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Laboratorium Mentis baner

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2024)

Articles

Sufficient Level and Beverly Hills: Reexamining Intuitions on Roger Crisp’s Thought Experiment [English original]

  • Krzesimir Cholewa
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/lm.9481  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2025-02-13

Abstract

The presented article addresses the issue of distributive justice based on Roger Crisp’s thought experiment, the Beverly Hills case. Besides a brief introduction outlining key theoretical distinctions, the article is divided into four parts. The first part introduces Crisp’s perspective and the original formulation of the Beverly Hills case. The following two parts explore three specifications of this thought experiment, analyzing their impact on initial intuitions. The final part includes a proposal of pluralist sufficientarianism, incorporating two thresholds: a static, objective threshold grounded in Crisp’s view and a dynamic threshold derived from the concept of relative fairness.

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