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Laboratorium Mentis baner

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023)

Articles

On an intuition regarding the acquisition of moral virtue [Polish original]

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/lm.8156  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2023-12-20

Abstract

This article concerns the issue of the moral enhancement of humans through technology. I propose a thought experiment that allows us to identify a new reason against implementing such enhancement. Achieving virtue through a path that involves one’s own effort in making and implementing morally sound decisions deserves greater respect. It also allows us to acknowledge that we are (co)authors of who we become morally. This kind of self-creation seems to be an important part of a meaningful life, and artificial moral enhancement deprives us of it.

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