Salta al menu principale di navigazione Salta al contenuto principale Salta al piè di pagina del sito
Biuletyn Stowarzyszenia Absolwentów i Przyjaciół Wydziału Prawa Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego

V. 18 N. 20 (2) (2023)

Artykuły

The Legal Scopes of Liberty and the State in Light of the Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill

DOI: https://doi.org/10.32084/bsawp.6981  [Google Scholar]
Pubblicato: 2023-12-01

Abstract

In modern democracies the liberty of the individual is ensured and protected by the state or the government. But it is well-known that restrictions on liberty are institutionalized and the individual is responsible for obeying them. The liberty of the individual and its protection is provided through restrictions. On the other hand, the legal system and the government are the institutions that threaten the liberty of the individual. Mill’s thesis on individual liberty implies the primacy of it and sets out the social conditions in which it will be possible to realize and protect individual liberty. The main theme of his treatise On Liberty is the nature and boundaries of individual liberty, the scope of legitimate interference with individual liberty. In other words, the principle establishes a sufficient basis for the legitimate protection of the individual liberty, i.e. what is a restriction of a right, on the one hand, is at the same time a protection of it. An individual must be free from all forms of violence, if his/her actions do not harm others [Riley  2001, 46]. The purpose of the paper On Liberty is to provide one very simple principle. Main point of it is that the method of societies’ relations with the individual should not be coercion and control. No matter is it a case of physical violence as a form of punishment or as a form of moral coercion by society. Power over a member of a civilized community can only be exercised for the sole purpose of preventing harm to others. Thus, the liberty principle establishes a necessary condition for legitimate violence against any individual: his/her liberty of action must be restricted by law or opinion if there is a reasonable expectation that it will harm others.

Riferimenti bibliografici

  1. Altman, Christopher. 2003. “Mill’s Harm Principle and the Limitations of Authority.” https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=70f13dc0dba9b4748b791962ccd9b33cca66810e [accessed: 15.05.2023]. [Google Scholar]
  2. Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]
  3. Binkley, Robert C. 1938. “Mill’s liberty today.” Foreign Affairs 16, no. 4:563-73. [Google Scholar]
  4. Donohue, Brian. 2007. “Rhetoric, Harm, and the Personification of Progress in Mill’s On Liberty.” Ratio Juris 20, no. 2:196-212. [Google Scholar]
  5. Dworkin, Gerald. 1982. Mill on liberty. Bluebook 21st ed. 10(1) Pol. Theory 149. [Google Scholar]
  6. Eremadze, Ketevan. 2020. ძირითადი უფლებები თავისუფლებისთვის [Basic Rights for Freedom]. Tbilisi. GTU. [Google Scholar]
  7. Gegenava, Dimitri. 2017. “Constitutional Court of Georgia as Positive Legislator: Transformation and Modern Challenges.” Polish-Georgian Law Review 3:87-94. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222290. [Google Scholar]
  8. Huhn, Wilson R. 1989. “Mill’s Theory of Liberty in Constitutional Interpretation.” Akron Law Review 22, no. 2:133-54. [Google Scholar]
  9. Hylton, Keith. 1996. “Implications of Mill’s Theory of Liberty for the Regulation of Hate Speech and Hate Crimes.” The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 3, no. 1:35-57. [Google Scholar]
  10. Kotter, Alexandra J. 2022. “The Ability of Positive and Negative Liberty.” Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2242:1-40. [Google Scholar]
  11. Larvor, Brendan. 2006. “On Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/2312/902438.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed: 10.19.2023]. [Google Scholar]
  12. Lomtatidze, Ekaterine, Natia Khantadze, and David Zedelashvili. 2018. პირადი თავისუფლება და ავტონომია [Personal freedom and autonomy]. Tbilisi: National Institute for Human Rights. Free and Agricultural Universities Press. [Google Scholar]
  13. Mavrokonstantis, Panos. 2008-2009 „A Critical Evaluation of Mill’s Proposed Limits on Legitimate Interference with the Individual.” Law and Society Journal at UCSB 8:87-102. [Google Scholar]
  14. Merritt, Deborah J. 1986. “Book Review: Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis. by Martin H. Redish; Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the Theory of the First Amendment. by Melville B. Nimmer.” Constitutional Commentary 259:234-43. [Google Scholar]
  15. Mill, John Stuart. 1963. The Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Google Scholar]
  16. Morgan, Glyn. 2022. “The Mode and Limits of John Stuart Mill’s Toleration.” In Toleration and its Limits: Nomos Xlviii, edited by Melissa S. Williams, and Jeremy Waldron, 139-68. New York: New York University Press. [Google Scholar]
  17. Riley, Jonathan. 2001. Mill on Liberty. New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library. [Google Scholar]
  18. Spitz, David. 1962. “Freedom and Individuality: Mill’s Liberty in Retrospect.” 4 NOMOS: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. 176-226. [Google Scholar]
  19. Ten, Chin L. 2008. Mill’s On Liberty: A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]

Downloads

I dati di download non sono ancora disponibili.