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Laboratorium Mentis baner

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023)

Articles

Are thought experiments a reliable method of doing philosophy? [Polish original]

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/lm.8148  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2023-12-20

Abstract

In the paper I defend the practice of using thought experiments against the claim that it is not a serious way of philosophical argumentation. At the heart of the criticism leveled against thought experiments is the assumption that the products of imagination, due to their lack of grounding in reality, are fundamentally unreliable. Assuming the existence of an analogy between thought experiments and real experiments, I point out that there are criteria that define the framework of a good thought experiment.

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