Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2023)

Articles

On an intuition regarding the acquisition of moral virtue [English translation]

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/lm.8157  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2023-12-20

Abstract

This article concerns the issue of the moral enhancement of humans through technology. I propose a thought experiment that allows us to identify a new reason against implementing such enhancement. Achieving virtue through a path that involves one’s own effort in making and implementing morally sound decisions deserves greater respect. It also allows us to acknowledge that we are (co)authors of who we become morally. This kind of self-creation seems to be an important part of a meaningful life, and artificial moral enhancement deprives us of it.

 

References

  1. Aristotle (2014). Nicomachean Ethics, transl. R. Crisp. Cambridge University Press. Original work published ca. 300 B.C.E. [Google Scholar]
  2. Bengson, J., Cuneo, T., Shafer-Landau, R. (2020). Trusting moral intuitions. Noûs, 54(4), 956–984. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12291 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12291 [Google Scholar]
  3. Buchanan, A. (2009). Moral status and human enhancement. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37(4), 346–381. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468461 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01166.x [Google Scholar]
  4. Eberl, J.T. (2018). Can prudence be enhanced? The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, 43(5), 506–526. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhy021 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhy021 [Google Scholar]
  5. Fabiano, J. (2018). Probing the Risks of Moral Enhancement [PhD thesis]. University of Oxford. [Google Scholar]
  6. Harris, J. (2011). Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics, 25(2), 102–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01854.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01854.x [Google Scholar]
  7. Hauskeller, M. (2013). The “Little Alex” Problem. The Philosophers’ Magazine, (62), 74–78. https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20136299 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20136299 [Google Scholar]
  8. Herce, R. (2019). Is human enhancement possible if it comes from the outside?. Scientia et Fides, 7(2), 165–170. DOI: https://doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2019.021 [Google Scholar]
  9. Lavazza, A., Reichlin, M. (2019). Introduction: moral enhancement. Topoi, 38(1), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09638-5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09638-5 [Google Scholar]
  10. Persson, I., Savulescu, J. (2013). Getting moral enhancement right: the desirability of moral bioenhancement. Bioethics, 27(3), 124–131. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01907.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01907.x [Google Scholar]
  11. Savulescu, J., Persson, I. (2012). Moral enhancement, freedom and the god machine. The Monist, 95(3), 399–421. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201295321 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201295321 [Google Scholar]
  12. Schaefer, G., Schaefer, G.O. (2014). Moral enhancement and moral disagreement [PhD thesis]. Oxford University, UK. [Google Scholar]
  13. Specker, J., Focquaert, F., Raus, K., Sterckx, S., Schermer, M. (2014). The ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement: a review of reasons. BMC Medical Ethics, 15(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-15-67 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-15-67 [Google Scholar]
  14. Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3/4), 331–352. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115831 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y [Google Scholar]
  15. Szutta, A. (2018). Intuicje moralne. O poznaniu dobra i zła [Moral intuitions. About the cognition of the good and evil]. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Academicon. https://doi.org/10.52097/acapress.9788362475612 DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/acapress.9788362475612 [Google Scholar]
  16. Tartaglia, J. (2020). Philosophy in a Technological World: Gods and Titans. Bloomsbury Publishing. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350070134 [Google Scholar]

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.