PERSONALIST FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON GOOD.
VIEWS OF MIECZYSŁAW A. KRĄPIEC
AND KAROL WOJTYŁA

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Abstract. This paper aims to draw attention to the personalist meaning of the category of common
good. The discussion begins with consideration of possible interpretations of the fact of society and
principal foundations of the philosophical concept of common good. The person’s structure, the
most perfect form of being in light of the personalist theory, is shown against this background. It is
also a fundamental common good of each social structure. The reflection will be guided by two
main proponents of Polish philosophical personalism, who present an interesting theory of man and
society which is important to contemporary culture: Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and Karol Wojtyła.

Keywords: person, society, participation

INTRODUCTION

In Poland, “the common good” is a basic constitutional value. The preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 contains the following words: “We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of this Republic, both believers in God as the source of truth, justice, good, and beauty and those not sharing this belief and deriving these universal values from other sources, equal in their rights and obligations to the common good – Poland.” Article 1 of the Constitution stipulates: “The Republic of Poland is a common good of all the citizens.”1 The Polish legislator regards the common good as an essential part of the democratic order that acknowledges the primacy of rights and liberty of every individual. Thus, the Constitution defines the nature of the state and its authorities as subservient to citizens.

“The common good” is a key notion of social philosophy. Although it is universally accepted as the objective and constituent principle of every society, both the theory and practice of the issue are experiencing a crisis. It appears, therefore, study of this institution is not only reasonable but also necessary given the rank and value of the common good. This paper is an attempt at exploring philosophical foundations of the common good. The reflection will try to discover those conditions of bonum commune that constitute its deepest meaning from the perso-

nalist point of view and thereby the *raison d’être* of both society and its prevailing laws. As far as the title is concerned, it should be added for the sake of clarity it is inspired by the personalism of the Lublin philosophical school and its most prominent representatives, Mieczysław A. Krapieć and Karol Wojtyła. Their analyses provide the main framework for this discussion.

1. A PERSON IN THE WORLD OF PERSONS: WHAT IS A COMMUNITY?

Classification of theories of societal life in the history of philosophical and social thought is rather complicated. Some theories claim the community is exclusively a sum total of individuals that can be fully reduced to its elements and, as such, does not create a higher-level quality. Only an individual counts, their needs and interests, since they are the sole subjects of free behaviour. Any higher-level structure is a mere fiction [Stróżewski 2002, 239]. An opposing concept stresses the role of community as the only fully autonomous being. It sees a person’s autonomy as non-existent. An individual is fully constituted and formed by society and, as such, should be treated as a dependent part of an overriding structure. Only the community is sovereign, particularly the state, which endows the community with an appropriate structure [ibid.].

M.A. Krapieć identifies two principal approaches as starting points for discussions of society: genetic-evolutionary and causal – finalist [Krapieć 1986, 178].

1.1. The genetic-evolutionary Concept

Followers of the genetic-evolutionary view accept results of natural sciences to adopt the concept of man as the most perfect stage in the evolution of nature. Man is thus ultimately explicated with reference to laws of nature and its necessary development. As such, he is not a privileged part of nature. Formed by the evolutionary sequence of developments, he appeared in the group of “primates” who performed some activities together and gradually attained awareness and self-awareness. According to supporters of this theory, group life preceded man as the subject aware of himself and his tasks [ibid., 188]. Man owes everything in his nature to the group: self-awareness, language, tools. Man not only cannot live outside society but cannot even be conceived independent from society [Krapieć 2005, 79]. Such an interpretation of societal being is characteristic of Karl Marx, who wrote: “Like society itself produces man as man, man produces society” [Marks and Engels 1960, 579]. The German philosopher maintains society is not a collection of individuals. Individuals do not exist prior to the community. An individual arises as part of a group, is “produced” by society, therefore his roots can only be explained with reference to community [Kowalczyk 2005, 36]. Only an individual integrated into a collective is human [ibid., 39].

As man developed, means of production and social classes arose. Owners of these means, including other men, were the first class. In this way, dictates of the ruling class, that is, holders of means of production, became the law. This in time
led to the class struggle. Regardless of his class, however, man’s consciousness and personality have always been shaped by the group he belonged to [Krąpiec 1986, 178–79].

The foregoing analysis is of course far from exhaustive. It only aims for a summary presentation of a certain type of thinking. In the genetic-evolutionary concept of man and community, the common good as the basis of prevailing laws denotes the good of a specific ruling class or interest of a party in power at any given moment, not the welfare of all citizens. As Krąpiec notes, once man is seen exclusively as a product of nature and community, the common good no longer provides reasons for emergence of society and binding force of law [ibid.].

1.2. The cause-finalist Concept

The causal – finalist theory is the other approach to explanation of the facts of society and law. Its adherents also present the emergence of man and society in natural terms. Man and communities he forms and in which he lives are natural creations. However, man is fundamentally distinct from the entire nature in his reason and the possibility of free choice. Man is conceived as a person. He has objectives with a view to which he undertakes actions and suitable means to attainment of the objectives. Man is also a being endowed with potential, open to development. The development is impossible without assistance of others. Therefore, an individual needs other people, an adequately organised society, to reach any objective, both indirect of improving the particular powers, and the final objective of personal perfection [ibid.]. This applies to every single man and entire generations who take advantage of achievements of earlier generations. According to this position, the fact of communities is grounded inside a potential-endowed person [ibid.]. M.A. Krąpiec and K. Wojtyła largely base their consideration of the person-society relation on this conviction.

a) M.A. Krąpiec centres his thinking about the man-society relation on analysis of its ontic conditions and seeks an answer to the question, does the community guarantee a person’s development and if so, on what conditions? According to Boethius’ classic formula, accepted by personalism, a person is *rationalis naturae individua substantia* (“individual substance of reasonable nature”). Here, “nature” is used in its metaphysical sense of the unchangeable essence of man. Man is reasonable by his nature. He is by nature a social being as well. This means a person, an accidental and potential-endowed being, is unable to realise its “nature” other than through specific actions and with participation of other persons. Full development of personal life is only possible in society, i.e. in the world of persons [Krąpiec 2005, 330]. Society is a niche that allows for man’s biological, psychological, and personal development [ibid., 332]. As Krąpiec says, an independent human individual “creates itself” as part of multi-sided and multi-dimensional interactions among persons. It is a “being in itself,” a “separate,” self-sufficient and complete being insofar as it is also a “being for the other” and a social being at the same time [ibid., 331].
In light of philosophical personalism, community is a relational being, or an assembly of people linked by means of relations. As Krąpiec says, relations binding people are not in themselves “relations constituting entitativity in the substantial order, but relations that constitute social – relational entitativity, which encompasses individual subjects as essential reasonable beings” [Krąpiec 2005, 332]. A social being is not substantial, as only a person is. The former is a relational being that can be understood as a unity of relations among persons. Krąpiec goes on to specify a community is a bond of categorical relations that “bind human persons so that they can develop their potential-endowed personalities in as versatile a manner as possible (not each individual in all respects, but various individuals in different respects) in order for each human person to realise the common good” [ibid., 333]. Accordingly, a community is a natural creation necessary to realise the common good. The notion of “social being” refers both to small social groups like a family and to any group including states and supranational organisations [ibid., 334].

b) Similar pronouncements about the person–community relation can be found in K. Wojtyła’s analyses. The Cracow-based thinker seems to desire to “dive” even deeper than Krąpiec into the person’s subjective structure to find there grounds for explicating the fact of their being and acting jointly with other persons. He is convinced the foundation of an individual’s participation in a variety of societal relations is part of their internal condition [Wojtyła 2019, 82]. Wojtyła situates his position against the background of a critique of individualism on the one hand and of objective totalism (collectivism) on the other hand [Idem 1994a, 313]. He writes that individualism “proposes an individual’s welfare as the supreme and basic good to which any community and society must be subordinated” [ibid.]. The objective totalism advances the opposite principle – “it totally subordinates an individual and their good to the communication and society” [ibid.]. Rejecting the extremes of both individualism and collectivism, Wojtyła maintains a person and a community are solely appropriate to each other. “The feature of society, or community, is branded into the human existence itself” [ibid., 302]. He suggests, therefore, man’s social nature should be explicited not only at the level of human nature but above all at the level of a person. Thus, Wojtyła tends towards the personalist thinking on man.

K. Wojtyła identifies the foundation of a person’s participation in being and acting jointly with others as a specific property of a person itself, which he names “the capacity for participation”. Harking back to the concept of participation, known in philosophical tradition, he accorded it a meaning other than the everyday association with taking part in undertakings together with others. He understands participation as “a property of the person themselves, internal and homogeneous, which determines the fact a person, by being and acting jointly with others, is and acts as a person” [ibid., 310]. Owing to the capacity for subjective being in a community, a person adds a personalist dimension to being and acting among other persons. In this way, a man-person “is not lost” in a community, to
the contrary, he reaffirms and realises himself as someone “personal.” Wojtyła, aware of the sheer diversity of interpersonal relations, specifies participation means “not only various forms of referring a person to others, an individual to society, but also […] the very foundation of these forms, inherent and appropriate to a person” [ibid., 310–11].

To Wojtyła, a person’s capacity for participation is key to explaining both the fact of human intersubjectivity and of communities created by man. A person, together with other persons, creates a variety of communities. The participation may take diverse forms there. An individual contributes the richness of their personality as well as their shortcomings and limitations to communities, therefore, exchange of personal gifts is necessary in each community [Wojtyła 2016, 29]. In the Cracow philosopher’s view, each and every community is about constituting a “we” with a distinct subjectivity of its own. This can only be achieved by a shared aspiration to the common good [Wojtyła 1994b, 411].

The idea of common good as the foundation of communities is present in the causal-finalist concept of man and community. The common good is seen as the goal of a man’s-person’s aspirations and actions [ibid.]. It is of paramount importance from the perspective of philosophical personalism. M.A. Krapiec and K. Wojtyła expand the finalist concept of common good with a subjective aspect. In their personalism, a human person and their comprehensive development in a community of persons is the primary common good.

2. THE ISSUE OF THE COMMON GOOD

A philosopher approaching the issue of the common good looks for answers to two important questions: what is the common good? and what is its essence? The notion of “the common good” itself (Latin bonum commune), like a number of other key concepts in philosophy and other sciences, derives from ancient Greece and Rome. It was already Plato in his Republic who wrote: “Law is not after making any type of men exceptionally happy but after this condition for the entire state by harmonising citizens by ways of persuasion and compulsion to make them share that utility any one can bring to the common good” [Platon 1958, 519]. Aristotle found the aspiration to ensure individual happiness of citizens the state’s objective, and thus its common good. He wrote in Politics: “It is therefore beyond any doubt the best system is by necessity the one where every single person without exception feels best and lives happy” [Arystoteles 2003, I, 1,8]. For the Stagira thinker, the state is a natural community that exists for the sake of man and is necessary for citizens to attain happiness.

The notion of the common good played a major role in the medieval socio-political thought as well. The term bonum commune appears several hundred times in Thomas Aquinas’s texts. Aquinas claimed every law worthy of this name aims for the common good [Piechowiak 2003, 23]. According to Thomas’s classic definition, “a legal norm will be a reason’s ruling promulgated for the common good
by an entity caring for a community.” Consideration of the common good is regarded as a major part of law by Aquinas. Any law is a reason for human action contained in its objective. The common good, as the objective of law, is the principle of legal order and law-making efforts [Piechowiak 2003, 23].

From the philosophical point of view, an objective is the reason for any action as part of the system of practical reason. Happiness is the final objective of human life. Hence law must be primarily intended to strive for happiness. Thomas, like Aristotle, maintains the state is a natural, complete, and self-sufficient community. He sees individual happiness in the context of what is naturally needed for its achievement, that is, of state community. However, Thomas, as distinct from the Stagira philosopher, had at his disposal the concept of person that treated freedom as a major perfection of man. This concept implies a definite understanding of a person’s happiness and perfection, which is of fundamental significance to understanding of the common good. In the subjective respect, this good is happiness reached in a community, while objectively, conditions that lead to it [Piechowiak 2003, 27].

M.A. Krapiec proposes, by approaching the issue of the common good in philosophical terms and presenting its essential features, to analyse its two components: “good” and “common.” Since the common good is assigned to the human person, the reflection must consider the concepts of human nature and human person, for whom it is the object of action and an objective. What is the good and what is the good of a particular being, that is, man?

The Greek αγαθός (agathos) and Latin bonum, “good,” have a number of meanings. One of the most basic qualifications of good, possibly the most common in everyday understanding, is concerned with economic values. In this sense, good is a value qualifying things or their states and whatever has value: hence valuable objects are named goods [Stróżewski 1981, 220]. One can therefore speak of goods that have been produced and acquired by purchasing or inheritance. Another meaning of “good” relates to moral qualification of deeds. Thus, somebody’s action or decision may be good.

The problem of the essence of good has found two solutions in the history of philosophy. The first says good is the so-called transcendental property of being. The other reduces good to values. The former tradition is referred to as metaphysical, the latter, axiological [ibid.]. Both the traditions are meaningful to this discussion, given the nature of the common good. However, good and its essence are ultimately explained by metaphysics.

Realist philosophy understands good as a transcendental property of being, an expression of things being as good-objective [Maryniarczyk 2000, 84]. In the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: “All art and all exploration, like any actions and resolutions, seem to tend towards a good, therefore good is rightly

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2 “Lex est quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, et ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata,” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I–II, q. 90, a. 4.
3 Ibid., q. 90, a. 2.
defined as the object of all aspiration” [Arystoteles 2011, 77]. The concept of good adopted by Aristotle is known as finalist, or positing good as the end of aspiration, particularly reasonable aspiration proper to man. Only good can serve as the foundation for explicating the fact of human action in both its objective and subjective respects. Krapiec explains: “The fact man acts for an end can only be explicated by the object of aspiration emerging before man as desirable – as a good. And man desires it, wants it, only for the sake of this good” [Krapiec 1986, 180–81].

In line with the general distinctions introduced by the finalist theory, good is an object of human will as well as the ultimate reason for each man’s action. Man lives among goods he desires and chooses from. Considering the social aspect of human nature, good is an object of human action which can become an individual end of each personal aspiration and, in this sense, can be shared by all persons in society [ibid.]. In his Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas offers the following analysis: “Actions are always individual and detailed, but this is such actions that can be referred to as the common good, which is shared, though not in the way a species or kind is shared, but as a shared end-oriented cause, therefore a shared end can be called the common good.”

When commenting on these words, Krapiec points to the possible rational conception of the common good as the basis for explicating human action in general and law in particular or, to be more accurate, human action insofar as it is guided by law. Human action is only explained with good, both for objective and subjective reasons [Krapiec 1986, 181].

Thus, the common good is the foundation on which a community can be constituted. It is the reason for its creation and end to which it aspires. There are various communities, however. Both natural (i.e. family and nation) and man-made (local, professional, political, religious) communities are hierarchic structures. Each community consists of a multiplicity of individuals guided by occasionally contradictory aspirations, which inevitably exposes them to internal conflicts. Each has a common good of its own, too. The question arises, therefore, is there a good that would be in fact shared, that is, going beyond individual values and needs? Can a universal common good be defined that would comprise ends of particular, sometimes diverse communities?

The personalist concept distinguishes two major components of the common good: internal and external. The former is ontological-axiological. The common good means integral development of a human person and a set of values necessary for this development. The other element is societal-institutional in nature. It encompasses a set of structures, institutions, economic and legal conditions necessary to realise the common good [Kowalczyk 2005, 236]. The subsequent sections of this paper will expand this idea and answer the above questions.

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4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I–II, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2.
3. PERSONAL GOOD AS THE COMMON GOOD (M.A. KRĄPIEC’S VIEW)

The personalism of M.A. Krąpiec relies on the anthropological views of Thomas Aquinas. In his doctrine of the so-called natural inclinations (*inclinationes naturales*) that govern dynamics of human life and are uniquely connected with personal human life, the Doctor Angelicus identified the aspiration to personal development by taking reasonable action as man’s basic natural inclination.\(^5\) Since increasingly full actuation of potentialities of man’s nature is his good, he desires to perfect himself [Krąpiec 2005, 337]. This tendency to self-improvement varies, but is analogous in each individual case. The Lublin-based philosopher writes: “Increasingly full (and appropriate to an individual’s natural potentialities) realisation of living aspirations in respect of cognition, loving, free self-determination is an *attractive force*, the good which is the *raison d’être* and a reason for action of each human person and thus, that is, in the sense of analogous identity of objectives, constitutes the common good” [ibid.]. Man as such is a limited and potential-endowed being who does not currently have the perfections needed for complete development. The essential incompleteness causes a unique “hunger” for good in man. To fill this deficit, man takes actions intended to deliver an appropriate good and a human being is thus supplemented in the variety of their aspects’ [ibid., 338].

What appropriate good is meant here? Krąpiec answers the nature of the good that can be shared by all people is determined by human personality itself. Personal good in its proper meaning is in line with actuation of the uniquely human powers of intellect and free will. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the good of an entire community and good of its individual members as part of the order of the purely personal good, attained by means of intellect and will [ibid.]. Accordingly, Krąpiec expresses the principle “increasing good of a particular person is in parallel with an increase in the common good of the whole society” [ibid., 339]. Increasing wealth of an individual man enriches the society.

In conformity with this principle, the fullest possible realisation of the common good, or unlimited provision of conditions conducive to personal actuation to all members, is the fundamental objective of all communities [ibid.]. One of these conditions is access to material means, i.e. food, accommodation, technical facilities, etc. All of these material goods, both jointly and separately, cannot be regarded as the common good in its proper meaning, however, or as reasons for social and legal order. Material means are solely means, occasionally necessary, but always just means to the objective proper [ibid.].

In the spirit of realist philosophy, Krąpiec points to a hierarchy of material goods: there are lower and higher-order goods of lesser and greater value. Accordingly, man’s vegetative life, being integrated into personal living, is more valuable than vegetative life of animals. There is both a hierarchy of beings and a hie-

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rarchy of goods in the order of nature. It is identified with a view to objectives inherent in particular things. Fair good (bonum honestum) is of a greater value to man than useful good (bonum utile) or good serving to satisfy his pleasures (bonum delectabile). In Aquinas’s system, the Supreme, Absolute Being, known to religion as God, is the common good shared by each person and the entire society. Enabling attainment of that Good is the raison d’être of a society, and thus of law prevailing in such a society [ibid., 340].

Actuation of personal good, including the supreme Good, requires not only access to material means but also adequate legal remedies. Man as a being endowed with potential has the right to full personal development. Since common good is the raison d’être of every community, none should issue laws that would obstruct or prevent man’s full personal development [ibid.]. Legislation and regulations should allow every human person to reach their principal right, that is, matching the common good through development of their personal potentialities [ibid.].

It should be noted in conclusion M.A. Krąpiec tends towards the finalist (teleological) explanation of the common good. Recognised as the objective of actions, it appears to man as his own personal good he comprehends with his reason and to which he tends freely with his will. Man relates to this good from inside, not, like in totalism, by means of external, irrational order that ultimately turns into moral violence. In the Lublin thinker’s opinion, the essential nature and meaning of the common good should be noted in order to comprehend it. To perceive that value of the common good, though, one must first understand the value of a person themselves. It is therefore the role and task of society to educate man in such a way that he is able to perceive and appreciate “from inside” the value of the common good, of himself and every other person as participating in that good [ibid., 341].

4. THE COMMON GOOD AS THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION (K. WOJTYŁA’S CONCEPTION)

K. Wojtyła focuses above all on the “horizontal” dimension of the common good. To begin his analysis, he notes the core of every community is in the relation of many I’s to the common good. By joint aspiration to the common good, a certain social we is constituted. That good does have an objective dimension outlined by the end to which a given community has organised itself, yet man realises and reaffirms his subjectivity by identifying with this good-end and actuates his personal subjectivity by free, creative aspiration to that objective [Szostek 2014, 70]. For Wojtyła, the dimension of participation present in a man-person, or the moment of a person’s subjective action in relation to other persons, is key to explicating the issue of the common good and its deepest essence. He believes an end of joint action understood objectively and materially has something of a common good yet without quite fully constituting it. Wojtyła writes:
“the common good cannot be defined without considering in parallel the subjective moment of action in relation to acting persons” [Wojtyła 1994a, 320–21]. Therefore, “the common good is not only the end of action conducted in a community understood in purely objective terms, but also, and even primarily, what conditions and somehow releases participation in persons acting jointly, thereby forming in them a subjective community of action” [ibid., 312]. It should be accordingly recognised the common good matches the social nature of man [ibid.].

According to Wojtyła, the fundamental common good of each community is what releases in its members the moment of fully subjective commitment for the community’s sake. Therefore, the most profound meaning of the common good is related to participation as a person’s property. The moment of participation triggered in persons being and acting jointly makes a community oriented towards realisation of an external objective a subjective community of the same action. In this manner, each person, by taking certain actions as part of a community, finds and reaffirms their own subjectivity. Therefore, the author of Person and Act regards the common good as “the principle of proper participation.” This principle safeguards the personalist structure of human existence in any community man belongs to [ibid., 321]. All social entities should therefore be organised in such a way that processes taking place in them lead to development of subjectivity in their members.

As part of this sense of the common good, K. Wojtyła distinguished two types of attitudes a person can adopt in relation to a community. He called them authentic and inauthentic attitudes. An attitude of solidarity that realises the dimension of a person’s participation is essentially authentic. It consists in a subject accepting the common good as their own. Wojtyła maintains solidarity is a person’s natural response to the fact of being and acting together with others. This is the basic form of participation and its chief expression. He wrote: “Solidarity means a continuing readiness to accept and realise the part assigned to everyone as members of a given community. A solidary man not only fulfils their part due to membership of a community but also does it for the good of the whole” [ibid., 323–24]. The attitude of opposition is also authentic and realising the dimension of participation. It is a function of someone’s own perception of a community and its common good. Opposition concerns the way the common good is perceived and actuated. Whoever opposes in the name of the common good does not abandon readiness to realise it, on the contrary, they seek confirmation of their presence in a community by way of authentic participation [ibid., 324]. Opposition is an authentic attitude as it expresses a person’s need of active being in a community. A subject expresses their opposition as they find a realisation of the common good adopted by a community to be inappropriate. In Wojtyła’s view, the possibility of diverse forms of opposition in a community is a condition of its adequate system [ibid., 325].

Devoid of values, the personalist authentic attitudes become inauthentic. They are dangerous insofar as they imitate authentic attitudes: conformism is similar to
solidarity and evasion to opposition. They differ from the authentic attitudes in a subject’s stance towards the common good. Wojtyła identifies conformism as lack of solidarity combined with avoidance of opposition [ibid., 327]. This is an attitude of merely external presence in a community. A conformist is deprived of a fully personal conviction in their actions and choices. They do not take part in creating a community but are passively “carried on by the community.” Wojtyła claims whoever adopts a conformist attitude deprives a community of themselves and lets a community “deprive them of themselves”. Therefore, conformism is a negation of participation. Participation and care for multiplying the common good are replaced with apparent participation and make-believe care that ultimately lead to indifference [ibid., 328]. Conformism is expressed as acceptance of common ways of building and multiplying the common good not because a subject recognises the good as objectively important, but because they see opportunities for individual advantage in the path they choose [Szostek 2014, 70].

Another inauthentic attitude identified by Wojtyła is evasion. It also jeopardises realisation of the common good. Like conformism avoids opposition, evasion shies away from conformism. This is utter withdrawal from a community. Like conformism, evasion is a person’s resignation from self-fulfilment as part of a community. By evasion, an individual attempts to remove themselves from a community as they are convinced community takes them from themselves. In the case of conformism, they maintain the outward appearances of being in a community, whereas evasion abandons even the appearances [Wojtyła 1994a, 329]. Both the inauthentic attitudes are destructive of community and personal life. By adopting the inauthentic attitudes of conformism and evasion, a person deprives themselves of the subjective being in a community, that personal dimension of participation, as their property by which they find and fulfil themselves in a community as persons [ibid.].

It can be noted the theory of participation proposed by Wojtyła arises out of the conviction man and the entire wealth of his personality are the supreme good of each social entity. That conviction set the main stream of Wojtyła’s social thought when a pope. That ‘personality argument’ recurs in each of his social encyclicals and in its name John Paul II calls for the subjective nature of participation in every type and dimension of man’s social commitment [Szostek 2014, 72]. Wojtyła as pope argued societies would be alienated as long as a variety of societal mechanisms hindered or prevented full personal development of their members.

CONCLUSION

It should be concluded the personalist model of person-society relations advanced by both M.A. Krapiec and K. Wojtyła is rational. Rooted in the common good, it avoids the error of individualism, which has individuals care solely for their own good and interests, and of totalism, which subordinates individuals to society (state) and deprives them of any initiative of their own. In the perspective
of both the authors’ philosophical personalism, the common good is more than the good of a community in its objective dimension. Accepting society is necessary for a person’s adequate development. They also point to the primacy of a person over the communities they belong to. This approach leads to an affirmation of personal and state rights. Any attempts at reversing this order of individual-society relations inevitably leads to personal alienation.

The common good may be referred to a range of social entities, namely, the common good of a family, local community, state or a supranational community. Both Krąpiec and Wojtyła indicate its broadest possible foundations. This is the universal common good, available to everybody and diverse types of communities.

The principal difference between the conceptions of the common good by Krąpiec and Wojtyła seems to consist in the latter attempting to stress the more profound and basic dimension of the common good than the end of joint actions alone. He pointed to a specific property of a person, expressed in their capacity for subjective presence in every type of social commitment, which is their fundamental good. Wojtyła’s social thought was founded on the conviction every individual human person is the greatest shared good of society and state. In fact, for Krąpiec man’s good is an increasingly full actuation of his nature’s potentialities which becomes a shared good of a community, however, he tends to emphasise the teleological orientation of a person’s activities towards whatever constitutes their good. Krąpiec’s thought follows Thomas Aquinas and ultimately concentrates on the vertical dimension of the common good. Wojtyła, endowing the notion of participation, known in the philosophical tradition, with a new meaning, enriches Aquinas’s theory, upholding the role of a dynamic human nature at the person’s level. The Cracow philosopher’s analysis of the common good highlights its horizontal sense.

It should finally be pointed out Krąpiec’s and Wojtyła’s texts are not treatises on economics or political theory, but philosophy. Their ideas invite readers to join their thinking. They are addressed above all to all those responsible in practice for public life: national and local politicians, economists, lawyers, entrepreneurs, etc. Their analysis is rooted in a shared thought: any social structures, particularly those created by the state, should be formed in such a way that they do not a priori change or distort natural human inclinations and that they secure a person’s transcendent character. They should all serve both man’s versatile development and become spaces where his personal potential is released. Only then can the common good be actually realised.

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