismic shift is underway, displacing aspirations and responsibilities from the larger society to our own individual universes. The detaching of personal expectations from the wider world transforms both…
>
> We have not lost all hope over the past generation; there is a maddening profusion of personal hopes. Under attack has been the kind of hope that is social, the motivation behind movements to make the world freer, more equal, more democratic, and more liveable.

In the nutshell:

> At one time, workers understood that they could improve their conditions by collectively asserting themselves; now workers understand that their best option is to protect themselves *by themselves*. Among self-seekers, experiences of class and solidarity are impossible and irrelevant. As [Steve] Fraser says, when the self is the only viable site of betterment, when there is no possible gain from collective action, collective consciousness seems "foolish, naïve, woolly-headed or, on the contrary, sinful and seditious".

Once abandoned to the markets game which they had little choice but join in the double capacity of sellers and the commodity on sale, the commodified humans are pushed and/or cajoled to perceive their being-in-the-world as an aggregation and succession of buying/selling transactions, and to regard the population of that world as accumulation of so many peddlers flaunting and haggling their wares each one of them displays on a privately owned and run market stall.

The people you meet on the first entry to that world, and then again and again upon successive entries to each one of its compartments, are most likely to "interpellate"[3] you, and equally likely to interpellated by you, as rivals and competitors; from time to time, may be as candidates for an occasional ad-hoc alliance, but hardly ever as natural brothers/sisters-in-arms – whether actual or destined to become. We are currently forcefully pushed – though with not much resistance on our part being evoked – back, to the early 19th century, when the peasants in many countries of Europe, and craftsmen and artisans in all of them, were expropriated on an accelerating pace of their means of production, and thereby also of their social standing and social capital. They have been crowded thereafter into the space of "life nasty, brutish and short" because conducted in a world engaged in the "war of all against all", a world populated

[3] A term introduced by Louis Althusser (1971).

by miserable like them, like them faceless and not fully human, and like them finding their new surroundings to be as alienating as are much hostile. It took them many decades to discover a common interest in that anonymous crowd clocking in and out the early capitalist factories and to crown that discovery with the notion of "solidarity" that ushered them in the era of experiments, aborted or stillborn attempts, false-starts, defeats and short-term triumphs stored in long-term memory; and yet more time to invent, institutionalize and practice a systemic and systematic solidary action aimed to replace enslavement with emancipation.

We are now in an era similar in its ambience. Some of us derive endurance from hoping for the forthcoming of new, more promising beginnings for all. Some others, disenchanted and exasperated by hopes' addicted to frustration, invest their aspirations in turning back to the past. But it seems that large majority among us don't care one way or another (either about the future or about the past), busying themselves instead in finding ways to disarm the unendurable prospects with the gadgets likely to deliver small but day in, day out satisfactions: cutting down on ambitions and expectations, having first retreated into the deceptively safe shelter of self-concern and self-reference. We haven't yet started however to take earnestly note of (let alone to draw conclusions from) the deceitfulness of that shelter's safety and disingenuousness of the self-reference. Blowing on singed fingers, most of us go on believing that – as Fraser noted – collective consciousness (not to mention collective action) is either seditious or naïve.

Frustration and the pain of singed fingers are all but genuine – but conclusions most people draw from them in practice even if not always in theory are not the only conceivable or even the sole convincing, let alone "foregone" or predetermined; just on the contrary, they are perched on several layers of tacit make-believe presumptions none of which holds much water. Jim Jackson, professor of sustainable development in the University of Surrey, managed to embrace all of these levels in a single concise phrase: "I t' s a s t o r y a b o u t u s, p e o p l e, being persuaded to spend money we don't have on things we don't need to create impressions that won't last on people we don't care"[4]. Cut to dry bones, this phrase means: we have been drawn into all those senseless preoccupations and routines, which we came to trust as the *foolproof* recipe for confirming our *illusory* status.

To apply Robert Merton's memorable distinction between the manifest and latent functions of social arrangements and the behavioural patterns they insinuate and demand, the manifest function of the mode of life imposed by

[4] https://www.ted.com/talks/tim_jackson_s_economic_reality_check

the consumerist culture is to service the clients' needs and choices and facilitate their gratification; why the latent function (as Merton suggests, the factual engine of the whole arrangement) is to allow the users to reconcile and adjust to a life in which the chronic lack of needs servicing is made liveable by the stratagem of illusory gratification of the phantom ones.

Drawing on the presently all-too-common and therefore familiar manifestations of that rule in operation, Umberto offers (in one of his 1991 essays – Eco 1995) an outstandingly, genuinely, uniquely perceptive autopsy of its mechanism:

> The man with power is the man who is not required to answer every call; on the contrary, he is always – as the saying goes – in a meeting…
>
> So anyone who flaunts a portable phone as a symbol of power is, on the contrary, announcing to all and sundry his desperate, subaltern position, in which he is obliged to snap to attention, even when making love, if the CEO happens to telephone… The fact that he uses, ostentatiously, his cellular phone is proof that he doesn't know these things, and it is the confirmation of his social banishment, beyond appeal.

His eye-opening, meticulously and in-depth researched study of what he calls "The Age of Acquiescence"[5] – a genuine compendium of factors joining forces in the job of reinforcing such "men with power" inside the castles to which they retreat and of making them immune to the acts of dissent and protest by those barred access – Steve Fraser subtitles "The Life and Death of American Resistance to Organized Wealth and Power". His question is not why did the "Occupy Wall Street" happen (a question with a too obvious an answer to demand a five-hundred-pages long study), but why it *didn't* "happen much sooner than it did?". And, as we may add with the benefit of hindsight when reading that book two years after it left the printing presses, why did it fade, wilt and grind to a halt so soon, leaving little if any trace on the Wall Street practices and eroding next to nothing of the "men in power" insurance against the thoughts and deeds of the remaining 99% of the nation? Considering that the "political class prescribed what people already had enough of: yet another dose of austerity, plus a faith-based belief in a 'recovery' that for the 99% of Americans would never be much more than an optical illusion", and that in those years "the hopes of ordinary people for a chance at a decent future waned and bitterness set in"?

[5] Published in 2015 by Little, Brown and Company.

What we are witnessing today, indeed day in, day out, is a compound of acquiescence and frustration, disenchantment and frantic search for alternative ways to act and live, disillusion and hope, feeling of letdown and expectancy of redemption: apocalypsis amalgamated with the foretaste of a messianic era. That compound is anything but cohesive or equilibrated: it needs to be viewed as an unfinished process rather than a fixed state of affairs. That process has been triggered by the failure and discreditation of the political class; it seems to be moving back to self – toward the paradox of a reciprocal sustenance of the self's autonomy and a decisionist ruler at the top.

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Zygmunt Bauman

SOME OF THE FOREMOST CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS QUO

Donald Trump's election, results of the British referendum on membership in the EU and the rise of populist parties in Europe constitute various aspects of the challenges to the status quo resulting from the growing economic and cultural gap between privileged elites and the masses, as well as from the immigration from less developed regions to the rich countries of North America and Western Europe. The existing democratic systems have been unable to cope with these challenges and a fundamental change in the status quo is necessary if authoritarian trend is to be stopped.

Key words: elites, immigration, popular protest, retropia

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Janusz Reykowski
The Institute of Psychology of the Polish Academy of Sciences[1]

THE MASSIVE EXCHANGE OF ELITES AS A MEAN OF FORMATION OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

The policy of "good change" and "massive exchange of elites"

The parliamentary election that took place in Poland in 2015 initiated the major socio-political transformation labeled by its authors, politicians of the winning party, the "good change". There are various ways of description of the "good change". In my opinion, however, its main characteristic is the process of the massive exchange of elites. This process concerns all fields that remain under direct or indirect control of the state authority. Thus, it pertains to the state administration, the apparatus of justice, the army, the police, media, state-owned companies, educational institutions, cultural institutions (also these that are formally independent but receive some subsidies from the state).

The process of exchange of the elites has elaborated ideological justifications – broadly popularized legitimizing myth. The main elements of this myth include the thesis about illegitimate origins of the Third Republic of Poland that was established after the fall of communism (it was allegedly a result of collusion of the communist and Solidarity elites), about the treacherous policy of the elites (Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the new government coalition, described Poland as a German-Russian condominium), about massive corruption of the previous governments that sold Polish companies to foreign corporations, about destroying of the Polish traditions and the reputation of the Polish nation (for example by acknowledging the post-war cases of pogroms and mass-murders of Jews who survived the Holocaust) etc. The quintessence of all these "grave sins" of the existing elites is their refusal to admit that the Smolensk catastrophe – the plane crash that involved

[1] E-mail: januszre@warman.com.pl

death of 96 persons including the Polish president (Jarosław Kaczyński's twin brother) and many top political and military officials – was an assassination (in fact there is no smallest evidence that the crash was caused intentionally by anybody). These and some other accusations of the existing elites is supposed to justify its elimination and replacement by the new elite chosen by the governing authorities.

The ideas and intents of the rapid exchange of elites have appeared in the minds of various people in various countries. For example, in the US it takes a form of an intensive hostility toward "Washington", that is, toward the political elite that is accused of various kinds of wrongdoings. There are politicians that base their political campaigns on the promise of a radical change of the Washington elite (Frank 2004). This kind of thinking was (is) popular among members of Tea Party (Beck 2009) or Donald Trump's supporters. But in fact it was popular in various countries among radical political movements – left and right.

The practical realization of the idea of the massive exchange of elites might require certain conditions. Such conditions have appeared in Poland. We can mention the following.

First, the existence of social groups that feel that the current system limits their chances for personal advancement or harms them in various ways. Such feeling exists in Poland among various groups. It is manifested in the form of economic emigration, in common complaints about employment conditions, in widespread dissatisfaction of young people who feel that their life perspectives are highly limited. It is related to broadening the system of employment described as "junk contracts" that implies very limited rights of the employee. There are also numerous groups of conservative Catholics who felt marginalized by political "mainstream". In fact, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church had strong reservations toward the ruling elites for their liberalism – these reservations were shared by numerous conservatively minded groups especially among people living in small towns and villages. Moreover, there are also some former members of the "Solidarity" movement that felt that democratic transformation put them aside.

Second, the very broad disappointment with the ruling elites. The indications of this disappointment could be noticed not only among the socially disadvantaged groups, but also among many others. It was reflected, among others, in high abstention rate in the election among supporters of the ruling center-right party (Civic Platform – PO) as well as a widespread belief that the ruling circles created a closed system of connections not permeable for "outsiders".

Third, the growing tolerance for authoritarian politics. There is many socio-psychological research showing that increase of authoritarianism is

a typical reaction in situations of increased sense of social threat and stress (Jost et al. 2003, Mirisola et al. 2004, Onraet, Dhont, Van Hiel 2014). For example, the growth of the Right Wing Authoritarianism was observed among Americans after September 11, as well as among Spaniards after the terror attack on the railway station in Madrid, and in many other cases (Matthews, Levin, Sidanius 2009).

In the Polish society, the increased sense of threat among the society could be caused by a number of factors such as:

The growing economic uncertainties evoked, among others, by old pension reform.

The Smolensk catastrophe, which undermined trust in the wisdom and sense of responsibility of these who govern. This loss of trust affected people who saw that the accident was a consequence of a mess among high level decision makers and recklessness of people responsible for the safety of the state. Even greater distrust appeared among these who got convinced that the catastrophe was orchestrated by the enemies of the Polish president and the previous regime was somewhat responsible for what happened.

The growing fear of terrorism. The fear was augmented by the perspective of arrival of refugees, especially from the Muslim countries. There is a wide chasm between elite groups and so called common people about acceptance of refugees in Poland. The elites presented admission of the Muslim refugees as a moral obligation and condemned the people who were against it. But for the majority of citizens whose knowledge about Muslims is limited to the information heard on TV or read in popular newspapers or Internet, these people are very dangerous due to their attachment to primitive traditions (e.g. killing daughters who violated the family code), hatred for the Western civilization and resistance to its influences. Muslim communities are regarded as homes to ruthless terrorists responsible for mass-murdering of innocent people. These people are supposed to come to Poland as a result of the decisions made by artsy dreamers from Warsaw. Fear and hatred invoked by such groups can be easily transferred to those who advocate for them.

A caveat should be added here: In the last two years the proportion of people in Poland who have agreed with the statement that "non-democratic government is more desirable than democratic one" has markedly declined. In November 2015 40% of respondents agreed with the statement and 40% have disagreed. In January 2017 agreed 28% – disagreed 52% (CBOS 2017). Apparently the policy of "good change" has changed the popular opinion about democracy.

Fourth, the massive exchange of elites is more likely to be successful if this policy gains a broad social support. Of course, first of all such support can be

obtained from these who can personally benefit from this policy. But support can be much broader, if government introduces reforms improving the economic situation of the disadvantaged social groups, the ones who felt neglected by the previous regimes. Without such social support, exchange of elites could require the use of direct, physical force to overcome a possible resistance. The rulers in Poland made several changes in economic policy that brought a visible improvement in the situation of the large part of underprivileged groups.

Is the situation in Poland unique? Yes and no.

It is not unique, because in many European Union countries there are clear signs of dissatisfaction with the existing authorities, and with their policy. This dissatisfaction is reflected in the systematic decline of confidence in the authorities. As shown by Standard Eurobarometer 84, between 2004 and 2014 there was a decrease of confidence both in the European Union leaders (from 50% to 32%), the national parliaments (38% to 28%) and the national governments (34% to 27%). The EU citizens have a particularly low confidence in the political parties – in 2014 in 21 countries more than 75% of the respondents had expressed distrust to political parties (in some countries – over 90%).

The increase in the popularity of the radical right in Europe can be regarded as an indication of dissatisfaction with the existing elites and increasing approval for some kind of radical changes. The political movements advocating radical changes become visible in various European countries such as Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Switzerland. In some countries they were able to obtain political power (Hungary, Poland) and in some other they got close to it (Austria, France) (Mudde 2007, Mudde, 2011). It means that processes in Poland are similar to processes in Europe but are more intensive, more radical.

It is hard to predict what might happen in European states if the observed trend would not be stopped. If the radical right would win parliamentary or presidential elections may it incur merely some more or less serious modifications of the existing policy or much deeper changes – something akin to a broad change of the elites? Most likely, the depth of the changes might depend on the strength of democracy in the given country – the degree to which the democratic system is rooted in the political culture of the given society (Wiatr, this issue). However, as much as Poland is concerned the political trends observed in Europe can strengthen the policy of "good change".

So far, the entire process of exchange of the elites in Poland has been executed by political measures supported by intense propaganda aimed at discrediting and denigrating the opponents, including their ancestors until the third generation. However, the methods might change, when the resistance against the "good change" policy becomes stronger, and when

social support for the ruling party declines due to economic problems. In such circumstances, the more fanatic forces inside the ruling party might employ other measures.

There are two kinds of indications as to the kind of possible measures. One indication is the progress in forming the paramilitary forces subordinated personally to the Minister of National Defense having the well-deserved opinion of an extremist. Such forces having special privileges and not regulated by law can be a convenient instrument in hands of politicians who would like to crack down on their enemies. The existing propaganda apparatus is able to provide abundance of moral justifications of such actions.

The second indication that physical violence is not strange to the authors of "good change" is their positive attitude to the groups of sport fans engaged in the stadium violence. They are prized for their "patriotism" and their aggressive behavior is justified.

The policy of "good change" and "massive exchange of elites" has its predecessors in Poland and in some other countries. In the recent Polish history, communist government that took power in 1945, after the WWII, instituted the policy of a very radical exchange of elites. In 1968 nationalists in the ruling communist party organized a massive purge under the banner of the fight with Zionism. Some major changes primarily among the political elite took place after 1989 during transformation of the socio-economic system in Poland (after "fall of communism"). These changes, however, have not affected Polish cultural elites because a considerable part of these elites was engaged in opposition against the previous system. Moreover, the norms of the democratic system inhibited a policy of revenge or dominance of a particular political group.

(Massive) exchange of elites and the Chinese Cultural Revolution

One of the most extreme and drastic example of the massive exchange of elites is the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Fenby 2008). It is obvious that there are vast differences between that revolution and the "good change". However, on a more abstract level, we can identify certain similar general mechanisms that might operate in various socio-geographical contexts. We might consider the following:

Similarity of assumptions:

- the previous order is fundamentally wrong and must be abolished,
- people who created this order and supported it were driven by their selfish (dirty) interests, inimical to the interest of the nation and they should be replaced with the people who want to build the new order and are loyal to

it. The concept of the new order is not clearly defined. It allegedly exists in the mind of the leader but his followers are convinced in its unquestionable superiority over the previous one.

A similarity of technology of the change:

It consists first of all in compromising the existing authorities and in destroying symbols of the past. In Poland it took the form of elaborated attack (not physical) on the icons of the democratic transformation, first of all on Lech Wałęsa and Adam Michnik and on other well-deserved Solidarity activists as well as on politicians who have built the democratic system in Poland. The new rulers try to popularize their own authorities and their own symbols (cf. the cult of Lech Kaczyński, the Smolensk disaster, the "cursed soldiers" – that is the armed underground opposition against the communist government after the WWII etc.).

During the Cultural Revolution the popular instruments of attack on people regarded as its enemies and representatives of the past were the Big-Character Posters. Of course, such posters do not appear in Poland. Instead, Internet is the place where opponents of "good change" – lawyers, judges (including former presidents of the Constitutional Tribunal), journalists, writers and other critics of the policy of "good change" are condemned, ridiculed, accused of various contemptible acts and even a betrayal. Contempt, disrespect, and mockery aimed at the most prominent figures of the Polish public life are very common practice of leading politicians of the ruling party.

Similarity (although very remote) of treatment of the members of the old elites, especially these regarded as opponents or enemies of the change.

The officials, specialists, managers whose present or past professional opinions or activities are not liked by the rulers or just because they obtained their positions in the past, are dismissed from their posts or send away to the remote places "in the provinces". Truly, it is not as bad as being sent to farms in the countryside for hard forced physical labor – the common practice of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

Espousing the radical youth.

Radical youth tends to be the striking force of the policy of exchange of elites. In Poland, there exist the right wing radical youth organizations that seem to be sympathetic to "good change" and meet with tolerance or protection of the rulers. There are some indications that among Polish youth there is a recruiting base for contemporary form of the "cultural revolution". But at present, the connections between radical youth and the ruling party appear as not very strong. On the other side, there are also large groups of youth devoted to democratic ideals. They were visible in manifestations in defense of the constitution and the rule of law.

Despite such and other similarities, both the scale and the level of brutality of the policy of "good change" is of course incomparable to "cultural revolution". We live in a different culture, in a different international context, and governing party has rather limited powers. And there is a strong opposition against this policy. Large groups of Poles publicly manifest their disapproval – hundred thousands of demonstrators take to the streets to manifest their opposition against the "good change". Moreover, still working democratic institutions are not easily silenced or eliminated. In other words, the executors of "good change" face numerous limitations. Jarosław Kaczyński is far from being like Mao Tse-tung. However, he consistently aims at increasing the extent of his power.

Change of elites – a desirable or even a necessary process

While discussing the phenomenon of the change of elites, we should not ignore the fact that some degree of change can be a desirable or even a necessary process. Although it is usually an evolutionary process combining continuity and change, there are instances when the natural change of elites is inhibited. The system is blocked and any major improvements are prevented. For example, recently, there have been many voices pointing out that Wall Street's financial elites have created a closed system that protects them from any significant changes as well as from responsibility for the disastrous social consequences of their practices. Thus, one cannot, a priori, question the very fact of replacing a part of elites, as it might have some healing effect for the society. But the main issue is the rules of change: the criteria of change, the procedures of change, the professional and moral qualities of these who replace the previous elites.

In the Polish case, the main criterion of the change is assumed loyalty to the ruling party. People are removed from their posts not because of lack of competence and poor performance but because of lack of the blind subordination to directives of their political superiors. It serves the concentration of power in the hands of one party and its leader. In other words, the change consists in the transformation of the political system in the authoritarian direction.

The best example of this process is the forceful replacement of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal whose main function is evaluation whether the existing or new law conforms to the principles of the Polish constitution. The procedure of appointment of the new judges obedient to the party line was a clear breach of the constitution. The highest European Union legal and political authorities condemned it.

To sum up, I would like to stress that the most frightening aspect of the policy of "good change" is its goal. Apparently, this policy is orientated toward formation of an authoritarian state. The massive exchange of the elites is

one of the main instruments of this policy. Therefore, in creation of the new elites open-mindedness, competence, professional qualifications, democratic ethos do not seem to matter much. Such a course of events might have highly negative consequences for the Polish society.

Perhaps there is one exception – the authors of the "good change" pursuing their own political interests try to strengthen their support from the underprivileged social groups that feel victims of the transformation. They instituted a social policy leading to a significant improvement of the economic situation of these groups. This might remain as a positive legacy of the "good change".

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Janusz Reykowski

THE MASSIVE EXCHANGE OF ELITES AS A MEAN OF FORMATION OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

After parliamentary election of 2015 in Poland the winning party (Law and Justice, PiS) initiated the major socio-political transformation labeled by its authors the "good change". Its main characteristic is the process of the massive exchange of elites. The process of exchange of the elites has elaborated ideological justifications – broadly popularized legitimizing myth. Its main claim is the thesis about illegitimate origins of the Third Republic of Poland that was established after the fall of communism and about policies of the previous governments that were allegedly contrary to the basic interests of Poland. The practical realization of the idea of the massive exchange of elites might require certain conditions such as the existence of social groups that feel that the current system limits their chances for personal advancement, broad disappointment with the ruling elites, growing tolerance for authoritarian politics, social support for the change. It should be noted that some of these conditions exist, to the certain degree, in various countries of Europe and facilitate the development of the radical right wing movements. This paper describes some of the mechanisms of the change that on the abstract level are similar to processes of exchange of elites in other geo-political contexts.

Key words: elite change, legitimizing myth, right-wing authoritarianism, confidence in authorities, cultural revolution

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Peter Anyang' Nyong'o
Senator for Kisumo County (Kenya), African Research and Resource Forum[1]

AUTHORITARIANISM WITH AN ELECTORAL FACE IN AFRICA

Introduction: Colonial and Nationalist Origins of Authoritarian Rule in Africa

Following my Keynote Address at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) 25th Congress held in the city of Poznan, Poland, on July 23–28, 2016, entitled "When Democracy Fails to Deliver, Can the 'Losers' accept 'Victory' as Legitimate?" my academic Grandfather, Jerzy Wiatr, requested me to prepare this paper for the Polish academic journal, *Sociological-Political Studies.* Jerzy Wiatr was professor to my former professor, Adam Przeworski, at the University of Chicago in the mid 1970s when I was doing graduate studies in Political Science there. Hence the academic genealogical relationship. But there is more to it than that. From Adam I learnt plenty of political economy, and the relationship between political power and social relations, between state and society throughout many historical epochs or modes of production. The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels came in handy, and so were many other social and political science treatises which were skeptical about the Euro--Christian notion that "we should always render unto Caesar what is Caesar's". In other words, that political domination and economic exploitation are both somehow God-given and immutable.

I learnt further that political power is imposed on people and not given by God from above although quite often rationalized as such through the ages. Further, again throughout the ages, people living under different forms of political order have always sought to control their governors. George Bernard Shaw's observation in *The Apple Cart* (1930) that "we need to be governed

[1] E-mail: nyongoanyang@gmail.com; george@arrforum.org

and yet to control our governors" is not unique to democratic struggles; many verses in both the Old and the New Testaments of the *Bible* depict this preoccupation among the ruled even in pre-capitalist societies. Likewise, every form of economic exploitation is always reinforced and reproduced through a certain form of state. Different forms of state have appeared and disappeared through history, not through the will of those who wield political power, but through some struggle waged between the beneficiaries and the losers in society, between and among various social classes.

Following three years of this study on "state and social processes," or "state and class struggles" through history, I was curious to find out how the transition from colonial rule to independence had been achieved, and what explained the similarities and differences in forms of government in Africa after independence. The nationalist movements had been so popular in Africa, receiving almost unanimous endorsement by the people except where they differed on how different ethnic groups and social classes would benefit from the post-colonial dispensation of the new African-ruled state. Tom Mboya, the Kenyan nationalist, put it very well in his autobiography written very early in his life. He observed that *uhuru,* or "freedom", was in the interest of all Africans discriminated against by the "colonial system" in various ways. After *uhuru,* prostitutes who had been discriminated against by racism would be free to enjoy the male market without any let or hindrance. Clergymen not promoted by their racist bishops would be freed to do so by the new non-racial political order. Africans made landless by white land owners would get their land back, and so on (Mboya 1963). Hence it was only logical that all African people needed to join hands into one formidable nationalist political party or movement called The Kenya African National Union (KANU) whose president was Jomo Kenyatta, Deputy President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Secretary General Thomas Joseph Mboya.

But the unanimity Mboya expected proved more of an ideology for KANU hegemony rather than an accepted fact by all in the nationalist movement. A rival party, called the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), grouped together the elite from so-called "small tribes" allied to the settlers in the Rift Valley who were suspicious of KANU's hegemony and the tensions in that party over land issues. That political independence from British rule although accepted as desirable by the nationalists in both KANU and KADU did not necessarily mean that there was unanimity regarding the outcome of doing away with British rule. That it would be realized under a unitary state was the bone of contention. The white settlers wanted their interests, particularly in the Kalenjin dominated Rift Valley region, where they owned large chunks of land, to be protected by a decentralized system of government, dividing

Kenya into regions, and giving each region some substantial "home rule". They persuaded the African nationalists in KADU that this interest was mutual: it was a political insurance against KANU domination after independence as well as a guarantee for protecting their land against "external" interests.

The nationalists in KANU regarded a highly decentralized system of government as balkanizing Kenya but they accepted it at the Lancaster House Constitutional negotiations knowing very well that they would break it after achieving political power at independence. And so they did, eventually turning Kenya into a *de facto* one-party state by 1969 as we shall later see. Inherent in this belief in "unity" and unanimity of purpose was the germ of the one-party state as the political shell within which political stability would be guaranteed and development delivered.[2]

Except for the Congo where the Belgian colonialists left in a hurry (and in a huff), destroying the infrastructure and leaving the Congolese in near total chaos, elsewhere the "transition" from colonial rule to independence was well orchestrated and "smooth". Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies were, however, another exception. In South Africa, a domestic white racist ruling class, forming a minority in society, was determined to use state power to deny Africans political, social and economic rights, and use the state almost exclusively to serve white economic, social and political interests. This was called *apartheid,* an Afrikaners[3] form of fascism. The struggles for independence in both South Africa and the Portuguese colonies were protracted and only finally resolved by decades of guerilla warfare and armed struggle by the African nationalists, very much like the Vietcong history in Viet Nam. These struggles have been well analyzed and documented by the nationalists themselves. In the case of South Africa, Nelson Mandela's autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom* (1994)[4], is the best read. For all intents and purposes, the apartheid state in South Africa was a one-party authoritarian state.

Contrary to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's (1965) belief that the one-party state was necessary since there were no fundamental differences to warrant competitive party politics in Africa, historical evidence shows that the struggle for independence, and independence itself, was a contested matter. Beneath the

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[2] See Ary Zolberg (1967) .

[3] "Afrikaners", or Boers, are the descendants of the Dutch-speaking settlers of the eastern Cape frontier in Southern Africa where they settled since the 1890s. They championed the segregated system of government in South Africa where "whites" were the ruling race and black Africans the dominated and subordinate race.

[4] In the case of the Portuguese colonies, although Amilcar Cabral, the Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau liberation leader, documented most of his experience confined to this specific region. See Amilcar Cabral (1979).

veneer of unity and excitement of being "free at last", there was the lingering fear that the political and economic deals made between the nationalist leaders and the colonial masters were not in the long term interest of everybody. Broad-based *nationalist coalitions* had come together to make their people be "free at last". There was a sneaky feeling that the hegemonic forces behind these coalitions would sooner, rather than later, emerge dominant, and even embark on programs of political exclusion in favor of certain social classes. In my doctoral study of *the political economy of coffee production in Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)* I confirmed this fear, and documented it in two articles published in *Africa Affairs,*[5] covering the Kenyan experience, and in Paul Lubeck's book, covering La Cote d'Ivoire experience (Nyong'o 1987a).

The arguments in these two articles were very similar. Both Kenya and Ivory Coast had been plantation settler colonies. Kenya, colonized by the British who brought in white coffee settlers and tea farmers, as well as cattle ranchers, to provide economic development that British imperialism would exploit by making "the colony service itself" while transmitting some surplus to the British economy. Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), likewise colonized by the French, saw white French farmers acquire large pieces of land to grow coffee, cocoa, bananas and pineapples while lumbering forests to achieve the same objectives as their British counterparts in Kenya. In Cote d'Ivoire the French had to depend on forced labor given plenty of land and reluctance of the peasants to work for wages. They subsidized this by importing cheap labor from the drier northern colony of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). In Kenya, the British deprived the Africans of their land and then forced them to work for slave wages in the plantations for a living. The result in both cases was the same: an alliance between the British and French landed gentry with a small African landowners' elite and "Uncle Tom's" both of whom were deeply resented by the peasants who were transformed into either forced laborers or very poorly remunerated semi-proletariat. After the Second World War, with grievances of the returned African soldiers who had served in the war to defend "European democracy and free society" against fascism, the contradictions became more obvious at home. The African elite in both countries mobilized all disgruntled social forces among the African masses to demand for democracy and freedom that the European masters had made them defend everywhere in Europe's interest, but at the expense of their lives. Colonialism in Africa became an anachronism after the war. This has been documented in many studies, the best of which are writings by Basil Davidson (1969), Thomas Hodgkin (1956) and Walter Rodney (1972). No sooner had they ascended to state power did these

[5] See P. Anyang' Nyong'o (1989), but see also my other earlier article from 1981.

nationalist elites transform political power, won through mass mobilization and democratic elections, into one-party presidential authoritarian rule at best, or military dictatorship at worst.

In this essay, we shall give Kenya as an example of authoritarianism coexisting with some form of electoral democracy arising as a result of popular resistance against political repression and illegitimate government after independence, with the governments "adjusting" to pressures for democratization in various ways from one country to the other (Nyong'o 1995).

Tribe, Class and Political Hegemony: The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalition in Kenya

In Kenya, the first crisis that led to the disintegration of the nationalist coalition was over the land policy and practice of the post-colonial state. A more entrenched elite regarded their economic upward mobility after independence as inheritance of the large scale farms owned by the departing white settlers in disregard to the interests of the landless peasants. This was mainly in Central Kenya where the division between a landed elite and a landless peasantry preceded colonialism and intensified during colonial times as the colonial regime rewarded this landed "native" Kikuyu elite with more land, as well as political power as chiefs and civil servants, so as "to keep the natives in check as home guards". The peasants, turned into squatters cultivating and grazing on land which did not belong to them, "bought this privilege" by providing the land owner with very cheap labor. The power to bargain over wages was absent. Grievances among the peasants simply waited for an appropriate opportunity to fight back.

The Mau Mau outbreak in the early 1950s saw the landless peasantry join hands with the returned soldiers into a Kenya Land Freedom Army which the settlers derogatorily called "the Mau Mau". But the Freedom Army was opposed by the Kikuyu privileged landed elite who believed that no land could be given free since it was a rare commodity and giving it free would spoil "the market for land". Nonetheless, the returned soldiers and the landless peasantry insisted that land had to be given to the landless without any condition. After all, the soldiers themselves did not have land and needed it for their own subsistence[6]. The interests of the soldiers and the peasants coincided, and their common enemy was the white settler, the Kikuyu landed elite and the colonial state. The colonial state, the British government and the Kikuyu home guards

[6] It is to be noted that the British government decided to reward some white soldiers returning from the war by giving them free land in the White Highlands to grow tea.

held their ground and struck back ferociously, detaining the Land Freedom Army leaders and confining the rebellious peasants into concentration camps and hamlets. Any land belonging to members of the rebellion was confiscated and generally given to the home guards and their allies. By the end of 1953, the Mau Mau had virtually been defeated, and plans were now underway by the British government and settlers to find a more lasting solution to the land issue without jeopardizing the interests of the white settler community and the Kikuyu home guard loyalists. A generous package was arranged to buy out the white settlers and give the land back to the emerging independent state under the domination of an acceptable African elite. The home guards fitted this bill perfectly (Wasserman 1970).

Since the arable land, in the case of Kenya, was limited and mainly confined to the white settler areas in Central Kenya, predominantly the Kikuyu countryside, it was this land that needed to be subdivided and dished out to the landless peasants. The conflicts between Jomo Kenyatta, the president, and his deputy Jaramogi Oginga Odinga – whose chief ally was Bildad Kaggia, a Kikuyu Assistant Minister for land in the independence government, was based on this land issue. Odinga and his allies believed that the landless peasants deserved free land while Kenyatta and his allies were committed to a policy of "willing buyer willing seller". In the event that the poor peasants were to be given land, a cheap loan arrangement, made possible through concessional terms from the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the World Bank to the state owned Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Agriculture Development Corporation (ADC), would be used. Oginga Odinga documented this in his autobiography, *Not Yet Uhuru* (1967). But even this arrangement still left the landed political elites, now in charge of state power, to benefit inordinately from the settlement schemes, capitalizing on their access to other public resources, exploiting political power for primitive accumulation and hence emerging as a rural bourgeoisie among a largely land starved peasantry. This peasantry subsidized their poor agricultural earnings by doing extra labor in the larger farms belonging to this emerging landed aristocracy. Thus inequality between the rich and the poor grew bigger and bigger by the day, drawing in the urban poor who fared no better[7]. This "constituency of the deprived" provided Odinga and his radical political faction within KANU a ready-made political base. The rivalry between the two factions within the ruling party intensified.

Jomo Kenyatta reacted to this by seeking to isolate and ethnically profile both Odinga and Kaggia. He likened Odinga to a jealous rival for political

[7] See the ILO report on Kenya on *Employment, Incomes and Equality*… (1972).

power from "another Community", the Luo. He saw Kaggia as a lazy Kikuyu who had failed to take advantage of having state power to organize his own self-advancement. He portrayed Kaggia as a betrayer to the Kikuyu unity for retaining state power for the eventual benefit of all Kikuyus, rich or poor. Peasant delegations were organized to his rural home in Gatundu in central Kenya to "pledge loyalty to his presidency and to denounce all traitors". Obviously the post-colonial state extended plenty of largesse to these poor peasants, and quite a good number of them were rewarded by being settled in small holding farms in the Rift Valley, the land of the Kalenjin ethnic community, away from Central Kenya where the rising landed Kikuyu state bourgeoisie was now asserting its hegemony. This, argues Colin Leys, is where the ideology of tribalism – or the politics of ethnic exclusion – began to cement the hegemonic rule by the bourgeoisie in Central Kenya as the nationalist independence coalition started to disintegrate.

With this clear ideological disagreement over the land policy, the Odinga group decided to leave KANU and form an opposition party in 1966 called The Kenya People's Union (KPU) whose ideological line was substantially socialist, emphasizing state control of "the commanding heights of the economy" while providing free land to the landless peasants. It did not take Kenyatta and his allies long to brand KPU as a communist party being propped up by the Kremlin and Red China. They demonized the KPU leaders as dispensers of "free things", including private property and personal possessions, obviously aware that even the small peasantry was dearly attached to their property and possessions. This ideological demagogy was extended to songs in the only state-owned radio and television stations which continuously broadcast damaging propaganda against the opposition and praised the KANU government's outstanding achievements and promises to the skies. In a Machiavellian move, KANU brought a constitutional amendment to Parliament making it necessary for those changing political party allegiance "to seek fresh mandate from the people in an election". KANU knew that in the "Little General Election" that was to follow, state machinery would be let lose on KPU candidates, especially outside Odinga's ethnic area, the Nyanza Province, so as to portray the party as a purely ethnic and exclusivist outfit. And this is exactly what happened (Mueller 1972). Only nine out of 31 KPU Members of Parliament survived the polls, seven from Luo and two from Luhyia constituencies, the Luo neighbors. From then on, state machinery was systematically used to harass the KPU, culminating in passing of several repressive laws by the KANU dominated parliament. These laws gave more and more power to the executive, making other organs of the state supplicant to the presidency. With this came even more intense struggles within the executive on who controlled the presidency,

or who was near enough to this increasingly personalized presidential regime to share this power.

In 1968, Kenyatta got a stroke, and possibilities of his passing on intensified the highly Kikuyunized state bureaucracy to determine the succession trajectory. Tom Mboya, the Luo Secretary General of KANU, was regarded by the Kikuyu establishment as "an outsider" who could not be trusted to safeguard the hegemony of this elite should he ascend to the presidency. On July 5th, 1969, he was assassinated by a Kikuyu gunman in a Nairobi street under very suspicious circumstances. Ethnic tensions followed. Kenyatta was pelted with stones at Mboya's requiem mass at the Holy Family Basilica in Nairobi. Kikuyu government ministers and senior personnel were not allowed to attend his funeral in Rusinga Island in Lake Victoria except for Jeremiah Nyagah from Embu, Mwai Kibaki from Nyeri and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki from Murang'a. The Kikuyu elite reacted by initiating a massive oath-taking of their people at Kenyatta's farm in Gatundu, binding them to defend the Kikuyu political and economic hegemony "for ever". Political coercion had started in earnest, disrespecting all constitutional safeguards, the rule of law and checks and balances in government.[8] An authoritarian presidential system, command-driven in nature, was to be imposed on people under the guise of a tribal ideology by a section of the Kenyan citizenry. But as Ruth First (1970) has observed, when politicians begin to command, who is more qualified to rule by command than the army?[9]

Tom Mboya had been a close friend of Kitili Mwendwa, then Kenya's Chief Justice and hailing from the Akamba community. Mboya had grown up in a sisal plantation in Ukambani as a young boy and spoke Kikamba, hence the many friends he had who were service men in the armed forces. His death created discontent among a section of the army who, in conjunction with certain parliamentarians, started to plot a coup d'état, their reason being the increasing ethnic exclusion by the Kikuyu in government departments as well as in business. A conversation between Gideon Mutiso, a Member of Parliament from Ukambani, and General Ndolo, the Mkamba head of the army, solicited the following comment from the General:

Let me tell you things have got to a stage when I think action must be taken. I have always hesitated to do anything while Mzee (Kenyatta) is in power, but I think I cannot let things go the way they are going. I would like

[8] For a personal rendition of this oath-taking saga and how the Christian community reacted to it in the Kikuyu country, see Rev. John Gatu (2016).

[9] See also Nyong'o (1986).

you to do one thing for me… go and draft a statement listing all the things you know one can read as reasons why one has taken over the Government (Leys 1974: 242).

This confession came from the trial of the coup plotters, and there is no certainty to its truth since the coup was thwarted by state authorities before it took off. What followed the attempts in terms of increased repression and purges in the army was much more important. Following Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu to open the Russian built hospital in Odinga's home turf, a heated exchange between Odinga and Kenyatta led the latter to quit Kisumu in a huff as his body guards shot wantonly at the crowds who had responded positively to Odinga's public appeal to Kenyatta to have a much fairer and socially just government. The following day all the KPU leaders were detained without trial indefinitely, and the government ordered a crackdown on anybody believed to be sympathetic to the KPU and the coup plotters. Purges followed in both the armed forces as well as in government bureaucracy, taking largely ethnic lines. Hostility to Kenyatta's government simply hardened among the ethnic communities that felt increasingly alienated from this authoritarian regime. With Kenya as a *de facto* one-party state after the banning of the KPU, Kenyatta quickly dissolved Parliament and called for a General Election in December 1969. It was a one-party affair, with almost all candidates swearing allegiance to the President. The party showered favors on individuals it wanted to win the election. Those regarded as unreliable, even when they were popular with the electorate, could find their entry into Parliament complicated by state-induced problems they never envisaged. The nationalist coalition was virtually gone; it would be generally wound up with the passing of even more repressive laws giving the President more authoritarian power. I prefer to call this *presidential authoritarianism* (Nyong'o 1989).

What is Authoritarianism and why does a Presidential Authoritarian System need Elections?

While "authority" refers to legitimate power, in other words power exercised by those appointed or elected to do so by approved and agreed norms and procedures by the ruled, "authoritarianism" is associated with "arbitrary" illegitimate authority, at least according to liberal democratic values. Non-democratic regimes have one thing in common: those who wield power quite often do so through little, limited, controlled or no choice by the people – the governed. Such regimes in most cases do not worry too much about what the people think about the way they rule or make choices to use and dispose of public resources. But very often they are "approval seeking": they will put up

shows of being approved by the public in all kinds of ceremonies: parades, birthday parties, funerals – of both the dead and the "living dead" – and state organized festivals.

Where they allow the people some choice of their leaders through elections, such elections are quite often controlled and determined from the center of power, and choices may be annulled by this center should it feel such choices may compromise its power or interests. The so-called elected representatives very often need to pass "the loyalty test", loyalty to the president to be precise, with little room to speak or act freely. When Daniel arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta at the latter's demise in August 1978, he promised he would follow Kenyatta's footsteps in ruling Kenya. He did exactly that, and his regime became even more authoritarian than that of Kenyatta. He often advised leaders to cough when he coughed and lough when he did the same, "mimicking all my ways like parrots", as he put it. All this was meant to protect the economic and social privileges of the small elite that had come to dominate Kenya politically and economically, constituting what J.M. Kariuki, the populist politician from Murang'a, called "a nation of 10 millionaires and ten million beggars" (Githinji 2000: xvii–197). J.M., as he was fondly referred to, was protesting against the rapidly growing urban and rural poverty in Kenya with a few state elites amassing more and more wealth and property.

KANU'S blue print for development published in 1965 under the title *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya* had advocated for state investment in the high potential areas which could give maximum returns, thereby creating the wealth that the country as a whole needed for development. This scenario assumed that those who benefited would of necessity be philanthropic enough to plough back their benefits to the rest of society. Things never worked out this way: the more the government invested in these high potential agricultural areas, the more wealth was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few who owned agricultural assets here while also having monopoly access to state power. This high income elite superimposed on a base of limited mass consumption due to lack of incomes and poverty, simply made more grave the gap between the rich and the poor (*Employment, Incomes and Equality*… 1972: 97). The ILO mission of 1972 that focused on how to remedy the growing gap between the rich and the poor went a long way to make proposals to bridge this gap, chief among which were: wide scale land redistribution for the benefit of the landless, cutting of wages among the well paid state elites and bringing up the wages of the lower classes, supporting the "informal sector" with affordable factor inputs while providing them with market access for their goods and services and creating import substitution industries that would rely on local raw materials and produce for the domestic

market, thereby providing jobs for the jobless and creating increasing demands for domestic raw materials.

The privileged state elite picked carefully from the Report and issued a new sessional paper in 1973 aimed at what it called "redistribution with growth". But with the oil crisis that year, economic growth started to enter hard times and hardly any redistribution took place, neither of land, nor of wages nor of state privileges. J.M. Kariuki's dictum gained more currency among the masses, posing a threat to Kenyatta's hegemony. On March 2, 1975, J.M. was murdered and his body damped somewhere in Ngong' hills, thereby closing a chapter on one of the regime's most erudite critics. The murder of J.M. ushered in a chapter of new forms of resistance to the regime, generally located outside Parliament, and especially at the University of Nairobi.

Presidential authoritarian regimes rarely tolerate criticism, more so when they feel that there is growing discontent in society. After the oath taking, Kenyatta assumed that no member of the Kikuyu elite would dare challenge his rule, hence the ruthless murder of J.M. Kariuki, a fellow tribesman. When resistance spread to the University and Kenyatta's leading critics were once again from the Kikuyu community led by Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Kenya's leading novelist, Kenyatta did not waste time and detained him in 1978 for writing and producing a play which was critical of the regime. The previous year George Anyona, a parliamentarian who had become critical of corruption in government, was also picked up within the precinct of Parliament and detained. The government then created torture chambers at the basement of a 27 floor government building in Nairobi called Nyayo House. Here critics would be kept in water for a whole day, occasionally being taken to the 24th floor for questioning and physical abuse. Many university dons critical of the government's authoritarian rule and political repression, including myself, ended here for weeks and months, suffering some of the most degrading and inhuman treatment.

When Moi took over from Kenyatta in August 1978, for a brief period of time people thought that he would be more accommodative and tolerant. Moi actually became worse than Kenyatta since he particularly felt insecure within a ruling class that was predominantly Kikuyu and very much steeped in wealth, property and access to state power. To feel more secure, Moi embarked on a two-pronged approach to consolidating authoritarian rule. On the one hand he started cutting down the economic power of the Kikuyu entrenched elite in an attempt to build his own elite completely dependent on him for wealth, possessions and access to state power. On the other hand, he unleashed unbridled terror against actual or imagined opponents inside and outside parliament.

Colin Leys has argued that, by 1978 when Moi took over power, most opportunities for "Kenyanising" the economy had more or less been exhausted. And with an economy that was no longer growing or expanding, Moi felt like a general without an army. In order to create this army of rich, landed and loyal elite, he had to cut down Kikuyu capital and transfer it to his own elite which he had to create very rapidly. This elite would owe their upward mobility to him, and hence become a political army he could rely on. But this policy alienated the Kikuyu bourgeoisie further, and Moi tried the divide and rule tactics of coopting some and alienating the others, a game of political chess he was continuously engaged in much to the detriment of finding sufficient time to pay closer attention to reforming the economy and creating more opportunities for the unemployed youth who were fast flocking into towns from the poor rural areas. When this growing discontent attracted yet another attempt at a coup d'état, Moi reacted ruthlessly on the failed attempt. He disbanded the air force, imprisoned many servicemen as well as civilians suspected to have been involved in the coup attempt and killed many more on the day of the coup itself. The subsequent political outcome of the failed attempted coup was a massive detention without trial of many of Moi's critics, including journalists and university dons. A number of journalists and dons fled the country, seeking teaching jobs abroad or working for NGOs. To gain total control of the party and the political process, a bill was rushed to parliament and passed in a record one day making Kenya a one-party state by law. This was an addition Section 2A of the Constitution which became a major bone of contention between the presidential authoritarian state and its democratic critics in the reform movement.

Democratization, the Politics of Reform and "Controlled" Democracy

The 1980s have generally been regarded as perhaps the darkest days in Kenyan politics. Overtly there was a veneer of political peace and tranquility due to severe political repression, but covertly there were underground resistance movements which were quietly suppressed by the state through physical eliminations, detention without trials and state cooptation. In the meantime, "peaceful" regular elections were held every four years in the eighties: 1983, following the attempted coup in 1982, and 1988 as a normal sequel to demonstrate the regime's respect for the constitution. The unusual feature of the 1988 election was that the sole ruling party, KANU, decided to nominate its candidates for the general elections having voters line up behind their favorite candidate and being counted in open daylight. After voting people dispersed

and there were no ways grievances of any miscount could be addressed. Very often the longest line was announced as having had the least numbers and the shortest the most. The winner was thereby pronounced depending on what type of results the party big bosses – read the President – wanted. And since Kenya was now a one-party state by law, the party nominations were, *ipso facto,* the general elections.

Following that "election" Parliament became virtually a house of "loyalists"; i.e. those who were ready to "sing like parrots" in near-total obedience to the president. Very senior and able KANU politicians, some of whom had been Cabinet Ministers, were unwittingly driven into the opposition as quiet allies of the reform movement in the religious sector, civil society, academia and the media. Underground movements proliferated. As the late historian, Mukaru Ng'ang'a, put it in one of his public lectures at the University of Nairobi before he died, "when you legislate against democratic pluralism in politics, you will simply drive the opposition underground".[10]

In 1989 we started plotting underground to launch a new opposition party. We involved three veteran politicians who were present at the foundation of KANU. Three of them, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and his protégés Luke Obok Rarieya and Ramogi Achieng' Oneko, had been KPU Members of Parliament and had been detained for several years after the banning of the party towards the end of 1969. The other, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, was a long serving Cabinet Minister in both the Kenyatta and the Moi governments but had fallen out with Moi because he was regarded as too sympathetic to reformists. He had also been one of Odinga's confidante during their days in KANU. On our side as younger reformists were Joe Ager, a businessman, Paul Muite, a lawyer, Dr. John Henry Okullu, the Anglican Bishop of the Maseno South Diocese and myself.

We used to meet clandestinely from five to eight in the morning every Sunday in Dr. Waiyaki's farm in the outskirts of Nairobi to avoid the dragnet of the dreaded secret police then called the Special Branch since we knew we were "marked people". We avoided including Oginga Odinga in these meetings since he was under the watch of the secret police almost around the clock. Se we used just one of us to brief him at home in what could appear as an innocent social visit. Henry Okullu, on the other hand, used the safety of the pulpit effectively to preach vitriolic sermons against political oppression and injustices in society.

[10] It was after giving this public lecture at the University of Nairobi in March 1982 that Mukaru Ng'ang'a was arrested and detained without trial in March 1982. I had escaped to Mexico in October 1981 to El Colegio de Mexico with the initial financial support by UNESCO. Between 1982 and 1991 many people were detained without trial. For a systematic account of all this see Raila Amolo Odinga's autobiography, *The Flame of Freedom*.

Quite often we wrote the substance of these sermons before he translated them into the biblical and evangelical contexts.[11] Roy Gachuhi (2010) recently reminded us of the significance of these sermons at the time they were written when he wrote as follows:

> Twenty years ago today, Bishop Henry Okullu called for constitutional change to discard the one-party state and specifically demanded a two-term limit to the tenure of any future president. Said the bishop: it was a mistake to make Kenya a de jure one-party state and this decision should be reversed. Power corrupts even a person with the best intentions in the world. Therefore, power must be limited by fairly acceptable checks and balances.

Rou Gachuhi then went further to add:

> In today's environment of unbridled freedom of expression, these words sound innocuous. But in April 1990, they were patently treasonous. Bishop Okullu attracted a lot of flak, with some of the more rabid KANU hawks calling for his detention – the party's most potent weapon against its critics. When the chorus of condemnation seemed overwhelming, he loudly reminded himself of his personal motto: One man with God is a majority".

When Okullu went to Nairobi soon after that Easter sermon, three senior KANU politicians were looking for him. These were Charles Rubia, Kenneth Matiba and Joab Omino. They had been contemplating coming out in public and denouncing the intolerable political repression that had followed the queue voting, otherwise called by its Kiswahili name *mlolongo.* It is this voting that had left the three of them out of Parliament. To add insult to injury, the popular foreign affairs minister, John Robert Ouko, had also been assassinated under dubious circumstances on February 12, 1990. It was strongly suspected that struggles for the Moi succession within the cabinet had led to his mysterious murder. A Commission of Enquiry to look into the murder, notwithstanding the assistance of a Scotland Yard detective John Troon, was disbanded by Moi before it submitted its final report.

The murder of Ouko and Okullu's courageous sermon encouraged the three KANU politicians to strike while the iron was hot. They therefore consulted with Okullu and agreed that they too would issue a public statement supporting the Bishop's stand. They soon announced, on July 7, 1990, that

[11] See, for example, his April 1990 Easter Sermon at the St. Stephen's Cathedral in Kisumu referred to in his autobiography, *The Quest for Justice: An Autobiography* (1997), Kisumu: Shalom Publishers.

they would hold the first public rally calling for political pluralism in Kenya. Before the rally could take off, they were quickly arrested and detained without trial. Riots and demonstrations rocked Nairobi and its environs as the people openly demanded multiparty politics. Severe police brutality and repression managed to temporarily contain the situation. But a clear lesson had been sent to the Moi regime.

In the meantime, one of Kenya's longest serving political detainees, having been released in mid 1988 following his first 6 year tint in detention, was rearrested again in September 1988. On June 12, 1989, he was released but a year later, suspected of being involved in the organization of the Matiba-Rubia rally, he was arrested and detained once more.

We therefore decided that these harassments could only be brought to an end if more and more people came out to demand for multi-party politics openly. Our secret discussions at the Munyua Waiyaki farm intensified, and we decided to launch an opposition political party called the National Democratic Party as soon as possible. Its leader would be the veteran opposition politician, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, the father of Raila. Very little has been written about the National Democratic Party (NDP) of 1990. Indeed, only one sentence appears on it in *Wikipedia's* coverage on "Jaramogi Oginga Odinga". And this sentence says: "In 1990, he tried in vain with others to register an opposition party, the National Democratic Party". The attempt to register the NDP as an opposition political party, though thwarted by the courts under the excuse that it was unconstitutional, was definitely "not in vain". It led to more and more people, aware of what had happened in the West following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, to come out more openly to demand political pluralism. Moi could not afford detaining all of them: he caved in to the demand and appointed a Review Committee to look into "the possibilities of creating more room for critical voices within the party as well as removing Section 2A of the Constitution that prohibited multi-party politics".[12]

In our book, written and published well before the fall of the Berlin Wall, we had already pointed out that popular pressures for democratization and democracy were so deep and so widespread in Africa that sooner rather than later, the diverse *ancien regimes,* masquerading as presidential authoritarian states, would soon not be able to keep down these forces. Given, in particular, the dwindling material basis for the reproduction of these regimes, and the growing changes in the international political environment, the sunset of unbridled authoritarianism was progressively growing closer (Nyong'o 1987b).

[12] For a fuller account of this process, see D. Throup, C. Hornsby (1998), *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya*, Nairobi: East African Educational Books.

In 1989, for example, the United States of America Republican government appointed a conservative journalist, Smith Hempstone, as ambassador to Kenya. Contrary to expectations, this conservative journalist became a very outspoken supporter of the reform movement and a vocal proponent of democracy, much to Moi's utter disgust.[13] There is no doubt that Hempstone had a strong brief from Washington to support the reform movement, and he did it with confidence and braggadocio, obviously making it clear to Moi that the days of defending "oppressive friendly regimes abroad to buttress communism" were over as far as the US government was concerned.

Following the refusal to register the NDP, the increasing pressure for democracy internally and externally and the final caving in of the Moi regime to remove Section 2A of the constitution, the opposition finally launched, in November 1991, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) as a broad national democratic front to remove the Moi regime from power. FORD's mobilization anthem, *yote yawezekana bila Moi* (all is possible without Moi) reminded one of the late Tom Mboya's dictum on *uhuru (*freedom) at the time of independence. So broad based were both the Freedom and the FORD movements that they easily grouped together uneasy bed fellows whose interest would obviously diverge when it came to access to state power. And FORD started unravelling no sooner had it set on its journey to remove the Moi regime.

Two clear tendencies soon emerged. One led by the KANU diehards who had left the ruling party after being excluded from power on ethnic and business related fights and conflicts. The second led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and the "Young Turks"[14] who saw removal of Moi from power as only a means to an end. The end to this second group were much more far reaching economic and political reforms that would require a fundamental overhaul of the constitution, indeed a new "social contract" between the people and the state ushering in what Thandika Mkandawire (2010) eventually called *a national democratic and developmental state.*

Eventually, well before the first multi-party elections were held in December 1991 after thirty years of independence, FORD had broken up into two major factions: FORD-Kenya led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and the Young Turks and FORD-Asili led by Matiba and the old KANU breakaway

[13] See Smith Hempstone (1997).

[14] The "Young Turks" were the 6 young professionals who had been involved in the reform movement from the seventies and were the prime movers of FORD together with Jaramogi. They represented the more social democratic wing of the movement while the old KANU politicians were steeped in the wheeler-dealer nationalist politics. These "Young Turks" were Raila Amolo Odinga, Paul Muite, Gitobu Imanyara, Joe Ager, Anyang' Nyong'o and Mukhisa Kituyi.

establishment politicians. The two FORDs played into Moi's hands by one being led by a Luo (Jaramogi) and the other by Matiba (a Kikuyu). State propaganda, like in colonial times, branded these two reform parties as mere tribal outfits against KANU's "more nationalist outlook". And given that Moi's former Vice President, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, had also broken off to form the Democratic Party of Kenya, Moi's appeal to his age-old "small tribes" to stay put in KANU to safeguard their interests won him a wide constituency of political adherents from the other ethnic groups. In the election of December 1991, though conducted under the veneer of multi-party politics, KANU still had the upper hand as the party with the presidency. State institutions were blatantly used to limit the organizational outreach of the opposition parties. There were areas which were largely closed to the opposition. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) operated under rules which favored the ruling party.

Though Moi did not, as president, win the majority of votes (36.4%), the other opposition presidential candidates split the rest of the votes giving Moi a simple majority win. What is even more amazing is that KANU ended up with more Members of Parliament than the opposition political parties due to the obvious gerrymandering of constituency boundaries. The electoral process was replete with fraud and malpractices, inter-ethnic violence, police harassment, blatant bribery of voters etc.; but the courts would not give a fair hearing to a petition filed by Kenneth Matiba seeking redress in the presidential poll.[15] The opposition became increasingly aware that without fundamental constitutional reforms, creating laws and "rules of the political game" – as well as institutions – for managing democratic elections, the opposition political parties were unlikely to win an election against the authoritarian regime.

The 1990s saw years of dedication to constitutional reform by the reformists. The prelude to the 1997 elections was a stand by the opposition which insisted on "no reforms no elections" (Mutunga 2002). Once more a broad section of the progressive lawyers, academics, clerics and even businessmen joined or supported this movement of "no reforms no elections". To avoid an embarrassing stand-off, Moi caved in and persuaded the opposition to agree to inter-party negotiations in Parliament for certain reforms in the constitution and the laws that would allow for holding reasonably free and fair elections. The Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) accords established an electoral commission in which both the opposition and the ruling party were represented. The IPPG reforms also removed state restrictions on public

[15] See for example, The Report of the International Republican Institute, *Kenya: The December 29, 1992 Elections* (1993), Washington: IRI.

gatherings, abolished the "Chiefs Act" which gave inordinate powers to local chiefs to control public assemblies and associations. The National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), the body that advocated that a National Convention be formed to discuss constitutional reforms rather than confining such debates to parliament, vigorously objected to the IPPG approach (Katumanga 2011). In many ways the NCEC was right; but the opposition was not united on the NCEC demands, nor would the parliamentary political parties boycott the pending elections. Some reforms were however, needed, to make the elections freer and fairer. In this regard, Moi found less room for manipulating these elections; but he still won. The game of numbers favored him.

Without a radical change in the constitution, and with the disunity in the opposition, it was unlikely that the latter would win any election. In the 1997 elections, several major parties were in the context apart from the ruling party KANU. FORD-Kenya, which had disintegrated and out of it came The National Development Party (NDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP); FORD--Asili which had become relatively weaker over the four years; FORD-People which was regionally confined among the Kisii people where its leader, Simon Nyachae, came from and the Democratic Party, led by Mwai Kibaki. After the elections, the opposition party leaders realized that without forming a broad coalition they could not win any election even with the limited IPPG reforms. Negotiations therefore started among these parties for coming together in a common electoral front. NDP decided to join KANU and fight from within. After all, under the new IPPG reforms, Moi would be serving his last term and would not be a factor in the 2002 elections. The argument of the NDP was that it was easier to reform KANU from within than fight it from outside. The other parties: DP, SDP and FORD-Kenya – and other minor non-parliamentary parties – started to negotiate for a common front. By 2001 a new coalition had merged, the National Party of Kenya (NPK). Quiet negotiations started between NPK and the now defunct NDP. In the meantime the Moi succession struggle had started in earnest in KANU. NDP felt that its leader may not, in the end, become Moi's preference for a successor. Other senior Moi cabinet members also became jittery. Increasingly Moi showed signs of favoring the young Uhuru Kenyatta, son of his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, as his preferred successor. This finally became a reality at the KANU delegates conference in Nairobi in September 2002. Top KANU officials and politicians, disgruntled by the choice, broke away to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). An alliance was quickly forged between the LDP brigade and NPK to produce yet another broad-based national democratic front called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), now to be led by Mwai Kibaki, the then octogenarian politician. Once more yet another broad nationalist movement, united

by a single factor of removing Moi, mimicked KANU of the independence (*Uhuru*) days. Like KANU and FORD before it, it would soon disintegrate into its various contradictory parts three years after initiating major reforms in Kenya.

When the People Speak and Democracy is Let Loose

There was one major outcome of the NARC triumph in the 2002 general elections: finally, a "people power" was tasted by the public. Circumstances had conspired, internally and externally, to make it possible for a broadly based national democratic movement to remove the authoritarian president from power. Internally, it was the breakdown of KANU occasioned by the opportunistic "swallowing" of the NDP as a way of increasing the parliamentary base of KANU not realizing that Moi would not dictate his succession. Externally, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening up of the world stage to pluralist politics devoid of the protection of non-democratic regimes in the Third World by the US simply because they were a shield against the communist expansion. The post-1989 world would be a different world. Democracy would be let loose!

Immediately after the December 2002 elections that swept NARC to power armed with a Manifesto entitled "Democracy and Popular Empowerment", the people went into the streets of Nairobi waiting to see the first policeman who dared take a bribe against a motorist accusing him or her of a traffic offence. The people arrested such policemen and took them, not to the nearest police station, but straight to the courts asking magistrates and judges to open "charge stations" and anti-corruption courts. To create order out of the enthusiasm of the people, Parliament passed an ethics and anti-corruption law, the Ethics and Public Officers Act and other drafts of legislation meant to tame corruption. A special office, complete with a Permanent Secretary in charge of corruption, was established in the President's Office. A process cleaning up the corrupt judiciary started under a commission that vetted all members of the judiciary and dismissed the corrupt and inept and appointed new supposedly "clean" judges and magistrates.

The Cabinet that the President appointed represented "the face of Kenya", both in terms of regional as well as ethnic terms. It had the highest number of women since independence. But it had one major shortcoming: it did not respect the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – or the Rainbow Alliance, the breakaway group from KANU led by Raila Amolo Odinga – and the National Party of Kenya (NPK), the president's own pre-election alliance. These two formed NARC under

an MOU that stipulated how the cabinet would be formed and government positions shared. To add insult to injury, the structure of consultations among the two coalition partners once the government was formed also started to wane, with the president relying more and more on state power to rule and less and less on popular politics and people's power to keep his legitimacy as a *raison d'être* of being where he was. As Adam Przeworski (1975: 49–67) once asked: is mobilization the source of political decay? In the Kenyan context of the post-NARC election and the resultant political exuberance of the people we are justified to ask: was political institutionalization the harbinger of the restoration of authoritarianism.

The unfortunate thing was that as a new clique emerged in State House determined to roll back the clock to the Moi years under the cloak of undertaking reforms. What more, Kibaki suffered a stroke and for a couple of months was not well enough to run the affairs of the state. This clique, composed essentially of politicians from the Agikuyu community from the Mount Kenya region, was referred to as "the Mount Kenya Mafia". They started to wind back the clock to the old authoritarian ways of giving state contracts to themselves and their colleagues, appointing people from their own community to state jobs and even beginning to use state apparatuses to oppress their political "enemies". All this did not happen overnight; but the more signs were observed of "political decay", the more coalition partners from other political persuasions realized that *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!*

There was, however, an alternative: a new constitution. NARC had promised that it would give Kenyans a new constitution within the first 100 days of coming into power. The LDP wing of NARC was determined to honor this pledge; the NPK started to drag its feet. This became a major bone of contention. A people's convention convened at the Bomas of Kenya convention center passed a draft constitution which the NPK brigade regarded as "too radical". It completely wiped out the presidential system of power by bringing in a parliamentary system with the parliamentary democracy. This, the NPK thought, would pull the rag from under their feet and deny them the chance to use the presidency as a source of primitive accumulation. They decided to fight the now named "Bomas Draft Constitution". Another radical quality of this draft was its emphasis on devolution and the use of the plebiscite in limiting central power, either at the national or devolved levels of government. This, too, the NPK brigade opposed. The latter decided to draft its own version of a constitution by a limited number of state officials and ministers assembled at the coastal city of Kilifi not trusting the people's power from Bomas. This latter draft became popularly known as the "Kilifi Draft". It was this Kilifi Draft that was finally taken to a national referendum in October 2005. As would be

expected, the LDP wing of the NARC government opposed it while the NPK wing supported it. The cabinet was divided almost in half. The referendum was won by those who said a loud "NO" to the Kilifi Draft with the "orange" as their symbol in the referendum. The Kibaki wing in the NARC government, the NPK, suffered an ugly defeat while the "orange" LDP group, now joined by other social forces from civil society and minor opposition parties from diverse ideological persuasions, emerged triumphant. Kibaki immediately dissolved his cabinet and kicked out all ministers who had championed the "NO" or orange campaign in the referendum. The LDP was out of the government. It decided to institutionalize a broader based coalition composed of the "NO" referendum partners. This coalition was named the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) where I became the Secretary General. NARC became an empty shell. Kibaki brought in leaders of minor political parties and once again, like his predecessor, started to rely more and more on state power, not popular power, to rule.

The Birth of the New Constitution and the Emergence of a new Authoritarianism with an Electoral Face

The experience of the 2005 referendum, the subsequent dissolution of the cabinet and the near restoration of the *ancien régime* by Kibaki consequent to that, taught the ODM brigade one important lesson. That is: democratic changes are not made or institutionalized by the good will or good nature of human beings but by institutional changes and institutional prerequisites that dictate certain forms of political behavior. The ODM therefore decided to focus on constitutional reform as its major mission with a devolved government as well as a parliamentary democracy as key pillars of the new constitution. A presidential system of government, in whatever form, would always be prone to authoritarian behavior.

The elections of December 2007, however, were held under the unreformed constitution inherited from the Moi era. Although certain progressive laws had been passed by the NARC government, the electoral laws remained essentially the same with members of the Electoral Commission appointed entirely by the President. As the results started flowing in on the night of December 27th 2007 showing that the ODM presidential candidate, Raila Amolo Odinga, was winning the elections, the state started tampering the procedure with Returning Officers suddenly disappearing and the national tallying center at the Kenyatta International Conference Center (KICC) suddenly being surrounded by the military (the first time this happened in Kenya's history). From then on, a crisis would follow when the chairman of the Commission, Samuel Kivuitu,

confessed on television that "I don't know what is happening; the Returning Officers may be busy cooking up the figures somewhere!"[16]

Subsequently, notwithstanding the public outcry, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission was driven to State House at dusk and declared Mwai Kibaki the elected president. Spontaneous public protest and resistance broke out almost everywhere, especially in the major urban centers. Inter-ethnic conflicts followed. Neighbor slaughtered neighbor depending on which side of the political divide they found themselves. Kenya suddenly descended into a Hobbesian state of nature. For weeks, state security agents, under the guise of trying to maintain order and restore peace and security, slaughtered citizens demonstrating and protesting against the rigged elections. It became necessary for the pan-African and international community to come in and try to mediate between the two major conflicting forces: the ODM and PNU (Party of National Unity, the new political outfit of Mwai Kibaki.

Kenya's Post-Election Violence of 2007/2008 has been extensively studied and written about, by scholars as well as diplomats, a good number focusing on the achievements of the Chief Mediator, the former Ghanaian Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan.[17] The narratives apart, the scholarly articles ask the questions *Why did the violence occur? What went wrong with the elections? Could the violence in which 1,300 people died, 5000 people were rendered homeless and property worth billions of shillings was destroyed had been avoided?* Much more interesting are those studies which zero in on one key issue: to what extent is an authoritarian regime prepared to resist the results of a democratic election when it loses it?[18]

The mediation process looked at three issues. First, the electoral process: how strong were the laws and regulations regarding the elections, what were the constitutional provisions, how well prepared was the Electoral Commission in running the elections impartially in terms of its composition, mode of operation and technical capacity? The South African Judge, Justice Johann Sandy Kriegler, who headed the Commission on the electoral process, found many flaws in this process and recommended extensive reforms to avoid another flawed election. Under the circumstances in which the December 2007 elections were held, it was difficult to tell who won the election since figures were messed up, documents deliberately destroyed, the Commission itself

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[16] See, for example, Stan Oyunga, *Exclusive: Kenya Presidential Elections that May Have Been Rigged*, The Kenya Election Database, December, 2015, (@ 2015 Stan Oyunga).

[17] See, for example, Elisabeth Linden Mayer and Josie Lianna Kaye (2009), *A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya*, New York: International Peace Institute.

[18] See, for example, Mwangi wa Githinji and Frank Holmquist (2012), *Reform and Political Impunity in Kenya: Transparency Without Accountability*, „African Studies Review", Vol. 55, Issue 1.

was compromised and government agencies not always willing to co-operate (Kriegler 2008).

The Kenyan judge, Justice Philip Waki, who headed *The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence,* focused on the violence itself: how it occurred, its perpetrators, the motives of their actions and who bore the greatest political responsibility for the violence. It concluded by pinpointing 10 key political personalities on both sides of the political divide, ODM and PNU, and within the state apparatus. These names were then handed over in an envelope to the Chief Mediator, Kofi Annan, who was expected to keep them while the Kenyan government was given time to put in place a domestic legal process to deal with the culprits. Failure to do this would mean handing over these names to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague for the concerned persons to be tried for committing crimes against humanity.[19]

The Kenyan government did not take action on the Waki Report. Following the time lines that the report stipulated on actions to be taken, the ten names were finally submitted to the ICC, charges preferred and trials undertaken. In the end 7 were acquitted but 3 committed for trial, but finally discharged for lack of sufficient evidence due to witness disappearance, bribery and intimidation, non-cooperation by the Kenyan government and hence insufficient grounds to convict. The two leading culprits, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, finally teamed together in the 2013 Presidential Elections and rode over the sympathy of their ethnic communities to win that election as President and Deputy President of the Jubilee Coalition.[20]

One important outcome of the crisis following the disputed presidential elections of December 2007 was the formation of the coalition government as a political settlement of the crisis with the task, with a strict timetable, to undertake far reaching reforms that would create a more viable environment for democratic governance and free and fair elections. These were all enshrined in *the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008.* A key element of these reforms was constitutional overhaul and reform. A new Constitution was finally passed in a national referendum in October 2010 which radically changed the architecture of governance in Kenya. A new bi-cameral legislature was introduced, two systems of government were established – national and county governments substantially devolving power to the latter – and a very progressive Bill of Rights institutionalized. But one factor from the old constitution was

[19] See, for example, The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, *The Waki Report* (Nairobi: mimeo, 2008).

[20] See, for example, *Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law* (2014), "Journal of Eastern Africa Studies", Vol. 8, No. 1.

preserved, though with subdued powers: the presidency. This proved to be the weakest part of the chain of democratic reforms in Kenya.

I have always argued, very much in tandem with other scholars, that presidential systems of government are highly unsuitable for multi-ethnic and culturally diverse developing societies. They are very prone to presidential authoritarianism and authoritarianism "with an electoral face" (Norris 1989).[21] Thus the 2013 presidential elections, the first to be held after the reformed constitution of 2010, ran into more or less the same problems as the elections of 2007. The difference this time was that, due to strict legal measures to be followed in electoral disputes, the "losing" party was compelled to seek redress in the Supreme Court where the process and outcome could not be fully accepted as properly discharged. The Supreme Court decision remained controversial.[22] It was not so much a test to decide who between two presidential candidates, Raila Amolo Odinga of the Coalition of Reform and Democracy (CORD) and Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Alliance, genuinely won or lost the elections, but whether under a highly ethnically polarized electoral contest electoral malpractices can be genuinely settled in a court of law. The electoral system requiring that contests be held to elect one person to a very powerful position of the presidency is itself the *casus belli.*

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[21] See also my article, *State and Society in Kenya*… (1989).

[22] See, for example, *Verdict on Kenya's presidential election petition: Five reasons the judgment fails the legal test*, "The EastAfrican", April 20, 2013.

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Peter Anyang' Nyong'o

AUTHORITARIANISM WITH AN ELECTORAL FACE IN AFRICA

This essay is about how authoritarian regimes in Africa use so-called democratic elections to stay in power or to avoid being removed from power. Some of these elections are blatantly rigged; some are semi-competitive and occasionally lend legitimacy to such regimes as being somehow approved by the people or based on the consent of the people. Since Africa is such a big continent with nation-states which have had different histories since independence, we cannot make watertight generalizations, though "typologies" very often prove useful in making comparative studies. In this case, we shall use Kenya as a typical case of former plantation colonies which political economies are comparable and the fortunes of democratic governance quite similar. We conclude that the struggle for democratic governance will always be rooted in people's need to be governed and yet to control their governors.

Key words: Kenya, Africa, authoritarian regime, elections, nationalist movement, political oppression, opposition, presidential authoritarianism, democracy, constitution

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Ilter Turan
Istanbul Bilgi University[1]

THE RISE OF POPULIST ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TURKEY: A CASE OF CULTURALLY ROOTED RECIDIVISM

Turkey appears to be the "talk of the town" these days in many corners of the world for the "wrong" reasons. Many journalists are in jail allegedly for having taken part in terrorist activities. Many academics have lost their jobs for having signed a "peace petition", an act also alleged to have been directed toward supporting a terrorist movement that challenges the territorial integrity of the country. School teachers, civil servants and military officers have lost their jobs, some are in jail as are a number of businessmen, for possible links with a religious grouping led by a cleric residing in Pennsylvania, who, by all indications, engineered an unsuccessful attempt at military takeover in mid-July 2016. While some of these allegations, particularly those pertaining to a coup plotting, may well turn out to be true, rules and procedures of due investigation have been broadly ignored in the implementation of security measures carried out under an emergency rule that is being regularly prolonged by a parliamentary majority that is exceptionally accommodating to the government. In addition, major constitutional changes have been approved by a small margin in a public referendum marked by irregularities, changing Turkey's political system from parliamentary to presidential and, in the process, Turkey has done away with the checks and balances that are associated with liberal democratic rule.

Turkey was also the "talk of the town" after 2002 when the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power after a prolonged period, since 1991, of ineffective coalition governments. At the time, the new government, characterizing itself as being socially conservative, had promised more economic development and more democracy and it appeared to be working hard to deliver on its promises. The rate of economic growth was high, while

[1] E-mail: ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr

a series of measures of democratization with a view to commencing accession negotiations with the European Union was introduced. Foreign direct investment was running high. In recognition of its efforts and achievements, Turkey was invited to begin accession negotiations in 2004 and they started at the beginning of 2005.

Turkey had, in fact, also been the "talk of the town" in 1950 when the country had made a peaceful transition from a modernizing single party rule to political competition. This development, coming soon after the Cold War had commenced, had been met with excitement and received warmly by the so-called "Free World" as an example of a successful transition to democratic politics in a developing society. Since both sides of the Cold War were out to impress the world that their system was not only desirable but also possible, the Turkish case was seized upon by the United States and its allies as a glowing example of the success of democracy.

Turkey enjoyed considerable economic growth under the Democratic Party administration that had won the elections in 1950 and then proceeded to win the two succeeding elections of 1954 and 1957, though experiencing significant electoral losses in the latter election. As regards consolidating its democracy, however, little distance was covered. Coming from a single party tradition, the Democrats behaved as if they were also a single party, but grew more authoritarian over time, particularly after they experienced a decline in their electoral fortunes after the elections of 1957. Rule by a popularly elected authoritarian government came to an abrupt end on May 27, 1960 by a military takeover led by a junta of lower ranking officers, to make Turkey once again the talk of the town.

How is it that a country that was perceived to be proceeding toward the expansion and consolidation of its democracy changes political course so abruptly and moves toward populist electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013: 21–53), a political system in which all institutions of a liberal democratic system exist but those in power use and abuse them so as to suppress the opposition and perpetuate their tenure, on two different occasions? What are the reasons behind the deterioration of the quality of Turkey's democracy? What factors contribute to it or are responsible for it? Are these likely to continue or is the direction of change likely to be reversed in the future? This article proposes to analyze the two occasions when Turkey has fallen under the rule of popular electoral authoritarianism, hoping to offer some answers to the above questions.

Explaining political change in Turkey

THE INITIAL TRANSITION TO POLITICAL COMPETITION

Scholars interested in explaining political change pursue different avenues of exploration. In the specific case of Turkey's turn toward democratic governance, three different modes of explanation have been popular. The first views Turkey's transition to competitive politics as being a result of the socio-economic change the country had undergone during the early years of the republic and particularly during the Second World War. In this context, it is argued that the early republic while bringing peace and security to the country, employed a rather extractive posture toward society to finance the centralized state that implemented cultural modernization policies not all of which were popular with the masses. The extractive stance grew stronger during the Second World War owing to Turkey's having to maintain a fully mobilized military though it managed to keep out of the war. The war also produced a new provincial commercial class that had benefited from the high demand for Turkish agricultural products and raw materials in the wartime international markets. This group that wanted to enjoy a bigger say in national politics and restrain the government from pursuing extensive interventionism both in society and economy. It became supportive of an opposition movement that was born within the governing single Republican People's Party (CHP) that finally opened the way to a change of those in power through elections (Keyder 1987, Turan 2015: 61–65).

The same mode of analysis is often continued beyond the initial transition to democratic politics, focusing on the mechanization of agriculture, the construction of a comprehensive highway system, the expansion of the educational opportunities, the adoption of an import substitution oriented industrialization strategy for economic development that created the conditions that lent support to the continuation and expansion of a democratic system by building a national economy, expanding education, facilitating communications and facilitating the expansion of a middle class (Keyder 1987, Turan 2015: 145–154).

The second mode of analysis takes the conditions prevailing in the international system as the driving force of domestic change toward democratization. According to this mode of analysis, as the world was being divided between the Communist and the Western Blocs after the Second World War, its security interests necessitated that Turkey join the Western Bloc to contain Soviet expansionism that might also target Turkey. In other words, rather than a socio-economic change being the driving force behind Turkey's move toward political competition, it was the country's search for closer affiliation

and integration with the emerging Western Bloc to meet its security needs. The proponents of this mode of analysis remind us that Turkey managed to become an integral part of the Western Bloc including becoming a member of NATO in 1952, shortly after its founding, and that these developments might not have taken place if Turkey had not changed its political system (Yılmaz 1977: 1–37).

A third mode moves to the political arena to emphasize that the westernizing orientation of the republican regime that replaced the Ottoman Empire did not preclude but rather implied that the country would move toward a politically competitive system at some stage of its political development since the countries that were taken as models, mainly England and France, possessed democratic systems. Furthermore, it is noted that the ruling single party, the CHP, had not developed an ideology that necessitated or legitimized its continuation as the sole holder of political power. Therefore, calls for democracy could not be easily rejected on credible grounds, particularly when the political leadership itself questioned its perpetuation. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the leader of the ruling party had a personal commitment to the advancement along the democratic path and did not yield to conservatives within his party who advocated the continuation of a single party rule (Özbudun 2000: 21–25).

While the evolution of Turkey in the direction of democratic governance may be explained in a number of ways, why it has failed to consolidate its democracy undergoing an electoral authoritarian experience during the 1950s and why it is moving toward electoral authoritarianism also today calls for an explanation. What I propose to do in the following pages is to focus on one major factor that, I feel, have contributed significantly to the erosion of democratic governance in Turkey and to the emergence of electoral authoritarianism: that is, the legacy of Turkey's modernization history and its problematical influence on the practice of liberal democracy. Let me emphasize that while the particular pattern of modernization that Turkey has undergone constitutes but one important component of Turkey's democratic experience factor. Certainly, other factors of importance may easily come to mind such as those relating to the political economy or to the personality traits of its leaders who turned authoritarian. Such factors will remain outside the scope of this paper although there is no question that they also deserve a close examination.

HISTORICAL LEGACY

Relying on the brief account of Turkey's two experiences with electoral authoritarianism, the reader should not get the impression that the interim between the two periods of electoral authoritarianism that I have chosen to examine meant a time of uninterrupted democratic development. True, the

country made slow progress in advancing its democracy, but the process was interrupted by direct and indirect military interventions. Even during the years when democratic politics seemed to prevail, the military exercised a critical political role as a veto power. What makes the two periods that I will focus on interesting is that the role of the military as a veto power was largely absent, allowing us to neglect it. Elected governments, in other words, were in a position to pursue policies without fear that they would be ousted by the military.

The Emergence of the State Elites as a Modernizing Force

The researchers of Turkey's modernization agree that the decision to modernize was stimulated by the Empire's persistent military defeats in conflicts with the Western powers. As defeats became more frequent, the ruling elite headed by the Sultan himself became convinced that further decline could only be averted by adopting the instruments, the technologies and the means used by the adversaries.[2] This approach that may be termed "innovation by mimesis" began in a highly selective way and grew more comprehensive over time as the adopted innovations usually proved useful but not enough to avert defeat. From the perspective of our analysis, it is important to note that change was led by the state and its intention was to strengthen the institutions of the state so as to prevent its demise. This path is very different from the experience of western societies that later came to be referred to as "modern" in which socio-economic change was driven by technological change, and where change in the political domain was brought about by demands emanating from the society.

The outcome of state led modernization of politics differed from society driven change in significant ways. In the former, change was to be achieved through training or educating cadres who came into the service of the state beginning with the military unlike in the latter where new social forces that challenged the existing political order had to be accommodated by incorporating them in the political processes through the devising of appropriate institutions and practices. As this limited "modernization program" proved insufficient, educational programs and institutions were expanded. The graduates of the educational institutions then began to work for new state institutions that had also been developed as a part of the modernization package. For example, the development of large armies using firearms led to many battlefield casualties necessitating the development of competent medical corps and hence the

[2] To this day, in my opinion, the most persuasive and detailed analysis of Ottoman modernization presenting arguments that are also briefly and partially presented here is Niyazi Berkes (1998). Another penetrating analysis is offered by Bernard Lewis (1961).

opening of a military medical school. Similarly, the use of a large number of animals for transportation constituted the grounds for the opening of a school of veterinary medicine. Financing the new institutions reinforced the need for state income, hence both a more efficient administration and a tax system that led, among others, to the founding of the Civil Service School that eventually became the famous Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University. In this way, over time, modernization programs and the network of modernizing institutions became more comprehensive and all-encompassing.

By way of summary, then, transmitting new knowledge and values to students who were candidates for service to the state and then staffing the institutions of the state with them, constituted the critical means through which modernization was being implemented. This process produced a corps of military officers, bureaucrats, diplomats, teachers, and intellectuals that may be collectively referred to as "men of state" or "state elites" that occupied positions of power in society and were ready to use this power to transform society along modern, or more accurately, since modernization was understood as westernization, along western lines.[3] The state elites viewed society as a target to be transformed in the direction of their pattern. They expected society to be passive and obedient and willing to change to conform to their societal designs. Reactions emanating from society in response to their modernization programs were usually viewed as manifestations of ignorance by people who failed to appreciate what was good for them. The flow of political communication in this relationship was understandably unidirectional, from the elite to the masses. The state elites, while claiming to be the masters of a popularly based regime, felt that their right to rule the society derived from their possession of higher knowledge and a superior set of values. They were "enlightened" people and their mission was to transmit the "light" to the rest of society using the instruments of the state.

The Problematical Prevalence of State Elites in Politics

Not surprisingly, the above described attitude of the state elites toward politics proved highly problematical once the question of political competition entered the national agenda. The men of state feared that competition introduced at a time when significant segments of society had not yet "modernized sufficiently," the opposition would appeal to the masses to reverse the achievements of the

[3] Frederick W. Frey, in his seminal work on Turkish legislators, entitled his third chapter "Education: Hallmark of the Elite". The chapter analyzes the critical function education performed in the formation of the new republican elite. Cf. *The Turkish Political Elite* (1965: 29–72).

modern republican state (Turan 2015: 58–60). The president of the republic, in fact, allowed an opposition party to register in 1946 only after assurances from its founders that they would fully observe the secular nature of the republic (Loğoğlu 1998: 145). But, more broadly, the state elite, suspicious of the outcome of open political competition, tried to devise ways through which the basic characteristics of the modern republic could be preserved.

One way was to ensure that the key institutions of government would remain committed to paying proper attention to the "correct" socialization of the state elites of the modern republican state. The officer corps, for example, were admitted to military middle and high schools and then went on to military college, ensuring that they were dedicated to the traditions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. If some failed to conform, they were weeded out at an earlier stage of their careers. The upper echelons of the Ministry of Interior as well as those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, came mainly from the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara and to a lesser extent from the Ankara and Istanbul Law Schools where the students were trained with the understanding that those who entered public service would be the guardians of the republic. Teachers' colleges, on the other hand, were places where those responsible for socializing the new generations into modernity would be trained.

Following the military takeover of 1960, having in mind the experience of democratic politics between 1950 and 1960, the Constitution of 1961 (also the Constitution of 1982 after the 1980 military intervention) included provisions that would keep the key institutions of government from the intervention of elected politicians, i.e. the "political elites". Some institutions were made autonomous and an impartial, non-partisan president was given the power to appoint officials of the key institutions of government such as the rectors of state universities, the state broadcasting company and the constitutional court (Cf. Özbudun 1988: 37–62). The promotions in the military were rendered into an exclusive military concern on which the government had almost nothing to say. The budget and the expenditures of the military were exempted from the ordinary procedures of parliamentary oversight. The military courts not only enjoyed great powers, but they also dealt with matters such as being a conscientious objector that would normally be taken up in civilian courts in democratic societies. The fact that in the following years, until 1989, the president, though elected by the parliament, came not from among elected politicians but high-ranking generals facilitated the functioning of this system as intended.

Keeping the scope of politics narrow was yet another way through which the state elites exercised tutelage over the political system. A clear manifestation of this were the limitations placed on the scope of political activity in the

constitution and the laws. For example, political parties that advocated the "establishment of domination of one class over another" (i.e. communist parties) and those that used religion for political purposes were banned. It is under such provisions that the string of antecedents of the currently ruling AKP, including the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party and Welfare Party were banned by the constitutional court.

Finally, it became an established practice after the coup d'état in 1960 that the military constituted a veto group, imposing limits on governmental action (Hale 1994, Turan 2015: 110–140). A variety of means were employed to achieve this end. The most forceful one was no less than staging a temporary military intervention. But more typically, lesser means were employed. Public statements by the Chief of Staff and other commanders expressing dissatisfaction with what the government was doing and/or announcing expectations were an example. There was also a mechanism provided in the constitutional arrangement after 1961 introducing an institutional way through which the tutelage could be exercised: the National Security Council (NSC). Bringing some key cabinet ministers and the top commanders together, the NSC provided a mechanism through which the expectations of the latter could be communicated to the former with the understanding that they would be implemented. After the 1980 intervention that led to the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the NSC, whose powers had now been enhanced, began to appoint representatives to other agencies such as the Council on Higher Education and the TRT (State Broadcasting Company) so as to communicate their preferences to them and also to be "briefed" by them (Özbudun 1988: 25–28).

Although the military was the most prominent component of it, the state elites incorporated the cadres of other institutions. The foreign ministry and the constitutional court continued to be a part of the state elite coalition until the political clout of the military crumbled through a set of trials accusing top commanders of planning coups after 2010. Other government agencies had slowly adjusted to coming under the control of the elected politicians but always contained some cadres that were committed to a modernizing orientation. A number of quasi-official organizations like the Bar, the Chamber of Physicians and the Chamber of Engineers and Architects were dominated by leaders who shared the values of the modernizing state and might be looked upon as constituting a segment of the state elites.

The roots and practice of electoral authoritarianism

As we have seen, the coming of electoral competition had posed a critical problem for the state elites since elections brought to power a political elite that did not fully share their values and their vision for the future of the society. Frequently referred to as "cultural bifurcation"[4], the problem has plagued Turkey's democracy continually, after it first became manifest following the 1950 elections that marked a unique peaceful transfer of power through elections. As argued above, the state elites believed that they possessed a superior set of values and a societal vision and they were intent on limiting the arena within which elected politicians could operate. That segment of elected politicians constituting a parliamentary majority, on the other hand, felt that the state elites constrained them unreasonably. In order to counter the latter's and to legitimize its own claims to power, the ruling party developed the argument that only they represented the national will. Turning to this rather imprecise concept and interpreting it to mean that only the party in power represented it, neglecting in the process that there was also an elected opposition whose views were more in line with those of the state elites, the winning Democrat Party (DP) introduced to democratic politics a problematical tendency, more commonly referred to as electoral majoritarianism, that continues to influence contemporary Turkish politics. Specifically, one of the critical cleavages that has marked Turkish politics is a split between the modernizing elites that claim that they have the right to rule the society because they know what is "right" for society and elected officials who have claimed their political will should prevail because they represent the people and they know what the "people" want (Turan 2015: 195–196, Kalaycıoğlu 2017: 10–15). This cleavage may bring to mind the evolution of socialist and social-democratic parties against the aristocrats and the capitalists in Europe where the working classes challenged the nobility's and the wealthy's right to rule by relying on their numbers.

Politics of populist electoral authoritarianism – the DP period, 1950–1960

To repeat my thesis, the leadership of the DP believed that since their party had obtained the majority of the votes, only they represented the national will. In this conceptual framework, the legitimacy of those in opposition was in question. The DP leaders believed that the victory at the polls entitled them to exercise unrestricted political power. They expected the opposition to be

[4] The expression was initially used by Daniel Lerner (1958: 130 et passim).

accommodating to the wishes of the government, judging that the activities of the opposition could be restricted and its voice muzzled. They also felt that government agencies were at their disposal to use for partisan purposes. This was particularly important because, owing to low level of organization and relatively poor communications, politics followed the path of clientelism, easily excluding all that were, one way or another, connected with the opposition parties. Shortly after the elections of 1954, as disaffection with the DP began to gain ground and the opposition improved its electoral position, the DP leadership, continuing to believe that only they represented the national will, started to suspect that the opposition was becoming subversive, tricking voters to come to their side. In the events leading to the military takeover in 1960, the DP government grew increasingly authoritarian, which reduced the commitment of the opposition to protect the system which contained the institutions of democracy.[5] The system continued to maintain a democratic façade but, as the following account will testify, had acquired the characteristics of an electoral authoritarian system.

From the very beginning of its tenure, the DP was concerned that the bureaucracy and the military, as constituent elements of the state elites, were closely attached to the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and were open to collusion with it. Its fears were confounded by the fact that CHP's leader İsmet İnönü was a hero of the national war of liberation and a founding father of the republic who enjoyed great respect among the state elites and could presumably easily mobilize them against the government. The strategy the DP chose in facing the challenge of the opposition was suppression. Some of the measures the DP adopted were in the legal domain. Over time a number of laws was changed to reduce the effectiveness of the opposition. For example, changes were introduced to the Standing Order of the parliament that rendered more severe the penalties for infractions of discipline and eased the conditions for the removal of immunity of the MPs. These provisions were, almost exclusively, applied to the members of the opposition. Another measure was banning the use of radio (a government monopoly on broadcasting at the time) by political parties, thus depriving the opposition from using the only instrument through which the entire country could be reached, while the majority party as well as the government had access to radio broadcasting. When mass rallies by the opposition proved popular, the government amended the laws limiting the holding of mass rallies only to election campaigns. But by far the most

[5] There are two excellent historical analyses of the DP period in which the summary of events outlined here are described in a greater detail. They helped to briefly recapitulate this story in this section. Cf. Cem Eroğul (1970) and Tanel Demirel (2011).

problematical change of laws came about when the DP leadership proposed and its parliamentary majority enacted a law depicting the establishment of a parliamentary committee comprised exclusively of the members of the governing party and equipped with judicial powers to investigate the subversive activities of the opposition. Particularly, as the electoral support of the DP declined as shown by the 1957 elections and its aftermath, the party leadership became more and more convinced that this was but the result of subversive activities by the opposition CHP allegedly deceiving the voters.

The strategy of suppression also covered narrowing down the freedom of the press. Measures of deprivation as well as sanctions were employed, often simultaneously. Opposition newspapers, for example, were not supplied with sufficient quantities of printing paper, then a government monopoly. Similarly, they were not given public announcements, a critical part of newspapers' income at that time. Laws were amended to penalize the authors of writings that criticized the political and financial integrity of the state, usually interpreted as undermining the government. Many journalists received jail sentences as the DP administration moved along its tenure of ten years.

Distrusting bureaucracy, the judiciary and other pillars of the modern republican state like the universities, the DP government challenged the limiting role they exercised on its power. Measures in this area included the forceful retirement of officials who had completed thirty years of service irrespective of their age and wish. Later the years of service qualification was repealed and all civil servants could be dismissed by government at will. Judges who rendered decisions unfavorable to the government were sent away to less desirable posts as a form of demotion. Finally, university administrators who expressed critical remarks about the government were removed from their positions.

As its base of electoral support eroded, the DP tried to suppress the opposition by actually physically coercing the CHP voters and sympathizers who attended opposition rallies as well as threatening the safety of the opposition leaders. Actions included throwing stones at those who were taking part in the rallies, physically or morally attacking the CHP leader İnönü and using law enforcement measures to prevent people from going to rallies. The opposition party supporters were not alone in being the targets of physical harassment. University students who demonstrated against the government constituted the target of police brutality. One student actually died during the demonstrations. By the time the military intervened, the opposition had judged that while the institutional features of a democratic system continued to exist, they were being used in such a way that replacing the government by electoral means appeared nearly impossible and would become even more so in the future.

Interestingly, the likelihood of a military intervention was never seriously taken into account by the government. There had been a couple of incidents when plans for a coup were reported, but the government had not considered such plans to be particularly serious. The top commanders were loyal to the government and they assured Prime Minister Menderes that there was nothing to worry about. Although the military along with the bureaucracy and others mentioned above constituted the pillars of the modern elites, at the time, it was not perceived as a veto group that could assume a more active political role in the face of domestic political developments. The military takeover was not expected by the government. Those arrested after the coup included the military's top brass.

To recoup the story, the anti-establishment popular movement to oust the ruling elite from power had been successful under the DP's leadership. The DP cadres did not want limitations that a constitutional system imposed on their power and demonstrated a proclivity to authoritarianism. When they sensed that they were beginning to lose power, they intensified their use of authoritarian means. They suppressed the opposition by subverting the rules of the democratic game using both legislation and coercion. They also tried to polarize the electorate by accusing the opposition of subversion. Such policies paved the way of political change through military intervention, an outcome the masters of the regime failed to anticipate.

The politics of populist electoral authoritarianism. The AKP period

The AKP came to power as a revolt against two types of establishments. The first was what we may call the "national establishment" comprised of a variety of secular parties that had learned to live with the tenets and the forces of the Kemalist republic extending from the various government agencies with the military in the lead and including the courts and secularist civil society organizations. The parties within that grouping had held an ambivalent stance toward the religious parties out of which the AKP was born. Interestingly, these parties had cooperated with religious partners in coalition governments, but they had not done anything to prevent the latter's ban by the Constitutional Court or the frequent reprimands they received from the military leadership. Simultaneously, the AKP also represented a revolt against the leadership of the Felicity Party, the last in a line of religious parties banned by the Constitutional Court for having used religion for political ends (Cf. Hale, Özbudun 2010: 3–19).

In contrast to the DP whose leadership came from among the CHP, the founding party of the republic, and was not concerned about a military intervention, the AKP was born in an environment where its predecessors had been resisted by the bureaucratic-military establishment and banned by the Constitutional Court. AKP's electoral victory in 2002, giving it an electoral majority and therefore the government, had incensed the state elites. The initial problem of the party was to assure everybody that it was a different party from its predecessors, that while its voters and political cadres might be socially conservative, they were committed democrats with no intention of transforming the political system of the country to a religion inspired autocracy.

Supported by rather favorable economic conditions due to a successful economic recovery program developed and implemented by the previous government, the AKP managed to present itself as a democratizing force which inevitably involved reducing the power of the state elites, particularly the military. To that end, the government turned to actively pursuing membership in the European Union which required much attention to civilian control of the military. In 2004 Turkey was invited to open accession negotiations for membership and the negotiations commenced in 2005. As Turkey worked to remove the initial barriers in order to start accession talks and then as it tried hard to comply with EU requirements, many changes affected the constitution and the laws that reduced considerably the institutionalized role the military had carved for itself in politics (Cf. Turan, Gürsoy 2014: 132–140).

An unanticipated opportunity arose in 2007 when the military and its parliamentary allies led by the CHP tried to prevent the election of Abdullah Gül, a former prime minister and foreign minister of moderate disposition, as president of the republic because his wife covered her head. While initially they succeeded through questionable interpretations of the voting procedures in the parliament, they failed after early elections were called, in which those parties who had stood in the way of Mr. Gül's election suffered significant losses. Mr. Gül was then easily elected to the presidency. But, in efforts to surmount the difficulties of electing a president by the parliament, the AKP's parliamentary majority had adopted a constitutional amendment that needed ratification by public referendum, moving the president's election from a parliamentary to a national vote. The referendum was held after Mr. Gül had already been elected president. An overwhelming majority approved it. In retrospect, this change appears to have been critical in the resumption of majoritarian arguments and of the authoritarian recidivism that the country is currently undergoing.[6]

[6] For the developments connected with the election of Mr. Gül as the president and the constitutional changes, see İlter Turan (2017).

If we return for a moment to the developments producing a decline in the role of the military, we must add that late in 2008, public prosecutors initiated an investigation into the military, alleging that some top generals were involved in the planning of a coup. Later investigations presumably revealed other plans in which other generals some on duty, others already in retirement, were involved. They were taken into custody, tried and imprisoned. After a period of six years, the political clout of the military was totally gone. During the trials, it became apparent that much of the evidence was flimsy, some of it seemed doctored, much of it unreliable. The logic the prosecutors employed was often circumstantial. Complaints regarding the maladministration of justice, however, were dismissed by the government, insisting that justice should run its course. After 2013, when the same judiciary alleged that some cabinet ministers had been involved in a corruption scandal, however, the stance of the government changed. Maladministration of justice allegations began now to be taken seriously; higher courts annulled the decision of the lower courts, in some cases calling for retrial and in other for acquittal. The trials also revealed major differences among the military leadership as regards the relation of armed forces to politics, undermining the image of the military as a highly unified political actor. Nearly all the commanders were set free, but the military could no longer act as a veto group in Turkish politics (Turan 2015: 135–137).

The corruption charges against some cabinet ministers in 2013 constituted the background against which the government began to turn to a clearly authoritarian direction. The prime minister alleged that there was a conspiracy against him and his government organized by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish cleric who lives in Pennsylvania. The organizations established by his followers were identified as terrorist organizations. A campaign was started to identify those with Gülenist connections in public service and the judiciary and to weed them out. A network of high schools and university admission preparatory programs established by Gülen connected foundations was closed. Businessmen who were thought to make major contributions to Gülenist activities were asked to terminate their links. It may well have been the case and later events have provided evidence that Gülenist related groups have engaged in conspiratorial activity to either establish control over the government or to bring it down. The point, however, is that the response of the government to meet the challenge did not remain within the confines of the rule of law and the ordinary administrative and legal instruments, but included mobilization of government agencies and use of their power in arbitrary ways to bring under control a movement that the prime minister had judged to be dangerous.

In 2014, elections for president were held under the new system. The Prime Minister, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, offered his candidacy and won by a small margin

over fifty percent in the first round. Upon taking office, he made use of the then familiar argument that he had the "national will" behind him and recognized that the role defined for the president in the constitution did not match current political realities and should therefore be changed. The constitution assumed an above party politics president with significant powers of appointment to agencies that carried out "state" as opposed to "political" functions; i.e. he had no policy making powers. He appointed the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu as the new prime minister. This government served for nearly two years; but relations between the president and the prime minister, i.e. the head of government, were continually marked by tensions and conflict, resulting from the highly interventionist approach of the president to the policy domain which Mr. Davutoğlu thought properly belonged to him. In the end, he was forced to resign against his will and a more accommodating person and an old time ally and friend of the President, Binali Yıldırım, was "made" the prime minister.

The parliamentary elections of Spring 2015 gave the president an opportunity to shape a parliamentary party fully loyal to him.[7] Though, he was technically an executive equidistant to all parties, he intervened actively in the selection of candidates of the AKP. His job was facilitated by the statute of his "former" party which depicted that an AKP member could not serve for more than three consecutive terms in the parliament. The rule led to the elimination, from both the parliamentary party and from key positions in the party hierarchy, of almost all of the party's founding leaders possessing independent electoral bases. The elections, however, did not quite turn out as the president had intended. The AKP experienced electoral losses and failed to get a parliamentary majority. Mr. Erdoğan did not encourage the parties in the parliament to search for coalition possibilities. Instead, he waited for the constitutionally defined period without government to lapse so that he could dissolve the parliament and call for new elections, reminding the voters that coalition governments were not a good idea. In the second elections in late Fall 2015 in which the AKP employed all the means of the state available to the government with the president interjecting himself into the race, and in which the opposition was starved for funds because they had used state aid to parties in the Spring election and no provision was allowed by the governing party to get additional aid for the Fall election, the AKP won a majority comprised of loyalists to the president.

Once the elections were behind, the president began to work to change the constitution in order to transform the system from parliamentary to

[7] For a comprehensive statistical report and political analysis of the November 2015 elections, see Erol Tuncer and Bülent Tuncer (2016).

presidential. The AKP's parliamentary majority was not large enough to change the constitution, therefore he started to search for an ally which he found in the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Earlier, Mr. Erdoğan had hoped that People's Democracy Party (HDP), usually identified as an ethnic Kurdish party, might have been the partner. He had initiated a peace process to bring an end to terrorism conducted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its acronym PKK, in Turkey's southeastern countryside. The strong linkages between the HDP and the PKK, he thought, constituted a mechanism through which negotiations might be conducted. But, when the head of the HDP proclaimed that his party would not support president Erdoğan's bid to reshape the Turkey's parliamentary system into presidential, he changed strategy and reintroduced the policy of fighting the PKK until it was "fully defeated". He found a new ally in MHP whose ethnic nationalism was highly supportive of the government's now changed Kurdish policy. The PKK response was to escalate acts of terrorism and to try to establish political control of towns. This gave the government not only an opportunity to declare a state of emergency which in Turkish practice gives the government extensive unchecked powers but also the possibility to ask for a temporary suspension of the immunities of parliamentary deputies so that they could be prosecuted. He also called for the nation to rally behind him in order to meet a challenge to the territorial integrity of Turkey. The unchecked powers have been used mainly to suppress the freedom of the press and to weed out the bureaucracy. The removal of parliamentary immunity of deputies, on the other hand, have landed some of the HDP deputies and an CHP deputy in jail for a variety of crimes allegedly connected with extending support to terrorism.

The alliance he forged with the MHP enabled Mr. Erdoğan to prepare a set of constitutional changes to render Turkey's parliamentary system into presidential with the chief executive acquiring extensive powers and hardly any means to check and balance them. The change was defended by attacking the separation of powers, which the proponents of change argued as constituting a major impediment to effective government, not surprisingly including fighting the PKK, a topic on which the MHP was very sensitive. The proposed changes, taken together, created a presidency equipped even with powers of issuing decrees having the force of law, with powers of appointment to all important positions in the government and the judicial system, and with no effective means to check the actions of the president.

As the constitutional changes were being debated, on July 15, 2016, there occurred an attempted military takeover, carried out for the most part by Gülenist officers whose numbers and the ranks they had achieved took the public fully by surprise. While the attempt was foiled, many lives were lost

and many officers put in jail. The government found in the development an opportunity to impress upon the public that Turkey's democracy was under threat and the only way to fight it was to adopt a presidential system. Following the failed attempt, sweeping arrests of Gülenists were made, many bureaucrats were taken into custody as were university professors, businessmen and journalists. The government without hesitation declared that all types of opposition were in fact interlinked, all serving the interests of the Gülenist conspiracy that was presumably being manipulated by external powers. The end result has been an unusual number of journalists in jail for "having supported terrorism", a significant number of "Gülenist" businessmen whose businesses have been taken over by the government and sold to others without sufficient consideration of the due process, a large number of academic staff fired for having signed a peace petition criticizing the way the government has approached the "Kurdish" problem, and an army of bureaucrats, judges and prosecutors who are alleged to have Gülenist connections.

In the meantime, the campaign to have the constitutional changes ratified in a public referendum proceeded with ferocity on the part of the government and the president. All means available to the public were used to mobilize voters. The state and many private broadcasting firms carried only pro-change news and discussions. Government employees, teachers, workers in public institutions were all encouraged and often required to attend pro-constitutional change rallies. Municipalities run by AKP mayors offered free bus service, food and beverage to those who wanted to go to the rallies. In short, the campaign was heavily balanced in favor of the government position.

The referendum was held on 16 April, 2017. Polls indicated that the vote would result in a stand-off. The yes votes won by a small margin (51.4% vs 48.6%) ended under allegations of electoral fraud.[8] These included the nearly impossible 100 percent turnout in a substantial number of remote villages in Eastern Turkey accompanied by allegations that some votes had been cast by voters who were proven to be away in another part of the country when the voting took place, But by far the most flagrant violation was counting the votes' cast in envelopes not stamped by the electoral board. This was an act prohibited by law, but as the voting was progressing, a government friendly High Board of Elections ruled that such vote was valid. This decision has been offered as evidence of the extent the judiciary has come under the influence of political authority.

[8] A statistical study by Peter Klimek, Raul Jimenez, Abraham Hinteregger, Stefan Thurner entitled *Election forensic analysis of the Turkish Constitutional Referendum 2017*, lends some credence to these charges. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.09839.pdf visited July 5, 2017.

The government, rather than hesitating about the uncertainty of the outcome, has proceeded to implement the changes. President Erdoğan has returned to his party and resumed its leadership in a ceremony with much pomp and circumstance. He has continued to argue, with growing determination, that varieties of opposition are in fact different manifestations of the same movement whose intention is to destroy the country in cooperation with external enemies that have been disturbed by Turkey's rising star, simultaneously reminding voters that if his government were to go, the bureaucrats who looked down on the citizens and did not respect them, would come back. He has invited the courts to do their jobs with vigilance in the fight against terrorism. Nearly two hundred members of the press are under arrest for what they have written, but the government argues that they are being tried for having assisted terrorist movements and that the charges against them have nothing to do with the freedom of the press. University faculty continue to lose their jobs for having signed a peace petition.

Conclusion

Has democratic government come to an end in Turkey? Rather than respond affirmatively as the above account of events would suggest, I would say that the system could best be described as one of electoral authoritarianism since all outward institutions of democratic governance exist, but they operate in ways that allow those who govern not to abide by the rules of the game and carry out their policies without the constraints that a system of checks and balances would impose on a government in a functioning liberal democracy. The reappearance of a populist electoral authoritarianism after nearly sixty years of democratic governance, albeit with interruptions, just at the time when Turkey appeared to be headed toward the consolidation of democracy, may indicate the powerful influence that cultural factors would play in shaping the way the democratic system operates and how it evolves in time.

If major political cleavages are culturally defined, if different "camps" of the electorate entertain different visions of a good society, if either camp finds government by the other side highly undesirable even if not wholly unacceptable, the conditions may favor the deterioration of democratic governance since both sides might be open to transgressing rules of democracy that undermine their domination in politics. In the Turkish case, the state elites that represented westernised version of modernization relied on maintaining powerful institutions of state that kept the elected politicians in check. When those institutions failed, the path was open for populistic electoral authoritarianism pursued by political movements that claim to represent the national will.

An interesting question still remains, however. Will socio-economic change eventually render the cultural bifurcation less important as a determinant of politics and reduce its role as a problem for democratic development? To the extent economic considerations have become important in shaping the politics of all societies that have evolved into market economies, there is no reason to think that Turkey will constitute an exception. The prevalence of economic concerns over other factors would favor democratic development and consolidation since the political debate moves into the domain of negotiables while rival visions of society become less important. Yet, the overall rise of populism throughout the world, including countries that have been traditionally identified as bastions of liberal democracy, manifesting itself as a rebellion against the political establishment and legitimizing itself by appealing to ideologies that were thought to have been buried in history, calls for caution. Cultural arguments, as evidenced by anti-immigration sentiments in Europe and the United States, have a powerful appeal to discontented voters. There is no reason to think of Turkey as an exception and Turkish voters are not susceptible to populist calls based on this or that source of dissatisfaction, concern or fear. The critical question is whether the institutions that constitute building blocks of a liberal democracy will display enough resilience in the Turkish case so that a restoration of a liberal democratic system will be possible. Only time will tell.

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Ilter Turan

THE RISE OF POPULIST ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN TURKEY: A CASE OF CULTURALLY ROOTED RECIDIVISM

The trend in Turkey's politics toward "electoral authoritarianism" is rooted in the long history of modernization. Tensions between traditional society and modernizing elites (with strong links to the military) resulted in the series of military coups in the 20th century and weak civilian regimes. The originality of the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since its coming to power in 2002 is that it has been able to consolidate the support of less privileged strata and to establish full control over the state. How durable is this system remains an open question.

Key words: Turkey, electoral authoritarianism, state elites, AKP, military, modernization

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Jerzy Jaskiernia
Institute of Law, Economics and Administration
Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce[1]

AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES IN THE POLISH POLITICAL SYSTEM

General Characteristic of the Polish Political System

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, which is a legal base for the contemporary Polish political system, is based upon several principles: sovereignty of the Nation; independence and sovereignty of the state; democratic state ruled by law; civil society; separation of powers; social market economy and inherent dignity of the person (Garlicki 1999: 51). Another classification of important principles of the Constitution has exposed: sovereignty of the Nation, democratic state ruled by law, separation of powers, political pluralism, freedom of the press and means of social communication, decentralization of public authority and social market economy (Tuleja 2009: 9). The final text of the Constitution was based on the concept of ideological and political pluralism. One can identify three main sources of axiological pluralism: liberal-democratic (socio-liberal), social-democratic and Christian-democratic (Winczorek 1999: 68).

The concept of sovereignty of the Nation corresponds with the political pluralism of Polish society, which is clearly expressed in and guaranteed by the Constitution. This is reflected mostly in securing freedom of the creation and functioning of political parties which bear the main responsibility for practical implementation of the principle of citizens' participation in the exercise of power (article 11). However, the Constitution prohibits parties of an undemocratic character (article 13), subjecting them in this respect to supervision exercised by the Constitutional Tribunal. Such a pluralism also finds reflection in freedom of creation of citizens' organizations other than

[1] E-mail: jerzyj@hot.pl

political parties (e.g. trade unions, associations – articles 12, 58 and 59 of the Constitution) and the permissibility of functioning of an unlimited number of organizations of a given type (multiparty system, pluralism of the trade unions) as well as a freedom to disseminate opinions in means of social communications – article 14). The Constitution does not impose any substantial requirements for citizens wishing to form a new party; on the other hand, it confers a range of significant powers on political parties, including particularly their right to receive financial subsidies provided that they participate in general elections (Sarnecki 2000: 13–14).

The Polish political system is based on the idea of balancing powers. Balance in the system of state organs has to be sustained due to the elimination of the possibility of any conflict between them. Such threat is always real when areas of joint responsibility of various state organs are being created instead of institutions having the nature of checks (Pułło 1999: 127). It also means that the balance would be easier achieved when no party dominates the political scene. Such scenario was actual in 1989–2015 when no party has dominated the political scene and coalition governments have been created.

The 2015 parliamentary election resulted in victory of a single party, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) (Marcinkiewicz, Stegmaier 2016: 223). For the first time in the history of a democratic Poland, the victor was able to form a government without having to negotiate with coalition partners. This was due not so much to significant switches in the preference of voters, but rather as a result of a very high number of wasted votes (more than 16% of active votes) due to the threshold for parties (5%) and party coalitions (8%). As a consequence, Gallagher disproportionality index surged to 11%. It is interesting to note that in three of seven previous parliamentary elections, the victorious party attracted a higher percentage of active voters than that achieved by PiS in 2015 (37.6%), but was unable to form a single-party government. It should be born in mind that in 2015 on PiS party lists were also candidates from two other political parties, Poland Together (Polska Razem – PR) and Solidary Poland (Solidarna Polska – SP), and was in point of fact a three-party coalition (Markowski 2016: 1311).

The situation, which occurred in 2015, when the office of the President and both chambers of parliament were dominated by the same political force (Law and Justice – PiS), has raised the question whether it might bring about a risk of the authoritarian tendencies.

Sources of authoritarian tendencies in the contemporary Europe

Today, without getting too much into the nuances of the conceptual definition and theory of democracy, one can indicate two competing models: procedural and substantive (republican). The procedural model assumes that every human as a rational being has the right to formulate, seek and implement their own conception of "good". The condition is to maintain the axiological neutrality by establishing state institutions upholding the equal and equitable treatment of all varying views that are expressed in society. The second model of democracy stands for a broader understanding of the function of politics not limiting its role to just follow the procedures; politics is the articulation of a deep-rooted vision of the moral life of the community, contained in the concept of common good. Democracy should produce and support mechanisms that will form the foundation for the functioning of good, well-meaning policies, and the existence of trust is crucial to it. A greater freedom in many areas can lead to engaging the greater responsibility of citizens, activating their potential ingenuity and commitment to common goals (Plecka 2013: 71–72).

A popular protest often leads to important changes in the personal composition and policies of elites, which considerably affect the structure and operation of authoritarian regimes, and at times produces regime change. Evidence is provided from authoritarianism in Poland and Yugoslavia, where sustained protests contributed to the fall of communism, and from competitive authoritarian regimes in the post-communist Serbia and Ukraine, which were repeatedly undermined by protest waves and brought to an end by pressure "from below" (Vladislajević 2014: 143).

Privatization frameworks are ranged from those that primarily reward political and enterprise insiders to those that reward outsiders. Illiberal democracies tend to choose privatization programs that reward insiders. This cements insiders' political influence and contributes to corrupt interaction between the public and private economic spheres. Subsequent poor economic performance combined with ongoing conflict over political institutions may produce a "break point" at which societies can decide to move in a democratic direction. Liberal democracies, by contrast, have no predisposition to an outsider- or an insider-based privatization framework. Insiders would have more resources to bring to the fight over privatization programs where reformist communists led or contributed to the "break-up" of communism. Nevertheless, the competitive processes inherent to liberal democracies prevent even poorly managed insider privatization from prolonging destructive rent-seeking practices. As a result, liberal democratic regimes are likely to perform

better than illiberal democratic and authoritarian regimes in implementing post-communist structural reforms (Gould 2003: 298).

Europe's multiple crises over the last decade seem to have slowed down but nevertheless convinced the governments of certain countries (Poland being the latest example, Hungary the most prominent and most resilient) that (neo) liberal reform is no longer an option. Building an "illiberal state" – whatever this may mean – is not only part of an ideological narrative placing the nation at the center of politics, but is being translated – in the worst case – into policies turned against basic European values such as the rule of law, freedom of the media or a system of checks and balances. In this regard, policies in countries that are members of the EU or that are pretending to be moving towards EU membership not only reveal deficits in their understanding of a modern liberal democracy, but also show that democracy is not the only game in town. The political elites in Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, until recently in Romania and now also in Poland – as some observers suggest – have developed particular skills and energies in implementing illiberal policies, calling into question the checks and balances of the liberal state or even transforming the original democratic project into an unfair game to be controlled by the incumbents in power. In some cases observers have described the national leaders as "Putin wannabes". This may be an exaggeration, since none of the Eastern or South-Eastern European political regimes came close to the type of autocracy realized by Putin and his followers. Still, there is an illiberal and even authoritarian "temptation", which may be temporary, an expression of crisis, of frustration directed against certain policies of the EU. It might also be the case that we are facing the beginning of a historic decline in democracy and the rise of a new authoritarianism (Džihić, Hayoz 2016: 4).

The rise of the new right must be seen as a reaction to the growth of cosmopolitan attitudes since the Second World War. The washed up catch-all parties and post-modernism have left an ideological vacuum that has been infiltrated by right-wing extremist parties. Yet it is not them that primarily profit from the present crisis of the EU but national conservative politicians such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland (Shekhovtsov 2016: 9).

In the literature the phenomenon of authoritarian reverse waves in Central and Eastern Europe is exposed. The analysts define potential factors and conditions of authoritarian reverse wave after the third wave of democratization, such as: reduction of legitimacy of democratic regimes, general economic crisis, appearance of "snowballing" effect after authoritarian transition of any democratic or democratizing state, transition of recently democratized countries to dictatorship, successful expansion by undemocratic state against

democracy, appearance of different forms of authoritarianism that respond the needs of the momentum. The reason for strengthening authoritarian tendencies of a political system in new independent states are interpreted, above all, in improvement of mechanism of "ruling circles' access" to the national heritage. However, the similarity of general trends in political developments of post-Soviet republics does not mean that the establishment of superstructural institutions generally occurs under one scenario and significant differences in national political processes primarily in pace and content of market transformation in new independent states are associated (Dziubenko 2015).

Sources, determinants and meaning of authoritarian tendencies in the Polish political system

The "winner takes all" scenario is likely to enhance the power monopoly of the dominant actor and the supremacy of informal institutions. The consequences of this scenario are the emergence of new political regimes with numerous aspects of authoritarian rule. These regimes could be relatively stable. The "elite settlement" scenario generally includes the sharing of powers between dominant and subordinate actors in order to limit public political contestation and establish the supremacy of informal, rather than formal, institutions. These regimes are fragile and dependent on changes in the political situation. The "struggle over the rules" scenario of outcome of uncertainty is likely to provide an institutional framework as a precondition to democratization in the sense of horizontal accountability through the institutional limitation on assertions of power. Until the institutionalization of the new regime, it still remains fragile. Democracy is not emerging from regime transition by default. Only if political competition among actors within the framework of formal institutions continues to develop, transitions to democracy may occur as a contingent outcome of conflict, or as the "lesser evil" for the actors (Adamski 1998: 12).

We have to think about the causes of the rise of the right-wing forces, not only in Poland but in Europe in general, in order to analyze the situation with a cold blood and rethink values on which politicians, philosophers and civic activists based the European polity. For the right-wing, the lack of a conservative voice and the lack of political pluralism in the European Union are the main problems. A liberal speech praising Europe seems to uproot today the opposition in politics. In Poland, this split between the right and the liberal camps is increasing tensions between PiS and PO followers. That is why it is essential for the Polish people to rethink their situation and move

towards rationality. The Polish people were able to fight for their freedom for 123 years since 1795, they were able to fight with the German occupying forces during the Second World War and to break free of the Soviet domination in 1989. However, as some observers suggest, current events seem to show that they do not take advantage of this freedom, and that the creation of a coherent community is only possible in front of a common enemy.

The paradox with the result of 2015 parliamentary election is connected with an observation that for the past few years Poland has been enjoying good press, having become something of a poster child for economic success in the post-communist region. Poland's real GDP growth has been among the highest in Europe; it has minimal inflation, single-digit unemployment, declining inequality ratio (at a level about the average for European countries) and healthy public finances with a budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP. The country has outpaced not only such regional neighbors as Hungary, but also some countries in "old" Europe. And it's not only the macro-level statistics: much the same positive story emerges from surveys of individuals and households, which show across-the-board improvements in a variety of economic and human development indicators. And yet in the elections of Oct. 25, 2015 the ruling coalition of the centrist Civic Platform (PO) and the agrarian Polish People's Party (PSL), in power since 2007, suffered a resounding defeat. The new government was formed by an electoral alliance headed by the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS), the first since 1989 to win the majority of seats in the lower chamber of parliament. PiS also won 61 of the 100 seats in the Senate. And its candidate, Andrzej Duda, won the presidency in 2015. So does this mean that the Poles are turning away from liberal democracy? Analysts suggest that it's a mixed picture. PiS has won the majority of seats and unquestionably gained the mandate to form the next government. But its 37.6 percent of votes, when only about a half (51 percent) of voters actually went to the polls, means it received the active support of only about 1 in 5 (19 percent) of all eligible voters, which does not add up to a mandate for overturning the constitutional order (Tworzecki, Markowski 2015).

Law and Justice (PiS), Poland's main opposition party until 2015, not only regained power but its electoral committee, composed of three other minor parties (i.e. Solidary Poland, Poland Together, and the Right Wing of the Republic), obtained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. This, coupled with PiS' candidate Andrzej Duda's victory in presidential election, gave Jarosław Kaczyński's party unprecedented power in the country. Since then much has been said about the overnight redrawing of Poland's political landscape, the causes of PiS' "stunning victory" and the governing Civic Platform's humiliation despite its incomparable economic record, as

well as the implications of PiS' victory for democracy in Poland or in Europe (Bertoa 2015).

Party	Votes	Votes (%)	Seats	Seats (%)	Seat change since 2011
Law and Justice (PiS)	5,711,687	37.58	235	51.09	+78
Civic Platform (PO)	3,661,474	24.09	138	30.00	-69
Kukiz'15	1,339,094	8.81	42	9.13	
Nowoczesna	1,155,370	7.60	28	6.09	
United Left	1,147,102	7.55			-67
Polish People's Party (PSL)	779,875	5.13	16	3.48	-12
Korwin	722,999	4.76			
Razem	550,349	3.62			
German Minority	27,530	0.18	1	0.22	no change
Other parties	105,191	0.68			
Total	15,200,671	100.00	460	100.00	

Total electorate: 30,629,150; turnout: 50.92%
United Left did not win seats because, as a coalition, it needed to clear a higher threshold (8% rather than 5%)
Threshold rules do not apply to parties of national minorities
Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (www.pkw.gov.pl)

Table No. 1: Results of the October 25, 2015 elections to the lower house of parliament (the Sejm)
Source: State Election Commission.

A half of Polish voters have preferred staying at home to participating in the electoral process. Thus, even though the last parliament has been the third most supported in Polish history after 1989, only 51 percent of the electorate went to the polls and cast their votes.



Table No. 2: Participation in the electoral process in Poland 1991–2015
Source: IDEA.

This makes Poland, with an average turnout of 48 percent, the most apathetic democracy not only in the post-communist Europe but in the European Union. And even if, as explained elsewhere, such low levels of electoral participation are not enough to question the legitimacy of the Polish democracy per se, it certainly confirms a tendency observed in most European countries: namely, the growing distance between citizens and their representatives. Moreover, it questions the extent to which a party system in which barely half of the citizens regularly exert their voting rights can be considered consolidated (Bertoa 2015).

The last parliamentary elections with a turnout of 51% showed that the most frequent choice in Poland is electoral abstention. As a result, the PiS could achieve an absolute majority with only 19% of votes of the eligible electorate. This would appear far from sufficient for a party to speak and act on behalf of the whole nation. Nonetheless, the party presents itself as the only true representative and protector of the common good. In its dominant narrative, the PiS creates an artificial division between "liberal post-communism" and a "truly free Poland of solidarity with the poorest" while reducing the term "liberalism" to radical economic reforms and individual freedom. However, opposing liberalism and social solidarity is misleading, because the democratic order needs both (Solska 2016: 14).

Civic Platform had all power with the coalition partner Polish People's Party (PSL), a full mainstream media support, and a broad social support. They successfully created a narrative according to which they were the forces of modernization, the only party coalition able to turn Poland into a prosperous and respected country. On the other hand, they presented Law and Justice as crazy kooks who would blow everything up and ruin things for everyone. Civic Platform also presented their time in power as the period of Poland's greatest prosperity, with the construction of highways, roads, stadiums, and big international investments in the country. Law and Justice seemed to be banished from the mainstream forever. However, they started creating their own channels of information: they revived small conservative newspapers, founded new magazines, created internet TV and YouTube channels, Facebook profiles, etc. Most importantly, these were not directly linked to the party but to so-called "independent" journalists with clear conservative dispositions. Every time there was a breach in the mainstream narrative, any time an actor, a performer, a journalist, or a writer has voiced a pro-Law and Justice opinion, he or she would immediately become a star of this alternative, conservative media. These media outlets began, of course, with crazy conspiracies about the Smoleńsk disaster. But with time they changed their strategy. They started showing the mistakes and plot-holes of the lengthy Russian and Polish

investigations of the disaster. They blew the whistle every time there was an instance of corruption in the ruling party. They have emphasized every instance of hatred towards traditional Polish society among the mainstream media. They started presenting Civic Platform's "modernized Poland" as a lie and claimed that Poland was becoming a neo-colony of the West, from which only the politicians of the ruling parties could profit (Ostrogniew 2015).

There were several attempts to explain results of the 2015 parliamentary election in Poland (Tworzecki, Markowski 2015: 2, Markowski 2016: 1315, Jaskiernia 2016: 27, Marcinkiewicz, Stegmaier 2016: 224). While Poland's overall economic health was strong, some groups and some parts of the country were suffering. Youth unemployment was twice the national average. Good jobs were scarce in small towns and rural regions, especially in the eastern Poland. Many people were working under short-term contracts that carry few protections or benefits. And although Poland was the only country in the EU to avoid a recession after the post-2008 global crisis (Prime Minister Donald Tusk often exposed himself in front of the map of the European Union where Poland was the only one "green island" without recession), that came at a cost. The government imposed austerity measures (including pay freezes for the public sector), while private businesses often imposed pay cuts while simultaneously demanding higher productivity. That's why, in elections, the incumbent PO party lost support even among younger, well-educated, urban voters who pushed it to its first victory back in 2007. It's also why PiS was able to garner so much support beyond its religious, socially conservative strongholds in small towns and rural areas of the eastern Poland, winning the plurality of votes in almost all regions and demographic categories.

To respond to the widely felt hardships and anxieties, PiS ran a campaign that called for vastly expanded public spending. It promised to increase the minimum wage and the personal income tax exemption; to offer new child support payments (program Family 500+), housing subsidies (program Housing+), and free prescription drugs for seniors; and to lower the retirement age from the current 67 to 65 for men and 65 to 60 for women. In doing so – positioning itself as a culturally rightist but economically leftist party – PiS was able to attract voters who in the past may well have voted for the left. In this election the United Left (the latest incarnation of the former communists and assorted allies) failed to win any seats in parliament (not reaching 8% threshold for the coalitions). PiS backed its economic promises by a radical critique of the status quo: rather than simply poking a few holes in the positive economic statistics, it went with the hyperbolic message of "Poland in ruins", through which it achieved its main goal of demobilizing the ruling parties' supporters, leading many of them to stay home on election day.

PiS also exploited the European migrant crisis which was especially acute in 2015. While the government dithered, PiS argued adamantly against the EU proposal for a quota system that would deliver a certain percentage of migrants to each country. PiS stoked fears that the refugees and migrants would threaten Poland's national security, religious and cultural identity, economic well-being and even public health. After World War II Poland became one of Europe's most ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries (87.5 percent of Poles identify themselves as Roman Catholic), which has meant that it has not had to confront the challenges of multiculturalism — although it did receive nearly 100,000 war refugees from Chechnya and, more recently, nearly half a million economic migrants from Ukraine with hardly anyone noticing. But the refugee crisis has dominated the news for much of the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, conditions were ripe for xenophobic appeals.

Law and Justice are usually denounced as nutty Catholic reactionary right--wingers by the chattering classes within Poland and around Europe. In fact they are a *sui generis* movement of truculent, carefully Eurosceptic étatist-patriots. They urge a "strong Poland", by which they mainly mean robust and sternly honest state institutions, and a square deal for state employees and pensioners. Latterly Law and Justice has successfully broadened their appeal towards small businesses and younger voters. But they are instinctively suspicious of big business and banks, and loath to do anything radical to reform state processes or advance privatization and deregulation. They are comfortable playing to conservative Catholic instincts of older Polish voters, but they see the Catholic Church as a patriotic force: they are not religious zealots (Crawford 2015).

The Law and Justice Party, though considered "far-right" by many political scientists and experts, is hard to define with a straight-forward ideological label. The party calls for an increase in social spending, higher taxes on the wealthy, and re-nationalization of key sectors of the economy. The party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, also expressed that the Law and Justice party was opposed to immigrants, gays, feminists, liberals, and most foreigners. In addition, he has expressed that his goal is to create a Poland in which lives only one Polish nation, and not diverse nations. He has admitted that his goal has been to remain in power for life. This combination of liberal and conservative sentiments can be seen in other European countries, like Hungary for example. According to the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, "the era of liberal democracy is over". Simultaneously, he has worked to increase taxes on larger businesses and establish price controls on electricity. In addition to domestic contributors, aspects of the international stage have also contributed to the rise of the rightist Law and Justice party in Poland. This category of issues is more complex, as it involves neighboring countries and other members of the

European Union. The most fascinating is that the EU, a body which touts a set of conditions cemented in democratic gains for its member states, is actually acting as a hindrance to the development of Poland as a democracy that ensures basic liberties. Over time however the reputation of the EU as a powerhouse of democracy and strong socioeconomic gains for its member states has greatly diminished. It has been tarnished by the failure of the EU to manage conflicts, like the influx of refugees recently (Arntson 2016: 10–11).

Developing tendencies of the Polish political system after the 2015 Law and Justice victory

What do these elections mean for democracy in Poland? Political science has long held that rising prosperity would inoculate countries against the risk of authoritarian backsliding. But in its draft constitution and various other pronouncements PiS has made it clear that its ambition is to transform Poland's political institutions in ways similar in their illiberal spirit to those seen recently in Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Although PiS did not get the 2/3 parliamentary majority required for making constitutional changes, it has won majorities in both chambers of parliament. With the presidency also in hand, PiS may be able to put many of its proposals into effect through a combination of ordinary legislation and determined political practice. A version of the Hungarian scenario is therefore possible. Going by the results of these elections, it is impossible to tell now whether Poland is experiencing illiberal backlash. At this point analysts suggest that Polish voters are reexamining the two fundamental democratic values: freedom and equality. Since the fall of Communism a quarter-century ago, the Poles have enjoyed an unprecedented expansion of liberties, not only of the political kind but also in social mores and lifestyles. Indeed, for the more traditionally inclined, the pace of cultural change has become threatening. At the same time the demand for economic equality hasn't been met. PiS achieved its victory by responding to this combination of fears and needs with promises to do both: increase economic redistribution toward the less well-off and protect traditional cultural values (Tworzecki, Markowski 2015: 2).

One of the first clear effects of the last parliamentary elections in Poland has been the end of the so-called "post-communist cleavage" which pitted post-communist parties (mainly SLD and PSL) against post-Solidarity parties (including PO and PiS) and characterized Polish politics for most of its democratic history. For the first time this end was claimed after 2005 elections but 2015 elections bring additional arguments to this theory. Indeed, SLD's failure to gain any parliamentary seats in the new parliament constitutes

the last strike to a political divide that started to fade away with the electoral and government coalition between SLD and UP in 2001, PSL' parliamentary support to Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz's (PiS) cabinet in 2005, and the PO and PSL coalition government in 2007. PiS' victory in almost all regions and across different socio-demographic groups (e.g. age, place of residence, education, gender) questions another feature of Polish politics which has so far been constant: the awareness of Poland's past. There seemed to be a clear cultural, economic and political division between the northwestern part of Poland, consisting of the territories that belonged to Germany before 1945, which were culturally more cosmopolitan, economically more developed and politically more liberal, and the south-eastern part of the country, which was culturally more traditional, but also poorer and politically conservative. Indeed, from the first presidential election in 1990 until the last presidential contest in May 2015, throughout every single electoral contest – local, legislative, for the European Parliament – social-democratic (SLD until 2001) or liberal (PO from 2005) parties received more votes in the west than in the east, which is more inclined to support rightist (Solidarity and AWS until 1997; PiS from 2001) parties (Bertoa 2015: 1).

The current composition of the parliament in Poland reflects a crisis of traditional political forces in the country. The disappearance of entire sections of the Polish political spectrum (specifically, post-communist left-wing forces, as the Democratic Left Alliance) from the parliament is a sign of distrust in the political structures (the poor performance of another long-standing party, the Polish People's Party, which mustered just 3 per cent of the votes, is a further proof of this). At the same time, parties that have built their rhetoric primarily around non-participation in the political system (Paweł Kukiz's union for example) have enjoyed a huge success. It is worth noting here that 25 per cent of the people who voted for Paweł Kukiz in 2015 voted for Janusz Palikot in 2011. This is particularly interesting because, judging by his views, Janusz Palikot has little in common with Paweł Kukiz, a left-leaning liberal. The only thing uniting these parties and their leaders is the tendency towards scandalous behaviour and their anti-system stance. This means that a part of the Polish electorate (both Kukiz in 2015 and Palikot in 2011 appealed to the youth) is prepared to cast their vote as an act of protest, as they are dissatisfied with the state of Polish politics in principle and are ready to support any party that offers a clear alternative (Kuvaldin, Guschin 2016). If this trend will continue in the next elections, it will have an important impact on the functioning of the Polish political parties' system.

Post-communist Poland, an example of a very successful democratic transition so far, began to move away from Western European democratic

ideals. This manifests itself in a serious constitutional crisis. The crisis started after President Andrzej Duda declined to appoint three judges elected to the Constitutional Court by the former Parliament (dominated by the PO), but instead appointed three other judges. In addition, the new law passed by PiS members of Parliament severely limits the independence of the Constitutional Court, though this body is one of the most important safeguards of the rule of law in Poland. From now on, it will be easier for MPs to dismiss the judges of the Court. It will also be a new competence for the President and the Minister of Justice. In addition, the decisions of the Court will need to be passed by a qualified majority of 2/3 of the votes instead of a simple majority. This law was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, however the sentence was not published by the Government. The worsening constitutional crisis which currently affects the Polish state is the source of many doubts about the existence of the separation of powers, and of the rule of law in Poland (Lechaise 2017).

Moreover, the PiS government seems to no longer respect the independence of the public media. As a result of the management changes of public media, many journalists have been fired and replaced by others who are more favorable to the government's policy. Polish public media adopted an explicitly pro--government speech, particularly by neglecting the demonstrations organized by the KOD[2]. It is clear that public media resort to blatant manipulation, showing images that suggest a smaller number of demonstrators. Generally, any criticism of the actions of PiS politicians is ignored by the public channels. The latter contributes to the historicization of the current issues propagated by the government (Lechaise 2017).

On January 13, 2016 in an unprecedented move, Frans Timmermans, the first vice president of the European Commission, announced the Commission would start a process aimed at protecting Poland from internal threats to its rule of law. Poland, the good kid of Europe, suddenly found itself out of favor. "How did this happen?" was the question heard following recent controversial actions by Law and Justice, Poland's new conservative government. How was it possible that a long period of cooperation between Warsaw and Brussels had hit a crisis point? The end of the myth of the West means that verbal warnings from politicians such as Timmermans will unfortunately not result in any meaningful change of attitudes. The only difference to Central European

[2] Komitet Obrony Demokracji (Committee of the Defence of Democracy) is a new civil society initiative which was created after PiS (Law and Justice) has assumed power in 2015. See: Karolewski (2016).

policies can be effected by EU institutions taking a firm stance—toward not just Poland but also Hungary (Kuisz 2016).

The current crisis unfolded over the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court. The traditional division of powers in any constitutional order warrants separation in its executive, legislative and judicial branches, while preserving their independence from each other. According to the furiously critical coverage by "Washington Post", AP, "New York Times" and others, Poland has destroying its image as a *good and democratic partner* of the West (Monroe 2016).

Andrzej Duda's election as president and the victory of the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland have been universally reported in the international media as "a lurch to the right". This is – as Adam Zamoyski suggests – highly misleading. The leadership of PiS is in fact deeply marked by the political culture of the communist era. The late night shenanigans surrounding the nomination of new judges to the Constitutional Tribunal and the determination to muzzle the media are pure Soviet-style politics. In a throwback to the old days, the ministry of culture will decide which plays are staged by the Kraków prestigious Stary Teatr (Old Theater). The PiS core is not inherent capitalist: they are hostile to free-market economics, regard businessmen as "speculators" and believe in government control of everything, including property rights. They have promised to crack down on banks, lower the retirement age and give massive monthly cash handouts to parents for each child. They are conservative only in that they view the liberal center ground of Western politics – and the modern world in general – with suspicion. Their conservatism is essentially provincialism, their politics populist. They beat the drum of patriotism and talk of preserving national sovereignty, but their idea of patriotism is to wallow in the martyrology of the Second World War and the talk of sovereignty is mostly an expression of xenophobia (Zamoyski 2016).

With the court unable to act as a check on the ruling party's power, lawmakers followed with other controversial laws that have centralized the government's power further. These include a law giving the government greater control of the state broadcast media and one increasing police powers of surveillance. An international human rights commission weighed in on Poland's constitutional crisis with a deeply critical report. "As long as the situation of constitutional crisis related to the Constitutional Tribunal remains unsettled and as long as the Constitutional Tribunal cannot carry out its work in an efficient manner, not only is the rule of law in danger, but so is democracy and human rights", said the report by the Venice Commission (Gera 2016).

The conflict around the Constitutional Court involves two major political forces in Poland that both created a vicious circle, also involving

the European scene. This conflict has prompted other parties to rethink the crisis; and that is why, for instance, the Kukiz 15' opposition party wants to create a compromise between these two camps. This is also the decision of the Venice Commission. This recommendation seems to go against the will of a daily newspaper, "Gazeta Wyborcza", which counted on the support of its arguments by an overwhelming democracy and an arriving dictatorship. The Venice Commission's decision does not find that the conflict crippling the Constitutional Court was created by this power-hungry PiS. It considers the current and precedent powers, who started this political quarrel, to be at fault. In addition, the Commission does not claim the obligation to enforce the Court's judgement and accept the appointment of three judges of the other parliamentary cadence, but rather encourages the finding of a compromise. This compromise also seems to be sought after by the Polish society. However it turns out that neither the Civic Platform or Nowoczesna nor the KOD intend to seek a compromise and find reconciliation (Hachoud 2017).

In the case of Poland, anti-government demonstrations in 2016 and 2017 consisted of not only the parliamentary opposition but also a wide range of independent movements that do not want the state to encroach on their daily lives. It was women, after all, who forced Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło to back down on her plans to make the country's tight abortion laws even more restrictive. She was bombarded with criticism and sarcasm via social media (Dempsey 2016). Poland's PiS government suffered its first blow since coming to power nearly a year ago. In what amounted to a complete U-turn following a dramatic parliamentary session in the wake of the Black Monday protest, PiS MPs struck down a proposed bill to ban abortion. Domestic and international media were quick to hail this as a victory for the anti-government protest movement. More so, PiS became divided over the issue as 32 MPs defied party discipline to vote against the bill. In Poland, the striking down of the proposed abortion bill was a first blow to the government, but PiS will most likely try again to tamper with the abortion legislation if only to appease the ultra-Catholic part of its support base. Furthermore, PiS still aims to continue with its political project of "good change" – it has for instance not backed down in the conflict surrounding the Constitutional Court. The Black Protest movement in 2016 demonstrated that PiS can be successfully challenged from the grassroots level. Even though Black Monday (3 October 2016) was not the biggest manifestation of protest since PiS came to power, it successfully divided the governing camp forcing it to retreat. Additionally, it mobilised and politicised segments of society that had thus far not been engaged in anti--government protest. Nevertheless, the situation is not as dire as it might seem. Though PiS clearly favours an authoritarian state based upon a majoritarian

interpretation of democracy, the likelihood that Poland could ultimately succumb to "orbánisation" is rather slim (Junes 2016: 1).

Final remarks

The success of Law and Justice in 2015 parliamentary election in Poland seems to be a result of the combination of several factors. It would be mistaken to portray an emerging situation as a simple rightist win. PiS to some extent represents social attitudes typical for the socialist (social-democratic) parties, with some part of program including a populist message, but with the combination of conservative approach to several issues and nationalistic stand on perception of patriotic mood. An important meaning plays the support for PiS by the Catholic Church, especially in the grass-roots level. The ideological importance of nationalism in Poland makes it a vivid example of the interaction between conflicts of definition of political community, on the one hand, and parties' European attitudes, on the other (Pontes Meyer Resonde 2005: 12).

The 2015 election results might be also treated as a proof of a growing illiberal order in the contemporary world (Boyle 2016: 49). Populist tendencies are present in Poland as well as in another Central and East European countries (Lang 2005: 6) and their credibility must be analyzed together with the responsiveness of established parties to peoples' expectations (van Kessel 2013: 186). Major resources of political knowledge were changed and political knowledge leads to changes in political interest, alienation, democratic attitudes and voting behavior (Kunovich 2013: 75). Growing importance, as shown by the Standard Eurobarometer 84 Survey (EB84), conducted between 7 and 17 November 2015, had a refugee crisis (*Public Opinion*… 2015: 12).

The victory of PiS in 2015 election and forming of the majority government have an important meaning for the functioning of the political parties' system in Poland. The opposition parties in parliament must offer a new strategy of behavior in such circumstances, specifically when PiS' policy is aimed at compromising the democratic system based on the 1997 constitution principles, e.g. division of power, position of the Constitutional Tribunal and functioning of the judiciary.

The political situation occurred after 2015 election has also open the way to a new civil society initiatives, such as the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (Komitet Obrony Demokracji – KOD). It could influence further development of political parties' system in Poland.

It is too early to claim that the authoritarian tendencies, observed after 2015 elections, will dominate the Polish political system for a longer time. Surely, controlling of the office of the President of the Republic of Poland and

parliamentary scene by one party (Law and Justice) did not help to execute political pluralism and balance of power in Poland, as has been stipulated in the constitution of the Republic of Poland and as has been the practice and the philosophy of the Polish political system since democratic changes in 1989 and then adopted in the 1997 constitution. Nevertheless an important counterbalance is still offered by the political opposition and mechanisms of the civil society. The Polish fundamental law still brings about the criteria to analyze the political practice and instruments to protect to some extent the balance of power and pluralistic values. The open question remains what tendency would bring about the constitutional referendum proposed by President Andrzej Duda for 11 November 2018, on the day of the 100th anniversary of independence of Poland. It might answer the question whether some autocratic tendencies would create the mood to change the constitution in that direction.

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Jerzy Jaskiernia

AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES IN THE POLISH POLITICAL SYSTEM

The author analyses some authoritarian tendencies which occur in the Polish political system after 2015 elections since one party (Law and Justice – PiS) has started to control the office of the President and both houses of parliament and has introduced changes in functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal and the judiciary. To some extent PiS represents social attitudes typical for the socialist (social-democratic) parties, with some populist message, but with the combination of a conservative approach to several issues and a nationalistic stand on perception of patriotic mood. To respond to the widely felt hardships and anxieties, PiS ran a campaign that called for vastly expanded public spending. It promised to increase the minimum wage and the personal income tax exemption; to offer a new child support payments (program Family 500+), housing subsidies (program Housing+), and free prescription drugs for seniors; and to lower the retirement age from the current 67 to 65 for men and 65 to 60 for women. PiS also exploited the European migrant crisis. It is too early to claim that the authoritarian tendencies, observed after 2015 elections, have dominated the Polish political system for a longer time. Still an important counterbalance offer the political opposition and mechanisms of the civil society. The Polish fundamental law still brings about the criteria to analyze a political practice and instruments to protect to some extent the balance of power and pluralistic values. The open question is what tendency would bring about the constitutional referendum proposed by President Andrzej Duda for 11 November 2018, on the 100th anniversary of independence of Poland. It might answer the question whether some autocratic tendencies would create the mood to change the constitution in that direction.

Keywords: Poland, constitution, political system, 2015 elections, Law and Justice, authoritarian tendencies

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Jerzy J. Wiatr
European University of Law and Administration[1]

NEW AND OLD AUTHORITARIANISM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In early 1990s, in the aftermath of the "third wave of democratization" optimism prevailed in the way future of young democracies was perceived. However, even then there were scholars who expressed concerns about the stability of democracy in the countries which had just departed from dictatorial regimes. In his comparative study of democratization in the twentieth century, Samuel Huntington saw six "potential causes of a third reverse wave": (1) systemic failures of democratic regimes, leading to the undermining of their legitimacy, (2) a general international economic collapse, (3) a shift to authoritarianism by a great power, (4) the lack of the usual preconditions for democracy in several newly democratic states, (5) the growth of power of a nondemocratic state beyond its borders, and (6) the emergence of "various forms of authoritarianism" appropriate to the needs of the times (Huntington 1991: 292–293). Among these forms of new authoritarianism Huntington listed authoritarian nationalism, religious fundamentalism, oligarchic authoritarianism, populist dictatorships and communal dictatorships.

Old concerns and new experiences

Huntington was not alone in his concerns. In 1991, Adam Przeworski in a comparative analysis of political and economic reforms in Latin America and in some European post-communist states, expressed his worry that radical economic reforms might result in massive social malaise and, consequently, undermine the newly established democratic governments (Przeworski 1991). The importance of social and economic issues for the survival of young

[1] E-mail: jwiatr@ewspa.edu.pl

democracies was also stressed in the comparative study of democratization (Bresser Pereira, Maravall, Przeworski 1993). In early 1990s, I have participated in two international teams set up with the aim of the analysis of conditions conducive to the consolidation of new democracies and on the identification of potential dangers (Przeworski 1995, Jahn, Wildenmann 1995). In both, we came to the conclusion that the greatest danger for democratic consolidation lied in the potential social conflicts resulting from radical economic transformation. Seen from this perspective, the formerly communist states of East and Central Europe were more vulnerable, since they faced a combination of political and economic transformation on the scale absent in Latin America or in Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain) in the 1970s. This, however, was not the only problem. In early 1990s, I identified three main sources of authoritarian danger faced by post-communist countries: socio-economic conflicts, nationalism and religious fundamentalism (Wiatr 1995). All three were present in the post-communist countries, but their respective strength depended on the nation-specific conditions.

There was also populist rejection of the "rule of elites" as the newly established democracies were perceived by less privileged strata. "Some disappointed groups – wrote the Polish sociologist and politician Hieronim Kubiak – began to perceive democracy not as 'power of the people, for the people and by the people' but as power of political elites, by elites and for elites" (Kubiak 1998: 63). In the aftermath of the democratic upheaval, which had brought the communist regimes to their end, such feelings have been a fertile ground for populist rebellion against the new, democratic elites.

We are now in a position to test the hypothesis of the "third reverse wave" against the political experience of last twenty-five years. Compared to the earlier reverse waves, the last years of the twentieth century and the first part of the present can be seen as relatively successful. No "old democracy", existing prior to the beginning of the third wave of democratization, turned into a nondemocratic regime and a great majority of new democracies in Latin America and Europe avoided the reverse wave. Economic tensions, resulting mostly from growing economic inequalities, produced populist movements but they did not cause an anti-democratic upheavals. An international economic collapse has not materialized, in spite of the financial crisis of 2008. Contrary to the pessimistic scenarios based on the historical analogies, the lack of democratic traditions and the perseverance of authoritarian traits in the political cultures in many of the new democracies, have not prevented them from consolidating their democratic institutions. The recent experience of the "Arab Spring" which had begun in 2011 has been much less positive. All Arab

states where dictators had been overthrown, except Tunisia, either fell into the state of the civil war, or reversed to the authoritarian rule.

There has been an important difference between the way in which the third wave of democratization changed the political situation in Latin America and in Southern Europe and the results of the collapse of the communist regimes. In Latin America and in three South European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) the removal of dictatorship resulted in the establishment of democracies, which with the passing of time reached the state of consolidation. While in some of them (for instance Brazil) new democracies have been plagued by corruption scandals and witnessed removal from power democratically elected presidents, the rules of democracy have not been broken.

The same cannot be said about the formerly communist states. Some of them from the very beginning switched from the dictatorship of the communist party to the authoritarian dictatorship, frequently with the former head of the republican communist party as a powerful president. This was the case particularly in the majority of the former Soviet republics in Asia. In several post-communist states the collapse of the old regime resulted in prolonged chaos and/or ethnic wars. This was particularly true about some of the former Yugoslav republics (Serbia, Croatia, and particularly Bosna-and-Herzegovina) as well as Russia and three post-soviet republics in the Caucasus. With the passing of time most of these states reached a degree of internal consolidation, but not necessarily fully democratic system of government. The third group of post-communist states is composed of those in which democratic governments have been established instantly after the collapse of the communist system, or very soon after. This category included all Central European states, including the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and always remaining a foreign body within the Soviet state. In addition, there have been countries where the collapse of the communist rule produced mixed results, including prolonged instability (Albania, Belarus, Ukraine).

These contrasts can best be explained by referring to the specific historical and cultural identity of Central Europe. The region can best be defined as composed of the group of countries which belong to the Western civilization (with Western Christianity as the dominant faith) and which had become parts of the Soviet empire during and because of the second world war. During the cold war comparative studies of communist systems stressed the impact of historical heritage and cultural identities on the character of Central European communist regimes (Shoup 1971). The way in which communists came to power also played a role. In none of the Central European countries communists won power on their own and in most cases they were a weak minority before the

war (Czechoslovakia being the main exception). This historical background explains both the strength of opposition to the communist regimes and the relatively strong position of the reformists within the ruling parties, particularly if compared with the situation in the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the Central European nations owe their success to history alone, but history seems to be the most powerful explanatory factor.

With the passing of time two different processes produced growing political differences between post-communist states. One was the consolidation of democratic forms of government and its expansion to some countries which at the beginning lagged behind. Serbia and Croatia – the two post-Yugoslav republics which in the first years after the collapse of communism were governed by nationalistic leaders (respectively, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman) are now considered consolidated democracies. The same can be said about Albania, after the stormy 1990s where the election of 1996 was stolen and the new regime kept using arbitrary arrests against the opposition. On the other hand, however, in some post-communist states a new type of authoritarianism emerged combining strong position of the popular supreme leader with the maintenance of contested elections and the existence of political opposition. The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin is the best example of this new phenomenon, but she is by no means the only case.

Neither is this phenomenon limited to formerly communist states. Turkey under President Recep Erdogan is in many ways similar, even if her past has been different. Authoritarian tendencies grow in several African and Asian new democracies. In his lecture delivered during the 24th World Congress of Political Science, senator Peter Anyang' Nyong'o of Kenya spoke about "constitutional coups d'état in various African autocracies where elections are held mainly to legitimize the ruling regimes on their own terms while undermining the very tenets of democracy" (Nyong'o 2016: 18). What we are dealing with cannot be reduced to the specific conditions of post-communism. Even in some old democracies recent political developments (for example, election of Donald Trump in the United States, strong showing of Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election, strong position of the populist party in Austria and of Geert Wilders in Holland) suggest that there exists a potential for the "escape from freedom" to use Erich Fromm's formula. The danger of authoritarian retreat from democracy is, however, considerably smaller in those countries where democracy exists for several generations and is entrenched in the democratic political culture.

This is not meant as an expression of naïve optimism. Future is uncertain and students of politics, as well as political practitioners, should seriously

consider the worst case scenarios. The main question is: do we face a retreat from democracy to authoritarianism and what kind of authoritarianism?

Authoritarianism as an analytical concept

More than fifty years ago the American political sociologist with Spanish background Juan J. Linz presented a sophisticated conceptual analysis of two different types of dictatorships: totalitarian and authoritarian. While it was well understood that totalitarianism was a special type of dictatorship, the specific features of which had been defined by Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzeziński (Friedrich, Brzeziński 1956), authoritarianism remained a residual category including a variety of non-totalitarian dictatorial regimes.

At the Round Table of the Committee on Political Sociology (Tampere 1963) Linz presented a paper on the authoritarian regime in Spain (Linz 1964). His main contribution was the comprehensive definition of authoritarianism, which he kept using in his later studies (Linz 2000). The explicit intension of this analysis was to do away with the simplified dichotomy of democratic versus totalitarian regimes, within which "failure to reach the totalitarian stage might be due to administrative inefficiency, economic underdevelopment, or external influences and pressures" (Linz 1964: 293). Instead, he suggested that we should see authoritarianism as a separate type of nondemocratic regime, distinctly different from the totalitarian dictatorship.

"Authoritarian regimes – wrote Linz – are political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points of their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (Linz 1964: 297).

Authoritarian regime defined this way is less rigid and usually less oppressive than the totalitarian regime but they have at least one common characteristics: neither of them is based on free and fair election and neither accepts honest competition between independent political forces.

The concept of authoritarianism helped to clarify the nature of nondemocratic regimes. It also served as a useful tool in the analysis of changes taking place in some totalitarian regimes, which – under pressure from below or due to the reformist tendencies within the regime (or both) were losing their totalitarian character and moved in the direction of authoritarian regime. Poland after 1956 has been the often quoted example.

In last two or three decades we have been confronted with developments which call for further terminological discussion. Ever since the third wave

of democratization scholars have been puzzled by the phenomenon, which could hardly be explained in terms of democratic-authoritarian-totalitarian divide. Democratically elected leaders behave like dictators but manage to maintain high level of public support and do not deny their citizens the right to vote in strongly contested elections. The Argentinian political scientist and president of the International Political Science Association Guillermo O'Donnell proposed the term "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell 1991) and Fareed Zakaria suggested that we call such systems "illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 2007).

My own preference is to use the term "authoritarian regime" but with distinction. What we are confronted with is a *new authoritarianism,* which shares some characteristics with the old model but differs from it in some essential aspects.

First, new authoritarian regimes are based on basically free elections, in which rulers receive and renew their mandate in an open competition. The political opposition not only exists but have the possibility to compete in election. Support for the regime is so strong that there is no need to steal the election; at the worst, there might be some manipulation with the results, but not to the extent which would make elections meaningless.

Second, political pluralism exists and is reflected in the existence of political parties and associations as well as in the media. The regime controls public media, but there is plenty of room for independent channels, including the internet.

Third, new authoritarianism uses coercive measures but does it in a less flagrant way than old authoritarianism, except in condition of acute crisis, like in Turkey after the abortive coup d'état of July 15, 2016.

Fourth, in most of the authoritarian regimes of the past, the armed forces were either in power or constituted a very important part of the ruling bloc (like in Spain 1939–1975). New authoritarianism is based on civilian control of the armed forces, and – while supported by the military – does not depend on them for staying in power.

It is a new form of government, but a version of authoritarianism, nonetheless. The key difference between new authoritarianism and democracy is in the sphere of the rule of law. Independent judiciary, effectively protecting the rights of citizens, is a necessary condition for a truly democratic system. Without it, government enjoying support of the majority can become as oppressive as the one which is based on a sheer force (Maravall, Przeworski 2003). New authoritarianism may enjoy support of the majority but as long as it does not respect the rule of law, it cannot be considered a democracy, even an "illiberal" one.

The road to power

Old authoritarianism was mostly the product of violence. Authoritarian regimes were products of military coups (like the Polish coup in 1926 or the Chilean coup of 1973) or of civil wars (like the Spanish war of 1936–1939). While they had support of a part of society, they almost never tested their public support in an open and fair election. The rare exception was Poland, where parliamentary election of 1928 (two years after the coup) was basically fair and resulted in the defeat of the ruling party. Because of the previously introduced amendments to the Constitution, the electoral defeat has not led to the change of regime and the new election (of 1930) was flagrantly rigged.

Massive coercion was the trade mark of old authoritarian regimes, even if they have not reached the level of violence practiced by the totalitarian regimes of Germany, Soviet Union or China. Nonetheless the magnitude of state coercion in some authoritarian regimes has been frightening. More than thirty thousand people perished during the Argentinian authoritarian regime of late 1970s and early 1980s, and over three thousand people were killed on orders of the military junta in Chile after the coup of September 1973. Not all authoritarian regimes were equally blood thirsty, however. During authoritarian rule in Poland (1926–1939) political opponents were frequently put in jail or forced to emigrate or in a concentration camp but relatively few lost their life.

The new authoritarian regimes come to power in democratic elections. In most cases, the victors had not been in power prior to the election and, therefore, cannot be accused of manipulating the results. Vladimir Putin's first victory in the presidential election (2000) was different in this aspect, since he had become the acting president due to the resignation of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, when Putin served as Prime Minister. There is no doubt, however, that overwhelming popular support for him was genuine. In this sense, genuine democratic support is the distinctive characteristics of new authoritarian regimes.

There are various, nation-specific, reasons for such support. In Russia, it was mostly the reaction of the population to the prolonged crisis of the state, the deteriorating economic situation and flagrant corruption (Shlapentokh 2008). In Belarus, Alexander Lukashenka's election of 1994 was mostly due to the longing for Soviet-style stability and the chaotic state of the Belorussian democratic forces. In Turkey, the electoral victories of the "Justice and Development" party (AKP) in parliamentary elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011, as the election of its leader Recep Erdogan as president of the republic in 2014, have their roots in the opposition of the conservative, mostly provincial sectors of the population to the secular, modernizing heritage of kemalism, more or

less faithfully followed by the traditional democratic parties. In Hungary, the impressive electoral victory of Fidesz in the parliamentary election of 2010 came in conditions of the economic crisis and in the atmosphere of universal condemnation of massive corruption under the previous (Socialist) government. What all these developments have in common is the democratic way in which state power came to the hands of authoritarian leaders. Moreover, they not only came to power in a democratic way, but have confirmed their title to rule in consecutive elections.

In the new authoritarian regimes, this road to power – based on free expressed public will – allows the representatives of the regime to define it as democratic. If democracy is understood exclusively as the "government of the people", new authoritarian regimes can proclaim themselves democracies. In Russia, the term "sovereign democracy", invented by Vladimir Surkov, has been adopted by the ruling party to justify the existing system (Shlapentokh 2008: 170). The president of Turkey Recep Erdogan refers to his country as "majoritarian democracy". Unlike the authoritarian leaders of the past (for instance Marshall Józef Piłsudski in Poland), contemporary autocrats do not reject democracy but give it a special meaning. Their understanding of "democracy" restricts it to the expression of the "will of the people", leaving aside the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

Political consolidation

The crucial problem for new authoritarian regimes is how to consolidate the new system. In democracy, parties get used to the fact of political rotation. Since they respect the rules of democracy, they do not fear electoral defeat, knowing that with the passing of time they would have their second chance. The authoritarian leaders are in a different position. The more they consolidate their hold on state power by legal or extra-legal means, the more reasons they have to fear defeat. Therefore, they have strong interest in fortifying their political position so that their removal from power would be very difficult, if not impossible.

There are three crucial elements in this process. First, they have to establish political control over the judiciary to prevent independent courts from questioning their power. This is being done by a combination of new laws and of buying support of some of the judges. In extreme cases (like in Turkey after the failed coup of 2016) massive arrests and dismissals are used to pacify the judiciary.

Second, they have to put their hand on mass media, particularly those which give them access to the less educated strata. Television – much more than the printed media – is particularly important since it is the primary source of political information for the less educated. It is true that today, with the free access to internet, it is more difficult to establish full control over the exchange of information and of opinions, but the extent to which internet is being used varies depending on education and social status.

Third, the new authoritarian regimes buy support of the poorer strata by adopting populist social and economic strategies of redistribution. Even if, as it is the case in Russia, they tolerate or even support oligarchs, they make systematic effort to improve the economic situation of the poorer strata – something that many of the previous liberal governments neglected.

In addition to these three policies, common for all new authoritarian regimes, there have been nation-specific policies reflecting specific conditions of various countries.

Lukashenka's unexpected victory in the presidential election of 1994 was mostly due to the post-Soviet nostalgia, remarkably strong among the Belarussians, many of whom felt themselves lost in the situation created by the rapid collapse of the USSR. His long tenure has been marked by the preservation of the Soviet heritage, both in the institutional structures and in the symbolic sphere. Consecutive elections show the effectiveness of this strategy.

In Russia, the crucial factor of the enormous popularity enjoyed by Vladimir Putin is the belief of Russian population that during his rule – and because of his assertive foreign policy – Russia is in the process of regaining her position as a great power. Russian political scientists have documented this phenomenon in public opinion surveys, including the impressive increase of support for Putin and for his party United Russia after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Shestopal 2016: 15). A recent poll, conducted by the American Pew Research Center in February 2017, showed that 87 percent of Russian respondents trusted president Putin and that close to sixty percent believed things in Russia were going in the right direction, while in 2002 only about twenty percent saw things in this way ("Gazeta Wyborcza", 21 June 2017). Because of Russians' traditional concern with issues of national security these findings are not a surprise.

In Turkey, Recep Erdogan and his moderately Islamic party AKP owe the coming to power and then the consolidation of their rule to the rejection of the secularist policies of the earlier governments. Secularism has been one of the key principles of Kemalism, protected by the constitution and seen as part of the legacy of the founder of modern Turkey. There has always been, however, opposition to it among the conservative, less educated (and poorer) strata,

particularly outside the big metropolitan cities. Carefully playing this card, Recep Erdogan has been able to mobilize those who considered themselves ignored by the liberal elite.

In Hungary, Fidesz exploited the shortcomings of the Socialist government (in power since 2002), particularly its poor economic performance and massive corruption. In this, it was helped by the fact that the Hungarian socialist party had its roots in the former communist party, while Fidesz had been built on the base of the youth wing of the democratic opposition prior to 1990. In addition, Victor Orban skillfully exploits the national feeling of frustration, which had been a permanent element of Hungarian nationalism since the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920, in which Hungary lost provinces inhabited by one-third of the ethnic Hungarians.

Each case is different, but they have one common trait. New authoritarianism appeals to the real or imagined worries of the less privileged strata. Populist campaigns against the better off serve very well in the struggle against the liberal elites, which mostly come from and are supported by the better educated and more affluent sectors of the population.

New authoritarianism is not a passing phenomenon. While things may change in individual countries, there is no reason to believe that the contemporary authoritarian regimes will disappear in the nearest future.

This forecast is based on the analysis of the social base of new authoritarianism. The economic and social structures of contemporary capitalist societies produce massive frustration among those who have not been able to join the ranks of the beneficiaries of the capitalist system. In societies which adopted this type of economic system recently, feeling of frustration is particularly strong.

There are also non-economic reasons for the durability of new authoritarianism, particularly the cultural ones. Political cultures of nations presently ruled by new authoritarians have always favored strong personal leadership and identification with the national symbols. Authoritarian regimes have no monopoly for strong leadership and on the use of national symbols, but they can use both to perpetuate themselves.

Nothing is eternal in politics. The present authoritarianism will, sooner or later, encounter problems and, perhaps, crises. The continuous presence of consolidated democracies may serve as a reminder that there is a different road, particularly if the main democratic states manage to free themselves from the orthodoxy of neo-liberal economic thinking and return to the tradition of socially concerned welfare state. In any case, however, it is not the scenario for the nearest future.

Poland: a special case?

The case of Poland is interesting for two reasons at least. First, with its past – as the first state where the non-communist government came to power – Poland was seen as the model of democratic transition. The first twenty-five years of transformation were considered – both in Poland and abroad – a success story. On the eve of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015, the majority of commentators believed that the ruling Civic Platform could not lose.

They were wrong mostly because they underestimated the psychological consequences of social malaise. Ten years ago, I suggested that "social malaise is the strongest in those countries were expectations were the highest" (Wiatr 2008: 160). Remarkably good economic performance of Poland – even during the world financial crisis – combined with relatively high level of economic inequality, made a large part of Poles angry with the existing system of government and ready to cast their votes for an alternative. Economic inequality in Poland, measured by the Gini index (32,4 in 2012), is approximately on the average level for the EU countries. However, Polish society has not been prepared for the relatively high level of inequality, if compared with the more egalitarian social structure under the previous system. When high inequality is combined with news of the economic success, less fortunate members of society tend to believe that they have been victims of the unfair, or even criminal, practices of the privileged stratum. This feeling creates a fertile ground for demands of change. "Law and Justice" provided such alternative. It promised new policy of a "good change": more sensitive to the needs of the underprivileged and guided by traditional national and religious values. In 2015, it worked. Two years later it is clear that Polish politics has changed. What is less obvious is the durability of this change.

Has Poland become already an authoritarian regime? Has democracy failed? Will the "good change", proclaimed by the "Law and Justice" party during the election of 2015, transform Polish state and society for many decades to come?

These questions are often asked, both in public debates and in private conversations. It is important to look for objective answers, free of value judgements. By this, I do not mean that the recent trends in Polish politics should not be subject to criticism (which I have voiced many times), but that when attempting to predict the future we should avoid the danger of wishful thinking.

"Law and Justice" party in many ways resembles the Hungarian Fidesz or the Russian United Russia party. It has vague, but essentially conservative, ideological orientation, it is dominated by the supreme leader and it is

committed to the populist concept of democracy, by which it simply means the rule of the majority, unrestricted by the principles of legal state.

During its two years in power (since its victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015) it went a long way to consolidate its hold not only over the state apparatus, which has been fully politicized, but also over public media and the courts. The struggle for political control of the judiciary has not yet ended, but the "Law and Justice" scored some important points, particularly by changing the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal. Because of its policy of establishing party control over the judiciary the Polish government has become subject to the special procedure instigated by the European Union.

There have been other events indicating that Poland was moving in the authoritarian direction. Purges in the military and in the police eliminated a large part of experienced cadres. Official propaganda castigates the opposition as "enemies of the state" or even "agents" of foreign powers. Extreme right-wing nationalist organizations enjoy support of the state administration. Prominent public figures, including some former presidents of the Constitutional Tribunal, have already declared Poland an autocratic state.

All these developments justify a pessimistic assessment of the state of democracy in Poland.

Yet, it is by no means obvious that what has been happening in Poland since late 2015 equals the establishment of the authoritarian state. There are several reasons to believe that the present political process will not result in authoritarian consolidation.

First, the political support for "Law and Justice" in the last parliamentary election (2015) was barely 37%, which gave it the absolute majority only because the United Left running as a coalition failed to pass the eight-percentage threshold. Had it been registered as a single party, its results (7,5%) would have deprived the "Law and Justice" of the parliamentary majority. Unlike the Russian, Turkish or Hungarian ruling parties, the "Law and Justice" does not have the parliamentary majority necessary for changing the constitution as is not likely to win one. Even more important is the fact, that during the two years after last election the ruling party failed to increase its political support.

Second, strong movements in opposition to the authoritarian policies of the government emerged, protesting against the attacks on the judiciary, as well as against the proposals to strengthen the anti-abortion legislation – already one of the most restricting in Europe.

Third, the ruling party has antagonized the majority of intellectual and cultural elites, whose influence on the public opinion should not be ignored.

Fourth, "Law and Justice" follows the policy of confrontation with the European Union – in a country where the overwhelming majority declares its strongly pro-European sentiments. The prospect of a deepening rift between the Polish government and the European Union will almost certainly weaken public support for the ruling party.

Fifth, the "Law and Justice" has a serious problem with its leader Jarosław Kaczyński. He is in full control of his party but, for a variety of reasons, he is one of the most unpopular politicians of Poland. Public opinion surveys regularly show that he is not trusted by the majority of respondents. Contrary to the authoritarian leaders of Russia, Hungary or Turkey, he is considerably less popular than his party. One of the consequences is that in elections "Law and Justice" puts other people on the ballot for top position, including the presidency of the Republic and the post of the Prime Minister. In spite of his unquestionable position, Jarosław Kaczyński is not – and never was – a political asset for his party.

All these factors combined make the Polish new authoritarian regime unstable. In fact, it can best be defined as the authoritarianism *in statu nascendi*. The jury is out on its ability to become a consolidated authoritarian regime. Two years before the parliamentary election and less than three before the presidential it is too early to predict the outcome. This in itself is important. In the consolidated authoritarian states predicting the electoral victory of the ruling party is very easy. In Poland, it is not.

This makes Poland a very interesting case for a comparative analysis. From the recent history of other countries we know how the new authoritarian regimes come to power. The attempt to establish such regime in Poland – if it fails – can show, how such process can be stopped and reversed.

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Jerzy J. Wiatr

NEW AND OLD AUTHORITARIANISM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The third wave of democratization, unlike the first and the second, has not been followed by the reverse wave. However, in several countries (Russia, Belarus, Turkey, Hungary, Poland) democratically elected leaders interpret democracy narrowly, as the rule of majority only. Other conditions for democratic government (the rule of law, protecting human rights) are ignored. Such system of government differs from the authoritarian model (as defined by Juan J. Linz) and can best be called "new authoritarianism". Poland is a special case because, while after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 authoritarian practices became common, the hold on power by the ruling party ("Law and Justice") is relatively weak. Future development of Polish politics depends mostly on the next parliamentary (2019) and presidential (2020) elections.

Key words: authoritarianism, democracy, election, leadership, parties, rule of law

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REVIEWS

Jerzy J. Wiatr
European University of Law and Administration[1]

Putin's Russia in Russian Eyes

Review of Lyudmila Ilicheva and Vladimir Komarovskiy, eds., *Russia in the 21st Century: Policy. Economy. Culture* (in Russian*: Rossija w XX wieke: Politika. Ekonomika. Kultura,* Moskwa: Aspekt Press 2016);
Review of Elena Shestopal, ed., *New Trends in Russian Political Mentality: Putin 3.0,* Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015;
Review of Natalia Tsvetkova, ed., *Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations,* Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017.

Three recently published books on contemporary Russia provide a valuable insight in Russian politics and in the state of Russian political sciences. Two were published in English by an American publisher (Lexington Books) and one in Russian by the prestigious Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration attached to the office of the President of the Russian Federation.

The editors belong to the top elite of the Russian science elite. Ludmila Ilicheva and Vladimir Komarovskiy are professors at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. Elena Shestopal is head of the chair of political sociology and psychology at Moscow State University and former vice-president of the International Political Science Association. Natalia Tsvetkova is professor of history at the Saint Petersburg State University. Among the contributors are several members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, including its vice-president and well known sociologist Gennady Osipov. They belong to the Russian intellectual elite and in their publicly expressed views are supportive to the present regime. Because of this, their views on the character of the Russian state and its policies are of great interest.

The volume edited by Ludmila Ilicheva and Vladimir Komarovskiy provides the widest panorama of various aspects of the current Russian state and society.

[1] E-mail: jwiatr@ewspa.edu.pl

The book is divided in five parts which deal respectively with (1) state, social and political structure of Russia, (2) Russia in the system of international relations, (3) Russian economy in the 21st century, (4) Russian culture in the 21st century, and (5) agenda and strategy of the modern Russia. Problems of Russian foreign policy are discussed in the volume edited by Natalia Tsvetkova; the volume contains papers written by scholars from St Petersburg University. A large part of the book is devoted to the review of major theories of international relations with special emphasis on the realist school, which seems to have the strongest impact on Russian approach to international relations. The most innovative of the three books is the volume edited by Elena Schestopal and co-authored by her collaborators from Moscow State University. It contains results of empirical studies conducted from 1993 with the use of up-to-date methods of sociological and psychological analysis.

The richness of these volumes makes it impossible to discuss all their findings. I should like, therefore, to concentrate on those aspects which are particularly important for understanding the present Russian regime and its dilemmas: both internal and related to foreign policy of Russia.

The crisis of the Russian state and ways of its overcoming is one of the central issues of the volume edited by Ilicheva and Komarovskiy. They give an interesting review of the history of Russia, stressing the colonial and imperial nature of the tsarist state. Seen from this perspective, the seventy years of the Soviet Union constitute a failed attempt to preserve the empire. Its collapse, due to the decisions made by the political elite rather than to the pressure from below, opened the period of prolonged crisis of the state. Vladimir Putin's access to power is presented as the turning point in the short history of the Russian Federation. The authors do not deny the authoritarian character of the contemporary Russian political system but seem to believe that this is the inevitable price for the preservation and strengthening of the state. The emphasis is on the perspective of modernization, seen as a long process. Modernization is not only a political, but also an economic necessity. The authors are very frank about the need to reform Russian economy and to free it from dependency on the exportation of raw materials. In the view of the authors, modernization, rather than democratization, seem to be the main task of the state power. The authors discuss briefly the state of civil society in Russia, but this fragment does not reveal the magnitude of problems faced by independent associations as well as the human rights problems in the contemporary Russia.

An interesting part of the book is devoted to the nationality question. The authors distinguish between two terms, difficult to translate in English (or Polish, as well): "Russian" and "Russkij". The first refers to the national identification with the Russian state and refers to all citizens of the Federation

regardless of their ethnicity. The second can be translated as "ethnically Russian". According to self-identification about eighty percent of the citizens of the Russian Federation consider themselves ethnic Russians, the rest being composed of dozens of various ethnic groups. The non-ethnic definition of the Russian state is important for the modern concept of state patriotism. The way in which the authors approach this issue testifies to the important change that has been taking place in the contemporary Russia in this respect.

Breaking away from the imperial past and from the ideological character of the Soviet state Russia faces the problem of the definition of her place in world politics. This issue constitutes the central theme of the volume edited by Natalia Tsvetkova. The book gives an interesting review of theories of international relations and of the history of world politics after the end of the cold war. The authors interpret the foreign policy of the Russian Federation as guided by the considerations of national interest. In this, foreign policy of contemporary Russia differs from the ideological policy of the Soviet Union. Russia no longer aims at the transformation of the world after her pattern but seeks a strong position as a regional, Euro-Asian power. The authors express their belief that such policy could be realized in a co-operation with other world powers, particularly the United States. They do not ignore difficulties facing such co-operation but express their hopes in the possibility of achieving mutually acceptable compromises.

The issue which the authors underestimate is the geographical scope of the Russian sphere of interest. From the beginning, Russia sought to preserve close ties with the formerly Soviet republics, the majority of which entered the Commonwealth of Independent States. With the passing of time conflicts emerged between Russia and some of the former Soviet republics, particularly with Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). The authors do not discuss these conflicts and their repercussions for relations between the Russian Federation and the West. While their emphasis on national interest constitutes a valuable revision of the traditional Soviet-style interpretation of international relations, a deeper analysis of Russia's concept of her role as a regional power would be welcome.

For political sociologists the most interesting is the volume edited by Elena Shestopal. The panorama of Russian political mentality based on the twenty-five years of empirical research offers unique possibility to understand the socio-psychological dimension of Russian policies – both domestic and foreign. The fundamental trait of Russian political culture, the strong attachment to the state and the belief in the role of powerful leaders, is fully confirmed by empirical studies. One of the most interesting findings of the book is the increase of support for Vladimir Putin after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of

the crisis in relations with Ukraine. Shestopal's research confirms the existence of the specific trait of Russian political culture: the priority of foreign policy over domestic issues. Historical experiences explain the fact that Russians tend to give preference to the considerations of foreign policy over the domestic ones. This should help to understand why support for Vladimir Putin grew in the years of sharp conflict with the West.

Taken together these three books offer a very valuable insight in the way in which Russian scholars see the present policies of their state. They do not represent views of the democratic opposition but neither are they uncritical in the way in which they discuss the problems facing Russia today. As such they testify to the positive change that has taken place in Russian political sciences since the end of the Soviet regime.

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Wojciech Rafałowski
Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw [1]

Christopher Steed, *A Question of Worth: Economy, Society and the Quantification of Human Value*, London, New York: I.B.Tauris 2016.

I start this review with a confession: I don't usually read books. This might sound like a rather surprising thing to say by someone pursuing an academic career, but there are reasons for this. The most important one is that the most recent and valuable research in comparative politics is published in articles in peer-reviewed journals not books. The latter are published at a much slower pace and they usually present what had already been discussed in the articles. Also, academic books published by prestigious publishing houses are extremely expensive – and particularly in comparison to salaries in the Eastern Europe and to the individual cost of zero for downloading a research article via a website of the university library.

Obviously not reading books on a regular basis creates a bias in expectations. Being used to studying concise empirically-oriented research papers with a relatively narrow topical scope makes you expect the same from every work-related reading. Since Christopher Steed's *A Question of Worth* is not a mainstream (quantitative) empirical political science study, I encountered a few difficulties while getting used to his writing.

The title of the book also contributed to my ineffective expectations regarding its content. 'Quantification of human life' in respect to politics is precisely what the mainstream political science does. We create synthetic indices of virtually every political phenomenon and incorporate it in the analysis. Personally, I find this process compelling to the extent that made me to transform my Ph.D. thesis into a book bereft of any actual empirical analysis and devoted to measurement of the properties of party systems only (Rafałowski 2017). Thus, including the word 'quantification' in the title of the Steed's book was really appealing as I expected it to deal with using

[1] E-mail: rafalowskiw@is.uw.edu.pl

quantitative indices to measuring some aspects of human life. But this is not what this book is about.

Steed's publication is rather an extended essay on the consequences of how the contemporary capitalism affects the human condition and the behavior resulting from it. It might be also considered a philosophical tractate that uses some empirical data to say things about human spirit at the beginning of the 21st century and formulates general propositions concerning problems the humanity faces.

The book is divided into three parts and fifteen chapters which I appreciate as a logical organization, even though it is not what I have got used to after getting through research papers with their standard structure. Each chapter focuses on a relatively narrow set of issues which makes the narrative clear and easy to follow. There are no spoilers. Author's diagnosis of what the problems and their solutions are not to be find in the introduction and then you have to get through to the end of the book to learn them. Also there is no concise summary at the end. You have to at least flick through the whole book to get the idea what it is about.

The first three chapters (the part entitled 'The Social Transmission of Value') elaborate the issue of human worth from the individual perspective: what makes people think how much they are worth. The author rightly demonstrates that this kind of evaluation engages several dimensions of one's life experiences, but also that they might be summarized with two rudimentary aspects: how much you earn and what you own. The latter is closely related to what Thorstein Veblen (1899) labelled as the 'conspicuous consumption'.

The second part of the book entitled 'Capitalism on the Couch' exhibits the variety of ways in which contemporary capitalism influences how individuals evaluate their worth. The title and structure of this part (each chapter dealing with a certain 'symptom') demonstrate well author's strong background in psychology and his experience as a pastor and a therapist who had talked with his parishioners on several occasions about their everyday problems and provided them with a psychological aid, advice and consolation. These quasi-interviews provide the main empirical material of the book that I was so eager to find given my own background. Although the observations from these conversations are merely a point of departure for the author to a wider look on the world economic system we live in, especially on inequalities, poverty and pain it creates as well as a predatory behavior it encourages. The analysis focuses on times of the economic crisis that struck the world economy after 2008. It exhibits the problems and contradictions of capitalism when they are particularly visible.

The third part ('Marching to a Different Drum') proposes solutions to the problems outlined in preceding sections of the book. In the opening of the chapter 14 (after a vast critique of contemporary capitalism in previous chapters) the author states: 'This is no tirade against capitalism' and his further propositions are indeed in line with his declaration. Steed suggests that in order to avoid harm to the life of an individual caused by capitalism it is necessary to incorporate human value into the economic calculation (page 185), i.e. to take into account the value of people's life, social relations, work--life balance etc. when evaluating options before making economic choices on resource allocation (page 201). This idea closely resembles the well-known postulate of incorporating the negative externalities such as destruction of the natural environment into the economic account. Steed's contribution is in fact changing the way we think about the externalities that should be taken into consideration. Unfortunately his work does not provide any specific ways to measure the phenomena to be added to the account. The postulate made by the book is undoubtedly important, but the reader is left without any definite solutions to the problem.

Author's proposal is not radical. It's simply about widening a perspective of something that is already a part of the debate. It also supports and maintains the logic of capitalism. Some might say that this lack of radicalism is good, because it increases the chances of implementation. Others (representing the radical left) will criticize it by saying that putting a price on individuals, their emotions and relations is basically a further commodification of life we should fight by putting the capitalistic logic aside.

Having said that I proceed to some more detailed remarks about the book. I would like to express my appreciation for the interdisciplinary theoretical background of the publication. His inspirations are grounded not only in psychology, but also in works of Marx, Weber, Veblen, Durkheim or Bourdieu – all classics when it comes to the subject of capitalism, capital and social cohesion – phenomena vastly interconnected in light of the book.

A great portion of the book is devoted to the issue of economic inequalities – their sources and consequences for individuals and communities. A part of this interesting discussion raises the question why people accept inequalities. One of the answers given is that as long as their pay is good, people don't mind astronomical pays of CEOs – even if the inequalities increase. The problem arises when there is a crisis striking the poor and the incredibly wealthy are hardly affected (page 39). The author justly emphasizes that the belief that poor are not trying hard enough reproduces inequalities. In the light of his analysis rioting becomes an understandable (yet not justifiable) reaction to poverty, not a sign of racism or religious unrest. These people are not just

getting the necessary resources by force. They want to destroy the very symbols of their oppression and rioting is the only available way of 'grabbing a voice' (page 123).

Looking at *A Question of Worth* from the point of view of social sciences makes it necessary to point out an important drawback of the publication. As it had been already mentioned the main empirical basis for the author's conclusions are his talks with patients and parishioners. This does not constitute a viable material to build a scholarly book on. A study based on qualitative interviews should include citations of interviewees longer than limited to few words to allow the reader to evaluate the validity of author's interpretation. There should be basic information about the subjects such as age, gender and social position etc. This would allow to judge if there might be any bias in the gathered material. Currently the methodological discussion with the book cannot be conducted, because there is insufficient information on the matter. This suggests that the material was not gathered in a systematic way. Thus the evidence presented is anecdotal.

Also the book does not test any particular theory. It indeed helps to understand the situation of individuals during the crisis of capitalism, but I doubt it expands our knowledge about the capitalism itself. Although the aim of the book was probably not to become a landmark in the field of economy or social policy, but an essay on important challenges that contemporary world faces. It fits well into the latter category and can be recommended for social science students during their introductory courses. It brings an overview of the most important social problems in the contemporary world along with an interesting and original approach to understand them. For the same reason the book might be of use for journalists who write about social problems and policy-makers who would like to understand better the people they may affect by their actions. This is not a book for specialists in the field of economy, social policy or psychology who expect rigorous analysis it lacks. This is a manifesto worth knowing, but rather for the general public not for scholars.

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