Abstrakt
The standard justification for the appearance of public social insurance in economic and financial theory is the imperfection and incompleteness of private insurance and risk markets. However, this approach is not complete, as it ignores other conditions that can be explained by public choice theory. Bringing them closer is the main goal of the article, which is further specified in the case study of social insurance for farmers in the Third Republic of Poland. The first part presents some of the most representative definitions of this theory and its central categories, namely: state/government failure and its forms; types, sources and consequences of ineffectiveness of politicians and public administration; the functioning of interest groups and the related rent-seeking, and the political economic cycle. Then a critique of public choice theory and attempts to defend it are presented. As a kind of partial summary of this part of the discussion, the case study entitled “Social insurance for farmers in the Third Republic of Poland” is analysed further. For comparison, the view of neoclassical economics on the emergence and development of social insurance is presented. On the other hand, the perspective of behavioural economics is ignored. The second part of the article is devoted to political and economic modelling, i.e. looking for solutions in the field of social insurance that simultaneously optimize political and economic and fiscal goals. First, the two rationale for the emergence and expansion of social security are discussed. Then this problem is presented in the convention of the expected utility hypothesis and the concept of generalizing it and alternative to it. It then moves on to the phenomenon of “populism in pensions” and the credibility of public and private pension systems. Finally, the problem of optimizing the combination of both these systems and their absolute and relative size is taken up. Although the work deals with social risks, it mainly focuses on the risk of old age.
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