The article undertakes an analysis of the institution of opposition to cassation decisions, regulated in Articles 64a-64e of the Law on Administrative Court Proceedings, as the legislator’s response to the abusive use of cassation decisions instrumentally by public administration bodies. These decisions, although formally final, do not resolve the case on the merits, which in practice is sometimes used to drag out proceedings, overturn favorable decisions for the parties and avoid decision-making responsibility. In this context, the objection is an extraordinary measure aimed at providing the parties with effective judicial protection against sham or grossly flawed cassation decisions. The article discusses the prerequisites for the admissibility of the objection, the scope of the administrative court’s cognizance and the practical consequences of the amendment. The author points out that limiting the court’s control exclusively to the examination of the prerequisites of Article 138 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure can lead to situations in which even obvious violations of the law are beyond the scope of the court’s interference. It concludes with de lege ferenda postulates aimed at expanding the courts’ cognition and allowing them to signal other significant irregularities. The objection – although limited in scope – can play an important role in preventing the instrumentalization of administrative procedure, provided it is properly shaped and interpreted.
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