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Językoznawstwo baner

No. 2/19 (2023)

Articles

The theory of predictive processing and the problem of general abstract concepts from the perspective of cognitive linguistics

DOI: https://doi.org/10.25312/j.6248  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2023-12-18

Abstract

The contemporary embodiment paradigm in cognitive linguistics provides a valuable conceptual framework for explaining the grounding of concrete concepts but faces fundamental difficulties in explaining the mechanism of abstract concept formation (the so-called disembodiment problem of concepts). It has been increasingly pointed out that the solution to this difficulty lies in combining the embodiment paradigm with the theory of predictive processing. Although this theory aspires to be a general brain theory in the cognitive sciences, it has some limitations, albeit in explaining the salient features of general abstract concepts. The article analyzes the theory of predictive processing in terms of its ability to explain the composability, productivity, systematicity and generality of conceptual thinking. Despite the limitations pointed out in the article, predictive processing theory, combined with the embodied language paradigm, is a promising proposal within second-generation cognitivism.

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