The article offers a philosophical analysis of the problem of artificial intelligence (AI) in the context of the problem of consciousness. The first part examines the conceptual complexity of the terms intelligence and consciousness, arguing that intelligence may exist independently of reflective self-awareness or mental life. The discussion then turns to selected theories that posit the gradability of consciousness or the possible emergence of conscious states in artificial systems, such as Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and David J. Chalmers’s naturalistic dualism. The author suggests that the construction of a genuinely conscious machine would constitute a strong argument in favour of reductive physicalism. On the other hand, classical philosophical arguments are invoked to highlight the limitations of computational models of thought – most notably John R. Searle’s “Chinese Room” thought experiment and the interpretations of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem by John R. Lucas and Roger Penrose. These reflections point to the logical possibility of so-called “philosophical zombies”: machines that perfectly simulate consciousness yet lack any inner life. The conclusion is that even if conscious AI never comes into existence, its advanced simulation may entail far-reaching ethical, social, and existential consequences.