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No. 2/23 (2025)

Articles

Paraphrasing philosophical questions

DOI: https://doi.org/10.25312/j.9776  [Google Scholar]
Published: 2025-06-17

Abstract

This paper examines the philosophical significance of merely posing a question. Drawing on erotetic logic,
particularly the work of Anna Brożek (2008), the author analyzes the cognitive structure of questions, focusing
on their presuppositions and resolvability. The paper argues that well-formulated questions, especially hypothetical ones can meaningfully guide philosophical and scientific inquiry by shaping research agendas and clarifying conceptual gaps. Further, the process of logical therapy and paraphrasing can transform vague
or semantically flawed questions into resolvable ones or demonstrate their unresolvability, both of which
are philosophically valuable. Through the lens of thinkers such as Ajdukiewicz, Collingwood, and Agassi,
the paper shows that questioning is not only foundational to philosophical methodology but can itself constitute a substantive contribution. Ultimately, the paper supports the thesis that simply asking a question can be a valuable contribution to philosophy.

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