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Laboratorium Mentis baner

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2024)

Articles

Does lying necessarily involve stating falsehoods? [English translation]

  • Artur Szutta
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52097/lm.9485  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2025-02-13

Abstract

This article addresses the question of whether lying inherently requires the expression of objective falsehood. While traditional subjectivist approaches focus on the divergence between a speaker’s beliefs and their statements, some contemporary theorists of lying argue that lying necessitates objectively false utterances. I offer a critical analysis of six thought experiments to illuminate the intuitiveness of the subjectivist claim. In explaining the intuitiveness of the traditional view of lying, I point to its fundamentally moral nature—namely, that lying is rooted in acts of will rather than external outcomes.

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