Abstract
The article deals with the issue of admissibility, legitimacy and, above all, criteria for judicial assessment of the sincerity of religious beliefs of a party to the proceedings, e.g. a conscript refusing to perform military service on the grounds of religious conscientious objection, a prisoner demanding a diet consistent with his declared religion, or a person applying for refugee status due to religious persecution. Firstly, it was pointed out that the fact that the state, society, and third parties bear the costs of accommodating claims falsely based on religious freedom justifies the need to verify the sincerity of the believer in doubtful cases. Secondly, it was pointed out that the assessment of whether a person actually holds certain religious beliefs is different from the unacceptable – because it violates the requirement of religious neutrality of the state – judicial assessment of the truth (truthfulness) of these beliefs. Thirdly, several determinants of sincerity were analysed, such as the compliance of the believer's beliefs with his conduct, possession of appropriate religious knowledge, readiness to bear certain burdens in exchange for the possibility of not betraying his faith, or the lack of ulterior non-religious motives for invoking religious freedom. The author, defending the possibility of assessing the sincerity of religious beliefs by the judiciary, at the same time advocates that the courts should make this assessment contextually, and, as part of a certain restraint, resolve irremovable doubts in favor of the believer.
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