That contemplation is an important concept in philosophy and theology seems hard to deny. There have been many debates concerning the nature and place of the contemplative life, for example. But not enough attention has been paid to the precise question of what contemplation is in the first place. It is clearly some sort of mental act, but what makes a mental act contemplative? Does it have a special type of object? This article discusses the views of Thomas Aquinas on the nature of contemplation, in part through engagement with the important recent work of Rik Van Nieuwenhowe. First, the article locates contemplation in the context of the foundational contrast between reasoning (ratio), on the one hand, and the grasp of truth by the intellect (intellectus), on the other. Second, the article asks whether Aquinas understands contemplation to be a special kind of act over and above the classic “three acts” of simple apprehension, judgement, and reasoning, or whether he includes it somewhere within that classic trio while distinguishing it in some other way. Third, after considering and rejecting the idea that what specifies contemplation is that its object is higher truth or highest truth, the article proposes a relational understanding of what makes a mental act contemplative: an act is contemplative or not depending on how it is related to other mental acts. Fourth, the article asks how contemplation can be simple. It then concludes with brief discussion of practical applications.
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