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Teka Komisji Prawniczej PAN Oddział w Lublinie

Tom 16 Nr 2 (2023)

Artykuły

The President’s Influence on the Formation of the Government on the Example of the Italian Republic

DOI: https://doi.org/10.32084/tkp.8021  [Google Scholar]
Opublikowane: 29.12.2023

Abstrakt

The purpose of this study is to elucidate the legal, primarily constitutional, constraints that govern the formation of the government of the Italian Republic and the involvement and significance of the President of the Republic in this process. The study is conceived as a synthesis of legal and socio-political perspectives, aimed at examining this pivotal yet complex process for the state. Considering the constitutional foundations that underlie the government formation procedure, the study first examines the legal limitations on the actions and duties of the President in that process. The interaction between the exercise of the head of state’s powers and their limitations, both by legal regulations and established constitutional precedents, is subjected to scrutiny. The role of the President, viewed through the lens of the boundaries of the authority of the office, is characterized, in conclusion, by the delicate balance between discretion and the legal and political-constitutional constraints on the President’s actions. While the study mainly concerns the circumstances surrounding the establishment and ultimate selection of the Meloni cabinet, it can be viewed as a notable addition to the overall analysis of the President’s influence on the formation of the government in politically fractured and divided Italy.

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