This paper, comprised of three parts, analyses selected provisions of Directive 2016/343, with particular focus on (1) the presumption of innocence, (2) the principle of in dubio pro reo and (3) the minimum conditions for adopting a decision to remand in custody, both in terms of the rules governing examination of evidence and the extent of the statement of reasons for such a decision. Given the existing level of protection within the European Union, this paper clarifies whether the protection of fundamental rights has been improved. As regards in dubio pro reo - taking into account the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union preceding the adoption of the Directive which extended the application of the said principle to some administrative proceedings that can lead to sanctions, such as competition law proceedings – the answer is definitely negative. The opposite is
true when it comes to the presumption of innocence. On the other hand, as regards the examination of evidence necessary to adjudicate on the lawfulness of detention on remand, the consolidation and development by the Directive in question of the standard defined already in the 1960s in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg was considered. So understood conditions for adopting a decision to remand in custody, when confronted with the jurisprudence of Polish courts (including the Supreme Court) indicate that, as a rule, the Polish courts fail to implement the provisions of the Directive as interpreted by the CJEU. This causes a systemic problem related to the excessive length of detention on remand, which without the intervention of the legislator may cause inconsistencies within the legal system.
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