We examine how constitutional structures shape judicial AI governance through a comparative analysis of Poland and India. We propose Sovereign Digital Constitutionalism—constitutional compatibility, technological sovereignty, democratic accountability, and
rights preservation—and show how the EU AI Act operationalises these principles for high-risk judicial AI. Poland’s governance-first sequencing (LEX-AIS within EU AI Act frameworks) contrasts with India’s implementation-first deployment (SUVAS, SUPACE,
e-Courts Phase III), yielding distinct risk profiles and coordination demands. We develop a three-tier safeguards model (constitutional, procedural, technical) and a judge-centred workflow in which AI assists but never decides. We argue that success depends less on technical sophistication than on constitutional safeguards, judicial leadership, and adaptive governance. We conclude with evidence-based recommendations for democratic jurisdictions integrating AI whilst preserving judicial independence and public legitimacy.
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